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PREFACE
I began this study with the intention of concen­
trating on the American military intervention in the Dominican 
Republic during the Dominican Revolution of 1965. 1 soon
discovered that there already existed a vast body of litera­
ture on the intervention and on the events of the Revolution 
itself. Yet, most of the available material contained little 
background information and only an occasional, superficial 
examination of the underlying causes of the civil war. In 
addition, much of the writing reflected a strong preoccupation 
with the idea of constitutionalism as a cause of the Revolu­
tion. Such a preoccupation seemed strange indeed, in view 
of the fact that the Dominican constitutional tradition has 
been one of the most chaotic in all of Latin America. At this 
point, I became interested in determining whether or not 
constitutionalism had suddenly become a viable force in 
Dominican political life. I, therefore, decided to abandon 
my original idea of studying the intervention; and, instead,
I began to examine early and recent Dominican constitutional 
history. Surprisingly, my research led me to discover some 
of the many societal tensions which were at the root of the 
1965 crisis. My research also demonstrated that in the spring 
of 1965, despite the emphasis on constitutionalism, it was
ii
iii
human and social concerns, and not political ideology, which 
disposed Dominicans to resort to collective violence*
Many persons have helped me in this endeavor, but I 
especially want to thank Dr* Paul Beck for his helpful 
suggestions and patient assistance* Gratitude is also due 
Mrs* Betsy Laird, of the Inter-library Loan Office, for her 
many efforts on my behalf. I would also like to acknowledge 
my indebtedness to the Columbus Memorial Library of the Pan 
American Union in Washington, D.C.. The bibliographical 
material and the vast collection of Latin American books and 
periodicals at the Columbus Library were indispensable in the 
preparation of this study.
Omaha, Nebraska 
May 1971
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INTRODUCTION
Since the early days of the Spanish conquest, Dominicans 
have lived with chaos, poverty and instability* Once the 
administrative head of the Spanish new world empire, Santo 
Domingo*s initial prestige began to decline with the discovery 
of gold and silver in Mexico and Peru. Fewer than fifty years 
after its establishment, the little settlement at Santo 
Domingo found itself virtually abandoned. Even chroniclers 
did not bother to write anything about Santo Domingo^ first 
250 years. Few early records remain, and little is known 
except that the colony barely existed, and that only occasional 
attacks by pirates interrupted the monotony of life on the 
island*
From time to time, the English, Dutch, and French 
raided the colony. These raids, plus Spanish trade restric­
tions discouraged commerce and settlement* Even though the 
French part of the island flourished, the Spanish portion 
stagnated, sinking lower and lower. In 179^ Toussaint L1Over­
ture and the French colonial forces drove the Spanish out of 
Saint Domingue. Finally, the Treaty of Basle in 1795 forced 
the Spanish cession of Santo Domingo, and the entire island 
then passed under French control.
As a result, many of the Spanish colonists began to 
emigrate to neighboring Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Venezuela.
1
2Thus, began the first of many such migrations of prominent, 
white Spanish families. With them, also went most of the 
members of the Spanish religious orders. In the decade be­
ginning 1?959 Santo Domingo lost over one third of its 
population— the primary representatives of the country's 
wealth, education, and cultural tradition.*
The Haitians dominated Santo Domingo until 1809 when 
the Spanish colonists revolted and voluntarily re-incorporated 
themselves into the Spanish Empire. Unfortunately, Spanish 
rule did not end oppression; the recovery of the Spanish 
throne by King Ferdinand VII ushered in another period of 
subjugation. In 1821, Santo Domingo again revolted, this time, 
against Spain; and the leader of the independence movement,
Jose Nunez de Caceres, requested admittance into Simon 
Bolivar's newly formed Republic of Gran Colombia. Before the 
request could reach Bogota, Haiti's President, Jean Pierre 
Boyer, marched into Santo Domingo and forced the colony to 
submit to Haitian rule.
So began another period of degradation for the people 
of Santo Domingo, with many of them being killed or victimized 
by the occupation forces. When the Haitian government at­
tempted to turn the entire island into a negro state, the 
remaining white Spanish families and the Catholic clergy began
1
Juan Bosch, Trujillo: Causas de una tirania sin e.ienrplo 
(Caracas: Libreria Las Novedaaes, 19^9)> p. 71.
to depart. Haitian authorities encouraged this exodus since 
emigration would leave the Haitians free to expropriate the 
property of white landowners and the Catholic Church hierarchy* 
The Haitians occupied Santo Domingo from 1822 to 18*Mf, 
and the long years of barbarous rule brought further decline 
and economic ruin* Santo Domingo remained a primitive, rural
country which appeared to have been 0by-passed by the main-
2stream of history*9 Everyone who could, left; those who 
remained fought among themselves* By the eve of independence, 
poverty, anarchy, and unrest had become endemic*
Not all Dominicans passively accepted Haitian rule*
In I838 Juan Pablo Duarte, Rosario Sanchez, and Ramon Mella 
founded the Trinltarlos. a secret revolutionary organization 
working for liberation from the Haitians* On February 27,
18*j4, the Trinltarlos easily overcame their Haitian oppressors 
and proclaimed the independence of the Dominican Republic*
The long struggle for independence had lasted almost 
fifty years, but the new republic was ill-prepared for self- 
rule* Dominicans had never accumulated the experience and 
skills required for dealing with their social and political 
problems. Steeped in poverty, most of the people were illit­
erate peasants who barely subsisted and who never exercised 
a voice in their government* Their leaders came from the 
upper classes; but they, too, were untrained and lacked any
2Bosch, Truiillo: Causas. p. 70.
kind of administrative experience* Principally interested 
in personal power, the leaders grappled with each other and 
kept the country in a state of constant turmoil*
The political history of the entire nineteenth and 
most of the twentieth centuries was singularly divorced from 
issues of any kind* In its entire independent history, the 
single, most outstanding feature of Dominican politics has 
been the violence of political antagonism and the absence of 
differences of principle among the existing political parties. 
Personalities of the leaders, not ideology, dictated party 
divisions.
Prom 18M* to modem times, Dominican history has been 
a long record of the struggles of the caudillos who were "in" 
to retain their power, and those who were woutw to return to 
power.^ For almost a century, rival leaders and their fol­
lowers fought back and forth across the countryside, scrambling 
for executive or local control. However, the parties were not
•V
unalterably composed of the same individuals. The leaders, 
as well as the rank and file, continually drifted from one 
group to another, with a constant shuffling and reshuffling 
of political alliances.
•^ Latin Americans have a strong disposition for caudil­
los. The caudillo embodies the program of his political 
partisans; he is the platform of his party. This is what is 
called nersonalismo in Latin American Politics* See Charles 
E. Chapman, MThe Age of the Caudillos: A Chapter in Hispanic
American History,” Hispanic American Historical Review.
Vol. XII (August 1932), 281-300.
5Confrontations between opposing sides had nothing to 
do with differences over public policy. In the early days 
of the Republic, it appeared that Issues might be the basis 
for political alignments when the parties divided over the 
question of annexation or independence. The former Trini- 
tarios. led by Duarte, initially held power and were intent 
on maintaining the country's independence. General Pedro 
Santana, the first President, continued to fear Haitian in­
vasion; and, therefore, supported the idea of placing the 
republic under the protection of some major power. At first 
the annexationists were designated as “conservatives,* and 
those supporting complete independence were called “liberals." 
This division based on issues lasted only a short time. 
Following the exile of Duarte, parties seldom took clearly 
opposing positions. No designated group of men adhered per­
manently to any set views on the question of annexation. 
Instead, the party in power usually espoused the idea of 
annexation, while the opposition supported independence.
Before long, the annexationist party split, and 
Santana's followers became known as Santanistas. The other 
faction led by Colonel Buenaventura Baez were called Baecistas. 
Again nothing ideological distinguished the two new parties. 
Both groups were equally conservative, dictatorial and dedi­
cated to the idea of a foreign protector. The Dominican 
people continued as before, never knowing anything of politics
6based on political dialogue.**
Governments continued to rise and fall with frequent 
regularity as the Republic alternated between periods of 
anarchy and despotism. Occasionally, liberal leaders appeared, 
briefly established new parties based on ideology, and even 
managed to gain control of the government. However, these 
well-intentioned governments never retained power long enough 
to make a lasting impact. Instead, the squabble for leader­
ship continued as before with the two parties see-sawing in 
and out of power, only changing labels from time to time.
The Roios and Azules later replaced the Baecistas and the 
Santanistas. but only the names were altered.
For many years, Santana's fear of the Haitians per­
sisted, and in 1861, he finally succeeded in proclaiming the 
re-incorporation of the Dominican Republic as a part of the 
Spanish dominions. By 1865* the War of Restoration once again 
gave the Dominican people their independence, but the restor­
ation brought neither peace nor stability. For a time, from 
1882 to 1889, the dictator, General Ulises Heureaux, put an 
end to disorder; but he also brought the republic to the brink 
of bankruptcy.
By the turn of the century financial mismanagement had 
become chronic, and the Dominican Republic was hopelessly in
lL
Pedro Troncoso Sanchez, Estudios de Historia Politics 
Dominicana (Santo Domingo: R.R. Julio D. Postigo e hijos
Editores, 1968), p. 161.
7debt abroad. In 19059 when European creditors threatened to 
intervene in order to collect their debts, Theodore Roosevelt 
applied the famous Roosevelt Corollary and established a 
financial receivership. With precise efficiency, the United 
States agents proceeded to pay off the foreign bondholders 
and even created a treasury surplus. All went well until 
1911 when the assassination of President Ramon C ace res again 
plunged the nation into financial and political chaos. The 
United States then attempted to restore order by intervening 
in the political affairs of the nation. When an anti-United 
States faction revolted against the existing government in 
May 1916, President Woodrow Wilson sent in the United States 
marines and completely occupied the nation.
Prior to the United States intervention, the style of 
politics in the Dominican Republic remained the same— only 
the names of the leaders varied. In the twentieth century, 
Juan Isidro Jimenez and Horaeio Vasquez dominated the struggle 
for leadership. The earlier Ro.ios and Azules now became the 
Jimenistas and the Horacistas; and as before, they constantly 
changed groupings, moving back and forth from one party to 
another. Until the American occupation in 1916, politics 
followed the same rhythmic pattern— revolutions, declarations 
of support, battles, sieges of the capital, take-over, pro­
visional government, some form of legitimizing election- 
followed by dissension, counter-revolution and a complete 
renewal of the cycle.
8Constitutional history followed a parallel pattern. 
Despite elaborate constitutional provisions, constitutional 
processes never decided vital issues. Revolution and politics 
went hand in hand, and revolution became the accepted method 
of transferring power. Always the first act of a successful 
take-over was that of promulgating a new constitution in 
accordance with the ideas of the new leader. Each counter­
revolution brought with it the abrogation of one constitution 
and the establishment of another. In less than a century of 
independence, from 1844 to the time of Trujillo*s assassina­
tion in 1961, Dominicans promulgated twenty-seven constitutions 
and were governed by fifty presidents. In a certain period 
in the last third of the nineteenth century, eight constitu­
tional texts were approved in eight consecutive years--l874 
to 1881; three in the four years between 1865 and 1868. On 
three occasions— during the years 1854, 1858, and 1929— two 
constitutions were approved in the same year. Five times, 
constitutions previously abrogated were reinstated. Four 
presidents— Baez, Hereaux, Vasquez and Trujillo— promulgated 
more than one constitution during their terms. No constitu­
tion lasted more than ten years, but the most stable has been 
the first, that of 1844 which was modified in 1854.-*
^Jesus de Galindez, La Era de Trujillo (Santiago de 
Chile: Editorial del Pacifico, 195^)» P* 191*
9The number of constitutions is perhaps misleading 
because of the Dominican practice of promulgating new con­
stitutions instead of enacting amendments. The Dominican 
essayist Pedro Henriquez Urena declares that the Dominican 
Republic has had only two constitutions— the liberal one of 
1844 and the autocratic one of December 1854.^ The majority 
of the documents have been simple revisions of previous con­
stitutions with little substantive change.
The various Dominican presidents have always carefully 
followed constitutional forms, while at the same time utterly 
disregarding the sanctity of the constitution. Sumner Welles, 
in Naboth’s Vineyard, charges that "the twentieth century 
dawned in Santo Domingo without even the vestige of a tradi-
7
tion of constitutional government or practice.
What, then, does constitutional tradition mean to the 
Dominican people? Was Welles correct in saying that to the 
average Dominican * constitutional government is but an empty
Q
phrase?" Does the Dominican nation attach any importance 
to a formalized constitutional order? Has the Dominican 
Constitution ever been real in the sense that it is a
^Jesus de Galindez, La Era de Tru-iillo. p. 192.
^Sumner Welles. Naboth*s Vineyard: The Dominican
Republic. 1844 to 1924 (New York: Payson and Clark, 1928)
II, p. 902.
8Ibld., p. 904.
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fundamental law under which people are governed and under 
which their liberties are safeguarded? Or is the Constitu­
tion merely nominal? Karl Lowenstein defines a nominal 
constitution as one which is "merely a declaration of con­
stitutional intent, a blueprint which expects to become a 
reality in the future. Its habitat is in nations where
Western constitutionalism is implanted into a colonial and/
o
or agrarian feudal social structure."^
What is the reality of constitutionalism in the
Dominican Republic?
Jesus de Galindez notes that in Latin America the
people and their leaders instinctively revere the idea of a
constitution, but seldom do they apply its principles in
practice. Almost never is the constitution a basic document
under which people are governed. Usually, it is a program
of political action imposed by the predominant group. For
this reason, it changes as frequently as-governments come
and go. The constitution is not permanent; instead, each
new regime quickly writes into another constitution the
10methods and principles it cares to apply.
In his article dealing with Latin American con­
stitutions, J. L. Mecham asserts that Latin American
^Karl Lowenstein, "The Value of Constitutions in Our 
Revolutionary Age" in A. J. Zurcher, ed., Constitutions and 
Constitutional Trends Since World War II (2nd ed.) (New 
York: New York University Press, 1955)» p. 205*
10Galindez, La Era de Tru.llllo. p. 189.
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constitutional attitudes differ radically from those of 
Anglo America. To Anglo Americans the constitution is 
fundamental law and must be observed, while to Latin Ameri­
cans, it is in most cases merely a declaration of ideals 
and objectives. To Anglo Americans, the constitution is 
sacrosanct, for Anglo Americans prescribe to the principle 
of government by law. To Latin Americans, the constitution
is usually a useful and convenient guide and program which
11must bend to the principles of government by men.
Despite great discrepancies between constitutional 
principles and their application, Latin American nations 
still attach importance to a written formalized document. 
Constitutions serve a useful purpose since they describe the 
organization, structure and powers of the government, even 
though the constitution makers do not delude themselves that 
they are building upon achieved democracy. Even dictators 
feel the need to use constitutions to give an air of respect­
ability to their regimes.
The reality of Dominican constitutionalism has been 
much the same as that of other Latin American countries.
Early independence produced a constitution based on western 
political tradition, but in almost every case a caudillo 
emerged to carry on by force and authority what could not
11J. L. Mecham, "Latin American Constitutions:
Nominal and Real," Journal of Politics. Vol. XXI (May 1959)> 
258-75.
be arranged by compromise and cooperation. Most of the time, 
the Dominican Constitution has been an instrument for the 
attainment of power and for the preservation of special 
interests, Sumner Welles declared that "instead of being 
regarded as a sacred charter of the peoples* liberties, the
Constitution has been considered a • , , source of advantage
1 2to legitimize the caudillo's power." Other times the 
nation*s charter has been the written expression, in legal 
form, of that which has already been accomplished. Fre­
quently the Constitution has been used for propaganda value. 
At times it has served as a statement of goals, but seldom 
has it been an instrument for the pursuit of happiness for 
all of the people.
Only after the assassination of the dictator, Rafael 
Leonidas Trujillo, did Dominicans begin to look at their 
Constitution in a different light. By 1962 a newly awakened 
populace began to view the Constitution as more than a mere 
statement of goals. After the election of Juan Bosch as 
President, many Dominicans, who had previously been excluded 
from the political decision-making processes, began to think 
of the 1963 Constitution as an instrument which, at long 
last, could fulfill their personal aspirations. Unfortun­
ately, aspirations met frustrations when Juan Bosch and his
1 belles, Naboth*s Vineyard, p. 90^.
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reform constitution were overthrown in September of 1963*
In April 1965, the Dominican Republic erupted into 
bloody civil war. From the beginning, the rebels called 
themselves "constitutionalists" and the loyalists were 
called "anti-constitutionalists." The battle cry of the 
revolution was, "a return to constitutionalism with Juan 
Bosch and the Constitution of 1963."
After one hundred years of chaotic constitutional 
tradition, why were Dominicans suddenly willing to fight 
and die in the name of constitutionalism? Had the idea of 
a government based on fundamental law become a vital force 
in Dominican life?
To determine the answers to these questions, this 
work will briefly examine Dominican constitutional history 
and the role that constitutionalism has played in the past. 
This study will also deal with the Trujillo legacy, the 
rising expectations experienced by Dominicans after the 
dictator's assassination, and the influence of Juan Bosch 
on political attitudes. All of these facets of Dominican 
life have a direct bearing on the violence of April 1965*
It is also necessary to examine and compare the 
Constitutions of 1962 and 1963, along with the debates that 
centered around the draft Constitution of 1963* The enact­
ment of the Constitution of 1963 polarized Dominican society, 
but it must be pointed out that the constitutional dispute 
was only one of many causes which contributed to the
14
ultimate breakdown of the Dominican society.
To truly understand the failure of constitutional 
government in the Dominican Republic, one must probe deeply 
to look for the root causes. It Is necessary to consider 
the recurrent historical pattern of chaos, violence, and 
political and economic stagnation which have characterized 
Dominican life since before the days of independence. In 
addition, it is essential to keep in mind the destabilizing 
effects of earlier American interventions and the political 
bankruptcy bequeathed to Dominicans by the Trujillo dicta­
torship. Against this background of past failures, one must 
juxtapose the rising tide of expectations which Dominicans 
began to experience with the assassination of Trujillo.
In 1961, all Dominicans began to sense new possi­
bilities ahead. During the Trujillo regime, much of the 
populace had been made to feel a part of the nation. In the 
presidential election of 1962, Juan Boscb further aroused 
the political consciousness of the masses; but, even more 
important, he instilled in them a feeling of hope. At the 
same time, those groups and individuals who had gained 
positions of power and wealth during the Trujillo era be­
came acutely aware of their own vulnerability and were 
fearful of being displaced. The result was a situation in 
which fears clashed against rising hopes. These and other 
societal tensions manifested themselves as a struggle over 
the Constitution of 1963. In reality, however, the consti-
15
tutional dispute was merely a surface aspect of the deeper 
dissensions and fragmentation in the society. Most Domini­
cans knew nothing of constitutional concepts or ideological 
principles. Fundamentally, Dominicans contended with one 
another over basic human concerns. The deprived and ex­
cluded fought for improved social and economic benefits— a 
higher standard of living, opportunities for employment, a 
chance to educate their children. Opposing groups and 
individuals sought to gain personal power, to retain privi­
leges, or to preserve social, political, and economic 
positions previously attained.
This study will attempt to examine these human con­
cerns as well as the question of constitutionalism in order 
to determine the real sources of conflict in the Dominican 
Revolution.
CHAPTER I
DOMINICAN CONSTITUTIONS
Dominicans have lived under many constitutions. 
Colonial Spain initiated the constitutional process in 1812 
when the Dominicans voluntarily rejoined the Spanish Empire. 
The Spanish Regency brought the Dominicans under the juris­
diction of the Constitution of Cadiz and granted the 
Dominicans representation in the Spanish Assembly. In 1814-, 
the Spanish monarch, Ferdinand VII, regained the throne and 
immediately abrogated the Cadiz Constitution, ushering in an 
era of absolute rule and oppression for Spaniards and Domini­
cans alike.
When a revolution in Spain forced Ferdinand to 
restore the Constitution of 1812, the Dominican independence 
leader, Nunez de Caceres, seized the opportunity to proclaim 
the independence of "Spanish Haiti" on November 30» 1821. 
Caceres* Declaratory Act of December 1, 1821, outlining the 
provisional lines of the government he hoped to establish, 
reflected the influence of the "French Declaration of The 
Rights of Man."1 Unfortunately, Dominican hopes for
1Creat Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign 
State Pacers, 1830, Vol. VIII, "Dominica: The Declaratory
Act of 1821," p. 557.
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independence were short-lived, and a few months later, Haitian', 
armies once again marched across the Dominican border; thus,
*
preventing the application of the Caceres document.
During the Haitian occupation from 1822 to 1844, 
Dominicans were governed under two Haitian constitutions. 
Several prominent Dominicans, among them Buenaventura Baez, 
served in the Haitian Assembly and participated in the Haitian 
Constituent Assembly of 1843. At the same time, however, 
Dominicans plotted to free themselves from Haitian rule.
In 1844, upon the proclamation of the independence of 
the Dominican Republic, a Constitutional Convention met at 
San Cristobal and drafted the first Constitution of the Re­
public, the Constitution of 1844. Fashioned along the lines 
of the United States Constitution, the Dominican charter 
divided the functions of government into the classic execu­
tive, legislative and judicial branches, and announced that 
the government would be unitary, civil and,, representative, 
and would follow the presidential form.
The document empowered the Senate and Chamber of 
Representatives to enact legislation and to pass legislation 
over an executive veto. The President, who was to serve a 
four year term, would be ineligible for re-election. The 
Constitution granted him broad administrative and appointive 
powers, and he was to be assisted by ministers chosen by him, 
but subject to interpolation by Congress and the Provincial 
Governors.
18
The Constitution proclaimed that Dominicans are bora
"free and equal as regards their rights," and that slavery
2would be abolished forever. An elaborate statement of human 
rights guaranteed individual personal liberties such as pro­
tection during arrest and trial, freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and the right of petition. The document also 
guaranteed the inviolability of property, home, and corres­
pondence.
Roman Catholicism was declared the state religion, 
but there would be no privileges or fueros (trials of reli­
gious personnel by special ecclesiastical courts), no 
ecclesiastical ownership of property nor civil collection 
of Church revenue.
The first Dominican charter also established the 
principle of free elementary education.
By almost any standard, the Constitution of San 
Cristobal was liberal. In the 19th century, all of the 
constitutions of Latin America reflected the influence of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Western political tradition. 
Nevertheless, as Franklin J. Pichardo Franco points out in 
his book, La Republica Dominicana. Clases. Crisis y Com­
mandos . in Latin America there was a basic difference. In
Brit, and For. St. Papers. 1865, Vol. XLVI. 
"Dominica: Constitution of February 27, 1854," p. 1320.
Note: This provision is the same in both the 1844 Consti­
tution and the 1854 document. A complete copy of the 
original 1844 Constitution is not available.
19
the United States and Europe, this liberal spirit was the 
product of economic and social development and above all, 
the rise of the middle class* "In our country," Franco points 
out, "liberalism has always remained only a spirit and has 
never been tied to material reality."-^
The Constitution of 1844 proclaimed popular sover­
eignty, but it did not provide for popular suffrage. As 
Franco points out, the first Constitution contained a subtle 
mechanism which prevented participation by the masses in the 
political life of the country. Voting requirements disen­
franchised a large segment of the population by employing the 
complicated apparatus of an Electoral College composed of 
electors who were chosen by another body: The Primary Assem­
bly. Article 160 of the Constitution stated that in order 
to vote in the Primary Assembly, an individual must be "a 
landed proprietor, public employee, officer in the army or 
navy, have a patent for the exercise of some profession or
trade, be a professor of some science or liberal art, or be
4a renter of a farm in active cultivation."
The Constitution gave to the Primary Assemblies the 
duty of choosing from each commune, the electors who would 
form the Electoral College of the province. Article 163 then
■^Franklin J. Pichardo Franco, La Republica Dominic ana. 
Clases. Crisis y Commandos (Habana, Cuba: Casa de las
Americas, 1966), p. 148.
Brit. & For. St. Papers. Vol. XLVI, pp. 1322-23.
20
assigned to the Electoral College the function of electing 
the members of the Chamber of Representatives, the Chamber 
of the Senate, the members of the Court, and the President 
of the Republic. ^
Thus, from the very beginning, a small group of those 
who had been the most active participators in the fight for 
independence were able to defend the interests of their 
class and consolidate their power under the banner of the 
caudillo.Santana.
'' 4
The first Primary Assembly had chosen Santana as the 
first President of the Republic* On the premise that such 
a power was necessary to defend the Republic against Haitian 
encroachment, Santana forced Article 210 upon the Convention. 
This article, which has since been a part of almost every 
Dominican Constitution, stated that during a war the President 
could declare a wstate of siege,* and he could freely organ­
ize the army, mobilize the national guard* suspend all 
constitutional guarantees and privileges, or take any 
measure necessary for the defense and security of the nation. 
The President could give all orders and decrees without 
authorization from any other governmental body*
Ten years later, liberal forces, not satisfied with 
the first document, set out to reform it. A lengthy preamble 
to the Constitution of February 27, 185^, explained the 
specific purposes of the new provisions.
-’Brit. & For. St. Papers. Vol. XLVI, p. 1324-.
21
The new document eliminated Article 210, and in the 
preamble stated that in either war or peace the powers of 
the executive must always be exercised along constitutional 
lines* Further, the preamble emphasized that "having laid 
aside the almost dictatorial power conferred by Article 210, 
the Executive will apply to every social grievance the 
necessary remedy but must give Congress a detailed account 
of its proceedings."^
The February 185^ document instituted the office of 
Vice-President with the specific purpose of providing conti- 
nuity should the President die, resign, or be removed. "By 
this means the deplorable consequences of all mere temporary 
periods will be remedied, and the imminent dangers constantly 
threatening a headless . . .  government will be averted."'
In this way the writers of the revised Charter hoped to make 
future de facto revolutions impossible.
The February Constitution also re-organized the 
judiciary and made the Supreme Court more independent by 
stating that "no power of the State is competent ever to
g
invalidate the decisions of this supreme tribunal . . . ."
The new constitution even attempted to infuse more 
vigor into local governing bodies by assigning special powers 
to the corporations exercising municipal authority. The
6Brit. & For. St. Papers. Vol. XLVI, p. 1317.
7Ibid.. p. 1316. 8Ibia.. p. 1317.
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writers of the document stated that they hoped that in this 
manner the "citizen would early acquire a political educa- 
tion."9
This new liberal document, with its high hopes, lived 
only a brief life; for when Santana returned to the presi­
dency later that year, he imposed his autocratic Constitution 
of December 1, 185^. The Santana document sharply reduced 
individual rights, restricted the franchise even more, and 
made the Electoral College more indirect. It reduced the 
Congress to one house with no authority to enact laws without . 
executive approval. Santana added another article which 
further facilitated the aggrandizement of executive power. „ 
Article 35 of the December Constitution empowered the Presi­
dent to take all necessary action to preserve the country 
not only in time of war, but also in time of emergency. In 
addition, the December document provided that constitutional 
amendments would be in the hands of a constitutional conven­
tion to be convoked, not by the Congress, but by the 
President.1^
Thus began the pattern which has dominated Dominican 
constitutional life since independence. The two constitutions, 
the Constitution of San Cristobal of lSkk, amended in February
9Brit. & For. St. Papers. Vol. XLVI, p. 1318.
10Otto Schoenrich, Santo Domingo: A Country With a
Future (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918)» P* 52.
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1854, and Santana's Constitution of December 1, 1854, became 
the basis for all future constitutions. Constitutions, like 
the caudillos. see-sawed in and out of existence, and Domini­
can constitutional history mirrored its political history: 
numerous interruptions in the constitutional life with the 
constant abrogation of one document and the re-instatement 
of another.
Though there were variations, the pattern always 
remained the same. Occasionally, liberal leaders succeeded 
in gaining power, at which time they proceeded to further 
liberalize the 1844 Constitution. Such was the Moca Consti­
tution of February 19, 1858. This document instituted direct 
election by secret ballot, of all elective officials except
the national Senators. This same charter abolished the death
11penalty for political crimes. As usual, the Moca Constitu­
tion lasted only a brief period though it was reinstated 
again on January 24, 1865 when Dominicans$ for the last time, 
proclaimed their independence from Spain. The 1865 document 
introduced universal manhood suffrage and extended the secret 
ballot for all elective offices. This continued to be the 
basic liberal constitutional form until the American occupa­
tion in 1916. Later constitutions such as the one of March 24, 
1874, while retaining Homan Catholicism as the official re­
ligion, established religious toleration. Subsequent
11Brit. & For. St. Papers. 1866, Vol. XLV1II. 
"Dominica: The Constitution of 1858," p. 1071*
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constitutions added freedom of teaching and abolition of the 
death penalty to the bill of rights.
Such a recitation of liberal provisions might lead one 
to believe that Dominicans were governed by an enlightened 
fundamental law. The trend toward liberalization was not 
consistent; rather, it was alternately liberal and autocratic. 
Between the promulgation of the liberal documents, the auto­
cratic Constitution of December 1854 was reinstated on 
September 27* 1858; April 19* 1866; April 23* 1868; and 
September 14, 1872. The Constitution of July 28, 1879 re­
duced individual rights, restricted the franchise and made 
the electoral system more indirect. The Constitution of 
November 23* 1881, once again empowered the president uni­
laterally to assume all constitutional authority in time of 
emergency. It militarized regional and local governments by 
providing for combined civil and military governors and local 
rule by an army commandant. This document did, however, 
retain most previously established rights, direct elections 
and universal manhood suffrage. The Constitution of Novem­
ber 15* 1887* differed only in that it reverted to indirect 
election. The Constitutions of June 12, 1896, and May 21, 
1903* were all modeled on that of 1887.
The only substantial twentieth-century changes were 
found in the Constitutions of June 11, 1907* and February 22, 
1908. Using the United States as a model, the 1908 document 
provided that the Congress be renewed in three parts, and
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the Chamber of Deputies was to be renewed by one-half every 
two years. The 1908 document retained indirect election and 
abolished the vice-presidency.
By 1916, the American military occupation suspended 
all constitutional authority and placed Dominicans under 
martial rule. Upon withdrawal of the United States military 
forces ten years later, Dominicans once again wrote a new 
Constitution which was promulgated on June 13, 1924. It 
reinstated the vice-presidency and a direct electoral system, 
abolished the renewal of Congress in parts, and it disen- 
franchised members of the armed forces and the police. 
Subsequent constitutions remained essentially unaltered ’ 
until the second Constitution of the Trujillo period.
Thus ended the first period of Dominican constitution­
alism. Tracing and following its tortuous path is difficult 
indeed, but one certain pattern emerges— the pattern of 
constantly recurring instability. General Rafael Leonidas 
Trujillo was soon to impose order and end this pattern, but 
at an extremely high cost to the Dominican people.
Constitutionalism Under Tru.iillo
During the thirty years of the Trujillo dictatorship, 
the Constitution no longer remained the instrument of privi­
lege and self-interest for caudillos and their followers. 
Instead the Constitution served only one person: General
Trujillo. A look at constitutionalism under his dictatorship
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will reveal the many ways in which Trujillo twisted the 
Dominican Constitution to serve his own ends*
In 1924, following the withdrawal of the American 
occupation, Horacio Vasquez was elected President and brought 
a few years of relative freedom and order to the Dominican 
Republic. In March 1930, the Vice-President, Rafael Estrella 
Urena, launched a revolution against Vasquez, who by that 
time was weak and ailing. General Trujillo, who now con-, 
trolled the nation1s army, refused to defend the Vasquez,? . 
regime. Vasquez resigned, and Trujillo, pushing Urena aside, 
proclaimed himself a presidential candidate. On May 16, 1930, 
Trujillo won the Presidency without opposition.
Trujillo put an end to political disturbances, but 
continued the practice of promulgating new constitutions. He 
governed under four different documents, all of which were 
basically the same.12 His Constitution of June 19, 1934 did 
not visibly change the earlier 1924 document. On January 10, 
1942, Trujillo enacted his second constitution which enfran­
chised women, eliminated the vice-presidency and broadened 
individual rights pertaining to social welfare. The Consti­
tution of 1947, essentially a restatement of its predecessor,
12Texts of the Trujillo constitutions may be found as 
follows: June 12, 1934, Brit, and For. St. Papers, 1939* Vol. 
CXXXVII, p. 421; Constitution of January 10, 1942, Ibid., 1952
V. CXLIV, p. 1136. January 10, 1947, R. H. Fitzgibbon, The 
Constitutions of America (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1946), p. 299* December 1, 1955, Pau American Union, 
Constitution of the Dominican Republic (Washington, D.C.:
1955).
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added more social welfare provisions, proclaimed freedom of 
education, and made primary instruction obligatory and sub­
ject to the supervision of the state*
The Constitution of 1955 further expanded welfare
provisions; made it obligatory for illiterates to be educated; 
required the state to act for the improvement of housing and 
working conditions; and pledged state assistance to the 
dependent elderly and poor* The 1955 Constitution also pro­
hibited the maintenance of programs or doctrines affiliated
with Communism and praised Trujillo as "The Father of His
Country."
Article 11 of the 1955 Constitution contained a new 
feature in the form of Concordat between the Holy See and 
the Dominican Republic "in accordance with the Law of God 
and the Catholic tradition of the Dominican Republic.1 Signed 
in 195^» the Concordat with the Vatican was held to govern 
Church-State relations, and it granted vast concessions to 
the Church.
On the surface, none of the Trujillo constitutions 
seemed ill-conceived. All continued to assert the principle 
of civil, republican, democratic and representative govern­
ment. In appearance Trujillo governed the Dominican Republic 
constitutionally with a structure similar to any typical 
Western democracy. There was, however, no relationship 
between the written precepts and the practical realities.
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Once in office, Trujillo established control over the 
entire governmental apparatus. First and foremost, he 
bolstered his control through the power of the armed forces.
In addition, Trujillo used the Dominican Constitution as 
another of his principal vehicles for wielding autocratic 
authority.
Trujillo ruled absolutely, but always within a consti­
tutional framework. Above all, he maintained the external 
forms of democratic rule and appeared to observe them 
meticulously. Trujillo followed the Constitution to the 
letter, but the letter was one thing and its daily application 
quite another. The Constitution was a facade which hid the 
excesses of his dictatorship and masked his absolutism. In
the words of Jesus de Galindez, constitutionalism under
1 ^Trujillo was a "parody." J
Since 1844 when Santana added Article 210, almost all 
Dominican constitutions have granted wide“emergency powers 
to the chief executive. Article 49 of the Constitution
empowered the President, in case of disturbance of the public
peace, to decree a state of siege and suspend individual
rights. Nevertheless, it was not the authority to rule by
decree which was the chief source of Trujillo*s power. The
1^Galindez, La Era de Trujillo, p. 189*
^The Constitution of 1949* Unless otherwise speci­
fied, all citations of the Trujillo constitutions will refer 
to the text of the 1949 document.
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real mechanism of control during the Trujillo dictatorship 
was the facade of constitutional democracy which he adopted 
and presented to the outside world; while, at the same time, 
perverting all of the guarantees and safeguards set forth 
in the Dominican charter.
Numerous illustrations may be cited to demonstrate 
the ways in which Trujillo made the Constitution a vehicle 
for absolute control. For example, Title I of the Constitu­
tion states that the government is divided into three 
branches, each being independent in its respective functions. 
All of the functions are meticulously spelled out. In 
addition, all local and national officials were to be 
directly elected for a period of five years. This was the 
letter of the Constitution; the reality was another matter. 
Three branches, each independent of the other never existed 
during the Trujillo regime, nor was any official actually 
elected for a period of five years. Only-the individual 
power of Trujillo existed--a power which he derived through 
his role as chief of the Partido Dominicano. It was through 
the party that Trujillo found his most effective machinery 
for the total domination of the Dominican political system.
Trujillo registered his Partido Dominicano with the 
Central Election Board on March 11, 1932, and the party 
statutes were the perfect vehicle for the manipulation of
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Dominican society.Everything was concentrated in the hands 
of the Chief of the Party. The statutes established branches 
in every community and province. The Chief of the Party, 
directly or indirectly appointed all local, provincial or 
national officials. All decisions and nominations were sub­
ject to his approval. He named all paid employees, authorized 
all expenses and had legal authority to interpret the statutes 
as he wished.
The Partido Dominicano was not confined to a few 
important followers of Trujillo. It was a mass organization, 
and almost anyone who was important belonged. No one in 
public, professional,or business life could survive outside 
the party.
Moreover, in actual practice, the party became a part 
of the official government. The Chairman of its Central 
Committee served as one of the Secretaries of State. The 
expenses of the party and the cost of its programs were met 
by a flat 10 per cent deduction from paychecks of all members. 
If the members were employed by the government, the Treasury
l fiwithheld the deductions.
1 *5<For the text of the statutes of the Partido Domini­
cano. see Jose F. Penson, El Partido Dominicano (Ciudad 
Trujillo: Imprenta Arte y Cine, 1958)> PP* 68-74.
1 6Hobert D. Crassweller, Tru.iillo: The Life and Times
of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1966), p. 99.
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It was through this party machinery that Trujillo 
exercised his political power. But the key to understanding 
Trujillo*s total centralization of authority is found in the 
Dominican Constitution itself. Article 16 of the Constitution 
states that
When vacancies of Senators or Deputies occur, 
they will be filled by the corresponding Chamber, 
which will choose the substitute from the panel 
presented by the appropriate organization of the 
political party to which the Senator or Deputy 
who gave rise to the vacancy belonged.
This provision fit in perfectly with Article 39 of the
statutes of the Partido Dominicano. Here was Trujillo^ most
powerful weapon. Article 39 requires that "all elected
officials deliver written but undated resignations to the
17Chief of the Party upon election.n 1
The Partido Dominicano, of course, was the only party, 
and Trujillo was the Chief of that party. He kept those 
unsigned resignations in his desk. If a legislator or a judge 
or any other office-holder defied the party line, he could 
expect to wake up the next morning and read of his resigna­
tion in the newspaper. Trujillo applied this device to every 
elective and appointive office in the nation. No person or 
branch of government was independent. There was no guarantee 
that an elected official would serve out his constitutional 
term.
1 ^ Franco, Crisis y Commandos, p. 153»
32
Legislators rubber stamped legislation, never attempt­
ing to oppose Trujillo^ decisions. The Supreme Court, too, 
was theoretically an independent branch of the government and 
had the power of judicial review. Jesus de Galindez, though 
he states that he cannot give exact documentation, charges 
that Dominican tribunals did not dare to make decisions that 
criticized the constitutionality or the legality of laws 
approved by the Congress or actions taken by the government. 
The outward appearance of a co-equal three branched govern­
ment was nothing more, argues Galindez, "than a masquerade
18 . hcovering an obedient court and congress.w The key, of 
course, to this obedience was the unsigned resignation in 
accordance with the statutes of the Partido Dominicano.
In addition to nullifying the independence of the 
three branches of government, Trujillo perverted the Consti­
tution in other ways. The Constitution provided for elections 
under the supervision of a Central Electoral Board and in 
accordance with the principles that the law and the Consti­
tution indicated, but Trujillo falsified returns or 
manipulated them to further his own ends.
In addition, Trujillo did not hesitate to revise the 
Constitution to strengthen his personal economic powers or 
to give himself special powers for the benefit of his private
18Galindez, La Era de Trujillo, p. 199*
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or family affairs. In 1959 Trujillo added a modification to 
the 1955 Constitution, Article 107* which said that the 
property of persons who exercised the office of President 
or Vice-President, as well as their widows or heirs, shall 
have the highest protection of the State. In no case could 
the President or Vice-President be subject to prosecution, 
restrictions, expropriation or dispossession, total or
19partial, of any part of his public or private authority.
And so, the mockery continued. For any meaningful 
provision of the Constitution, Trujillo used the technique 
of perverting the application to his ends. Though he placed 
little value on the precepts of the Constitution and never 
vacillated in modifying it to remove obstacles which stood 
in his way, he was always careful to give a constitutional 
appearance to even the most minimum details. The will of 
Trujillo was omnipotent but always artfully concealed under 
constitutional trappings. Such methods had a profound effect 
on the later political life of the Dominican people.
1^Franco, Crisis y Commandos, p. 156.
CHAPTER II
THE SETTING
"Pero un regimen politico no es un hecho 
aislado sino el fruto del arbol nacional. 
Es en las raices del arbol donde hay que 
buscar la razon de que el fruto sea sano 
o enfermo.w Juan Bosch1
The Ghost of Tru.iillo
Thirty years of the Trujillo dictatorship reshaped
the character of Dominican society and profoundly altered
the socio-economic structure. These far-reaching changes
brought with them a legacy which contributed in "a major way
to the disorder, frustration and chaos of the post-Trujillo
period and ultimately to the 1965 breakdown of the system
2into revolution and civil war."
In order to understand why Trujillo was able to 
transform Dominican society, it is necessary to return to 
1916 and the American military occupation which ended the
Juan Bosch, Tru.iillo: Causas. p. 12. Translation:
WA political regime is not an isolated fact, but the fruit 
of the national tree. One must look at the roots of the tree 
to determine whether the fruit will be healthy or diseased."
2
Howard J. Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development: The
Methods of Control in Trujillo*s Dominican Republic (Gaines- 
ville, Florida: The University of Florida Press, 1968),
P. 193*
3^
long period of caudillo politics. Several aspects of that 
period distinguish the history of the Dominican Republic from 
that of most other Latin American countries. It was these 
differences which help to account for the ease with which 
Trujillo came to dominate Dominican society. It is essential 
to note that at the time that the United States established 
military control in the Dominican Republic, the traditional 
triad of "oligarchy," "church," and "military" did not domin­
ate Dominican society. Dominican social history differs from 
that of most Hispanic nations in that Spanish control and 
influence was neither continuous nor strong. In addition, 
the repeated large scale emigrations of important landholders 
and the Catholic clergy, plus the complete absence of a 
unified military force, prevented the consolidation of a 
ruling elite.
Examination will reveal that throughout its inde­
pendent history, the Dominican Republic hajs lacked a powerful 
oligarchy. With the first Spanish withdrawal in 1795* many 
of the elite families began their series of emigrations from 
Santo Domingo. Successive Haitian occupations further 
diminished the Spanish population,and most of the important 
white families were either killed or fled. The exodus of 
these more prosperous and educated members of the society 
precluded the emergence of a group of large and powerful 
landowners. Furthermore, political disorders prevented the 
growth of commerce and industry as an alternative source of
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wealth* In the nineteenth century a small group of pres­
tigious families emerged at the top, tout their influence was 
primarily social and did not rest on an economic base. Thus, 
the elite families were not wealthy or powerful; but were, 
instead, "insecure and unable to exert political control.
In addition, the Church, though powerful had not been 
the strong we11-entrenched force that it has been in other 
Latin American countries. It, too, had been weakened by the 
Spanish withdrawal in 1795 • After 1822, Haitian occupation 
authorities deliberately tried to destroy what was left of 
the Church as an institution by expropriating property and 
deporting priests. Since that time, the Church had never
h,
regained its wealth or power.
Last, and most significant, before the American occu­
pation, the Dominican Republic had not developed a national
■^Abraham P. Lowenthal, "The Dominican Republic: The
Politics of Chaos," reprinted from Reform and Revolution, 
edited by A.von Lazar and R.R. Kaufman (Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 
1969) by the Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C., 1969)*
For more on the oligarchy see Wiarda, Dictatorship and 
Development, p. 99; Macio Antonio Mejia Ricart, Las clases 
sociales en Santo Domingo (Ciudad Trujillo: Liberia Domini-
cana, 1953)» PP• 23-24; Juan Isidro Jiraenez-Grullon, "Est- 
ructura de Nuestra Oligarqhia," Listin Diario. December 12, 
1964, p. 7; Juan Bosch, Trujillo: Causas de una tirania sin 
ejemplo, pp. 56-71«
^See Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development, p. 144; 
Wiarda, "The Changing Political Orientation of the Catholic 
Church in the Dominican Republic," A Journal of Church and 
State. VII, Spring 1965, 238-254; Juan P. Pepen, La Cruz  ^
senala el camino: influencia de la iglesia en la formacion y 
conservacion de la naclonalldad dominicana (Ciudad Trujillo: 
Editorial Duarte, 1954); William Louis Wipfler, The Churches 
of the Dominican Republic in the Light of History (Cuernavaca, 
Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentacion, 1966).
military institution. Shortly after the Spanish coloniza­
tion, the Haitians began their long occupation of Santo 
Domingo. While neighboring countries fought their wars of 
national independence, in Santo Domingo, rival bands and 1 
their caudillos fought among themselves. When the Dominicans 
finally prepared to oust the Haitians in 18^, Haitian 
strength had declined to a low level; and it was not neces­
sary to muster a strong unified military force. With only 
the help of the caudillos and their followers, the revolu­
tionaries easily overcame the Haitians. After independence,
the military chiefs once again split into small bands whose
<
members were loyal only to their respective leaders.^
Hence, contrary to the accepted opinion in almost 
every piece of writing on the Dominican Republic, a powerful 
triad of oligarchy, church and military did not control 
politics and the economy. Instead, as Abraham Lowenthal 
insists, "the Dominican scene could be described as exactly 
the reverse: an insecure grouping of elite families, a weak
^Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican 
Republic and Nicaragua: Progency and Legacy of the United 
States Intervention (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1962); Luis F . Mejia, De Lills a Tru.iillo: Historia 
contemporanea de la Reoubllca Dominicana (Caracas: 194*0. 
p. 1^7: Sumner Welles. Naboth*s Vineyard: Max Henriques 
Urena, Los Estados Unidos y la Renublica dominicana: la 
verdad de los hechos. comprobado nor datos y documentos 
oficiales (Havana: Imprente El Siglo XX, 1919)•
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£
and dependent church and no national military institution*" 
Thus, as Lowenthal points out, "a power vacuum existed which 
was filled by the continuous, virtually unchecked struggles 
of caudillos and their a d h e r e n t s * B y  1916, the United 
States, fearing that its security and financial institutions 
were threatened, thought it necessary to intervene with a 
military occupation. This total intervention had a crucial 
bearing on the future history of the Dominican Republic and 
especially on Trujillo and the armed forces*
Attributing the turmoil to the lack of a national 
military institution, the United States set about organizing 
a non-partisan National Constabulary* Before the intervention,
This is the approach taken by Abraham Lowenthal in 
his essay, "The Dominican Republic; The Politics of Chaos." 
Lowenthal expresses his personal dissatisfaction with the 
available literature on the Dominican Republic* He explains 
that while working in the Dominican Republic as a Ford Foun­
dation Training Associate from 1964 to 1966, he experienced
first-hand many of the events others have ‘discussed in print. 
Reading various published accounts, he found it difficult to
match his own perceptions and those of Dominican friends
with what he found in most of the available literature on 
the Dominican Republic.
Lowenthal also challenges the discussion of Latin 
American History in terras of the supposed triad of "oligarchy, 
church and military." He charges that this "conventional 
approach," which has been espoused by writers such as Frank 
Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America and James Bryce, South 
America: Observations and Impressions. is "being discarded
bit by bit," as sociologists examine the area's history and 
current situation.
I wish to express my indebtedness to Lowenthal for
this line of reasoning. This work will not attempt to sup­
port or refute Lowenthal's assertions in regard to other Latin
American countries; however, my own research tends to support
Lowenthal*s opinion on the role of the "triad" in Dominican
history.
7
1Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p* 53*
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the Dominican military establishments were fragmented and 
inept. Power was divided between the national government and 
the provincial governors and was easily accessible to the 
members of the warring political factions.
With the organization of the Constabulary, the United 
States introduced a new power factor into the politics of 
the Dominican Republic. United States officers of the inter­
vention replaced the traditional elites in government, and 
provincial rulers were stripped of their military power.
Enraged by such intervention, members of the elite refused 
to serve as officers, little realizing that they were for­
feiting their already weakened political power. The United 
States military government found it necessary to call upon 
new social elements to fill the officer corp of the Constabu­
lary. Representative of this social change was the middle-
8class officer, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.
The result of the United States intervention was the 
centralization, unification and modernization of the Dominican 
armed forces. By organizing a relatively stable institution 
in a society totally lacking in firmly-rooted institutions, 
the United States authorities helped make it possible for the 
head of the newly established military force, General Trujillo, 
to seize power and to retain control for thirty years.
Q
Trujillo's father was a small, not very successful, 
businessman.
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In assessing the far-reaching effects of the American
intervention, Marvin Goldwert, in his monograph on the Con- '
stabulary, asserts that
. . .  viewed in retrospect, the Constabulary 
policy represented a tragic simplification of *
the causes of Latin American instability and 
chronic militarism. The broad chasm between 
democratic forms and political and socio-econom­
ic realities in the Dominican Republic doomed q 
the non-partisan constabulary from the outset.
The newly centralized, unified, and modernized Constabulary,
after the withdrawal of the marines, quickly became converted
: V
into an instrument for the rise and consolidation of the 
dictatorship of Trujillo. This same military apparatus be­
came the chief buttress of Trujillo*s power and made it 
possible for him to maintain absolute and monolithic control.
Once in power, Trujillo*s system of domination 
reached into every aspect of Dominican life. Howard Wiarda 
points out that Trujillo was not the typical caudillo. In­
stead he used the techniques of the modern totalitarian state. 
His near monopoly over national life allowed him to control 
the day-to-day existence of the entire population, and Min 
so controlling the Dominican society, he completely trans­
formed its structure.*110
q
^Goldwert, The Constabulary. p. vi*
10Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development, p. 195*
No longer was the Dominican Republic a country ruled 
by regional caudillos squabbling over local spoils. Trujillo 
performed the function of a unifying dictator. Before 1930# 
the Dominican Republic was a collection of separate towns
•vjr. ■
and villages immersed in local and personal political con­
flicts. Trujillo built roads, improved transportation, and 
modernized communication by creating a powerful radio network 
At the same time, previously isolated elements were beginning 
to be uprooted, mobilized and organized. The entire society 
became more complex. Trujillo destroyed most of the old 
order, but as new groups arose, he kept them subjugated. No 
group or individual was ever allowed to wield any influence.
When Trujillo came to power, poverty and illiteracy 
were widespread; the economy was exclusively agricultural. 
Trujillo*s rule began the transition to modernity and ended 
the country*s semi-feudal order. Trujillo also performed the 
function of an economic nationalist. On behalf of himself 
or his family, he purchased foreign holdings and brought most 
of the national wealth into Dominican hands. He thereby 
transformed the pattern of the economy, and upon his death 
most of his personal holdings plus the holdings of the state 
became public patrimony. As a result of the assumption by 
the state of ownership of all the properties of the Trujillo 
family, the Dominican Republic in 1968 had a higher percent­
age of its Gross National Product in the public sector than
bz
any country in the hemisphere except socialist Cuba.*1 These 
holdings were tremendous and the stakes involved later be­
came one of the chief sources of conflict during the Bosch
12regime and the Revolution of 1965*
Even though such economic activity was chiefly for his 
own ends, Trujillo brought capitalism and industrial develop­
ment to the Dominican Republic* He began or expanded many 
industries, notably those concerned with producing flour, 
peanut oil, cement, paper and glass. Between 1936 and 1956, 
the industrial work force expanded four times; electric pro- 
duction multiplied fifteen times. J The import-export pattern 
changed from regional to national. Santo Domingo became the 
commercial and financial administrative center of the country.
Industrialization brought rapid urbanization, an 
expansion of governmental activities, and the emergence of 
new social groups.
11Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p.
12Official sources revealed that Trujillo^ share of 
the national wealth had amounted to the following: bank
deposits, 22#; money in circulation, 25#; sugar production, 
63#; cement, 63#; paper, 73#; paint, 86#; cigarettes, 71#; 
milk, 85#; wheat and flour, 68#; plus the nation^ only air­
line, its leading newspapers, and the three principal radio 
and television stations. Hispanic American Report. XV:1114 
(Events of December 1962).
^ 1 figures taken from Dominican Government publication
21 Anos de Estadlsticas Dominicanos (Ciudad Trujillo 1957) 
show the industrial work force in 1936 to have been 20,301; 
in 1956 it was 75*000. Electricity production was 13*4 mil­
lion KW in 1936; 20**. 5 million KW in 1956. The Dominican 
Republic^ total population during this period barely doubled.
**3
In fact, by the time of Trujillo's death, the Domin­
ican power structure had been completely altered. The 
military was no longer the haven for the second sons of the 
elite. Because the elite had shunned the Constabulary, 
military officers were now coming from the middle rather 
than the upper classes. The old local leaders who decided 
policy and put presidents into office had long ago been sub­
jugated by Trujillo. Moreover, Trujillo stripped the 
traditional elites of the remainder of their waning strength. 
Because the elites had excluded him from membership in their 
social clubs, Trujillo deliberately set out to destroy the 
power of the "first families." He expropriated much of the 
remaining property of the elites and forced them into exile 
or economic impotence. By 1961 the elites--about 5 per cent 
of the population— remained a closed social aristocracy, with 
local prestige but with no capacity for political action.
On the other hand, many of Trujillo's followers 
managed to accumulate great personal wealth or obtain high 
military or governmental positions. Thus, just below the 
traditional elites, there emerged an upper class of new rich, 
whose members held great economic and political power al­
though they did not have distinguished family backgrounds. 
Many of the business community were recent immigrants.
Between the new rich and the lower classes, an 
embryonic middle sector began to develop. For the first 
time, increased agricultural production under Trujillo
****
generated enough income to support a commercial and. pro­
fessional class consisting of salaried urban clerks and 
department heads, white-collar workers, small business men, 
professionals, teachers,and lesser government officials.
The base of society continued to be the masses of
poor, largely illiterate, peasants, sharecroppers,and day
laborers. Slightly above them but still considered a part
of the lower classes were those with jobs in industry or
commerce, small tenant farmers,and owners of tiny plots of
land. During the Trujillo regime, the lot of the lower
classes remained unchanged except that many of the rural poor
migrated to the cities, thereby creating an urban proletar- ,
1 **iate.
During the Trujillo era, Dominican society had changed 
and had become increasingly mobile. Nevertheless, though 
many had gained wealth and new social positions, not any 
person or group shared power with Trujillo. Political parti­
cipation had expanded and Dominicans had been made to feel a 
part of the nation, but there were no organizations for their 
participation. Political parties other than Trujillo's had 
been forbidden. From 1930 to 1961 Trujillo exercised near 
absolute control over all aspects of the social, political,
1 **On social stratification see Wiarda, Dictatorship 
and Development: Mejia, Las clases sociales: Manuel Troncoso 
de la Concha, "La clase media en Santo Domingo," Materiales 
para el estudio de la clase media en America Latina. IV 
(Washington, D.C. : Union Panamericana, 1950) .
military, economic, educational, and intellectual life.  ^ ^.
Because of the total control concentrated in his hands,. 
Trujillo's death produced a complete vacuum. .
■ *■ *
No group institution or individual could begin to fill
the void. Trujillo brought the Dominican Republic into the
twentieth century, but he had never given Dominicans any
experience in democratic methods and procedures. He had not
provided even the most minimum institutional strength which
might have facilitated an orderly transition after his death.
When John Bartlow Martin, the American Ambassador sent by
the Kennedy Administration, arrived in the Dominican Republic
in 1962, he summed up the situation when he said that
. . .  there was simply nothing here to build 
upon— no government, no labor unions, no free 
civic association, no men experienced in govern­
ment (they were dead, in jail, or in exile), no 
money, no work, no going economy, no civil service, 
no democratic traditions, nothing.^5
The socio-economic groups of the country were deeply 
divided. The rural peasantry remained isolated, unorganized 
and inarticulate. The urban labor forces had not been per­
mitted to form unions. Parties and interest associations 
were weak, and all sectors of the society competed to fill 
the leadership vacuum.
^John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events: The
Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Tru.iillo to the Civil War 
(New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966}, p. 196.
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At the time of Trujillo's death, Max Frankel, writing 
in the New York Times, observed,
The 69 year-old Generalissimo, who ruled for 
thirty-one years, left more than a power vacuum 
in his capital. In the Dominican Republic he has 
left an ideological void, a people unaccustomed 
to governing themselves and unschooled in any 
political doctrine except the jungle doctrine 
that the strongest shall rule.1®
Especially, Trujillo's method of observing forms while 
committing brutal and monstrous acts, his practice of rais­
ing men from obscurity to power and eliminating them in 
disgrace, had left a deeply engrained and all-persuasive 
negative attitude in the Dominican people and had a lasting 
effect on the conduct of Dominican politics. Following 
Trujillo's death,the people were cynical and skeptical about 
public activities. Abraham Lowenthal speculates that "per­
haps the most corrupting effect of the Trujillo period on
the Dominican policy has been the development of this set
17of attitudes." f Building a democratic institutional 
structure based on trust and loyalty would be difficult 
indeed.
Such was the legacy that Trujillo bequeathed to the 
Dominican people.
*^New York Times. June 4, 1961, p. 4.
17{Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p. 56.
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Hunger and Hope
“Since I am so poor, I need a house and 
some money, because I am suffering terrible 
hunger• There are days when we don't even 
eat at all . . . ."18 1
Paradoxically, at the same time that Dominicans were 
growing increasingly skeptical, the death of Trujillo 
brought a wave of optimism, and Dominicans began to exper- 
ience a rising tide of expectations• By 1962 they began to 
identify the attainment of their social and economic aspir­
ations with the fulfillment of political values expressed 
in their many constitutions*
Throughout their troubled history, the Dominican 
people and leaders held fast to the ideals expressed in their 
charters although fulfillment had not once been achieved.
The tragic history of continuous failure and frustration had 
left the Dominican people disappointed; but despite their 
unfruitful experiences, they gave no thought to replacing 
their values with radically different substitutes* Pew 
Dominicans understood democracy and the institutions through 
which it actually worked, but all seemed to be aware of the 
benefits it had brought to the people of the United States. 
They believed deeply that the establishment of democracy in
18Lloyd A. Free, Attitudes, Hopes and Fears of the 
Dominican People (Princeton, N. J.: Institute for Inter­
national Social Research, 1965), 9*
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their own country would somehow alleviate the poverty, pri­
vation and stagnation in their own society*
This attitude is dramatically demonstrated in the 
results of Lloyd Free's public opinion survey taken in April 
1962. In answer to the question:
We are clearly entering a new era in our country's 
history in which there will be an opportunity to 
choose a new governmental system and a way of 
life . . .  is there any country which comes to 
mind in this connection • • • which has a politi­
cal system and a way of life that you admire and 
would like to see followed?
sixty-five per cent answered that they wanted a system modeled
on that of the United States.1^
The extent to which Dominicans equated political
values with social and economic aspirations can also be seen
in Free's survey. When asked “What really matters in your
own life and what are your wishes and hopes for the future?"
seventy-two per cent wanted an improved standard of living
for self or family, sufficient money to 1-ive better or to
live decently; make ends meet and to have relief from poverty
and want. When asked about their chief worries, seventy-six
per cent mentioned deterioration or inadequate standard of
living, poverty, etc.^
Whether expressed as aspirations or as fears, these
lists of personal preoccupations demonstrate the potential
^Free, Attitudes, p. 3« 
20Ibid.. pp. 7-8.
appeal of political platforms or programs having to do with 
housing, landownership, employment, public health, and edu­
cation. The figures show that of all the issues, the greatest 
in the mind of most Dominicans was that of improved living * 
standards. But even more significant was the fact that 
Dominicans identified improved living standards not only as 
a personal but as a national problem. Free felt that this 
indicated that the “revolution in rising expectations had 
taken hold in the Dominican Republic in a form which had 
political meaning for the society as a whole." The Dominicans 
appeared to view economic betterment as a national political 
problem to be solved by the Dominican government. Free 
believed that "this high degree of political awareness in
itself, constituted a potentially explosive factor in an
21already surcharged situation."
Free suggested that even more fraught with danger were 
the answers to questions asking Dominicans to rate themselves 
on a ladder in regard to where they thought they personally 
stood five years ago, in 1962, and where they would stand in 
the future. According to the answers given, clearly the 
Dominicans as a whole had no sense whatever of personal pro­
gress from past to present. Irrespective of the factor of 
the lack of personal progress, all socio-economic groups felt 
that they were badly off. The lowest personal rating that
21 Free, Attitudes, p. 13*
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the polltakers had ever recorded was a ^.6 among Brazilians*
*, 22The Dominicans rated themselves at 1*6* ^
Mr* Free speculated that perhaps the intensity of *
frustration was the result of earlier widespread expectations
that the overthrow of Trujillo would usher in the "era of the
promised land*w The writers of the survey indicated in
strong language that / ;
whatever all the factors may be, we feel confident 
in alleging that an extremely serious situation of 
popular discontent and frustration, fraught with 
a dangerous potential for upheaval, exists in the 
Dominican Republic* Never have we seen the danger 
signal so unmistakably clear.^3 ^ .
Nevertheless the survey also showed that there still
appeared to be hope for the future as evidenced by the
optimism of most of the participants.
One of those who sensed the popular frustration, but
still felt optimistic about the future, was Juan Bosch, who 
had recently returned to the Dominican Republic to participate 
in the elections of 1962. It would be impossible to discuss 
constitutional government in the Dominican Republic in 1962 
and 1963 without also discussing Juan Bosch.
22Free, Attitudes, p. 15 
23Ibid.. p. 17.
CHAPTER III
JUAN BOSCH _ s
Juan Bosch1s election to the presidency in 1962 
precipitated an irrepressible conflict which began with the 
drafting of his reform Constitution of 1963.
When Bosch arrived in the Dominican Republic in 1961 
shortly after the May 30 assassination of Trujillo, Joaquim 
Balaguer still retained his post as President, the same 
position he held during the Trujillo regime. Freed from 
Trujillo's control, Balaguer tried to build popular support 
by reducing the price of basic goods, increasing freedom of 
expression, allowing formation of opposition parties and 
permitting exiled leaders to return. Nevertheless, he was 
unable to maintain support and resigned after a few months.
A seven man Council of State (Conse.io de Estado) , which was 
to serve as an interim government, replaced Balaguer.
On September 16, 1962, the Council of State enacted a 
new constitution which remained in effect until the promul­
gation of Bosch's 1963 Constitution. Transitory provisions 
of the 1962 document called for national elections to be held 
on December 20, 1962. Those provisions also instructed the 
Council to call for the election of representatives to a 
Constitutional Revisionary Assembly and provided that
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candidates elected to the National Congress would also serve 
as delegates to the Assembly.
Most of the provisions of the September 1962 Constitu­
tion were identical to those in the last Trujillo Constitution 
except that the praise of Trujillo and the prohibition against 
Communism had been omitted. The Concordat between Church and 
State was left in tact. The only substantial changes dealt 
with new additions to the social welfare and human rights 
sections. Among these was the right to expropriate Tru.lil- 
lista property.1
In mechanics and formal pronouncements, the 1962 
Constitution appeared to be adequate. However, in the period 
following the fall of the dictatorship, many Dominicans looked 
upon the Constitution as a reminder and a symbol of the 
Trujillo tyranny. That document brought to mind not only the 
Trujillo constitutional abuses, but also the terror, corrup­
tion and oppression of the entire Trujillo era. These 
connotations soon became a source of growing resentment. 
Moreover, in the minds of many people, the 1962 Constitution 
was identified with the Council of State, a moderately con­
servative business oriented group. This group was closely 
associated with the National Civic Union Party (Union Nacional, 
Civica) (UNC) to which most of the Council members belonged.
The Constitution of the Dominican Republic. 1962 
(Washington, D.C.: The Pan American Union, 196*0Title 2,
sec. 9* This article will be discussed more fully in the 
next chapter.
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The Council of State was not a reactionary group 
controlled by the oligarchy as some maintained. It had " 
initiated a good many reforms though it had avoided basic 
reforms which might change the status quo or the economic^
' . i
political, or social order. Nonetheless, those who wanted 
active reform disdained the Council as being oligarchic and 
Tru.iillista. Others merely felt that the Council had not 
moved fast enough in this time of rising demands. Thus, a 
good many reform groups and individuals placed the blame for 
lack of reform on the Constitution of 1962. Perhaps, more 
than any other person, Juan Bosch was responsible for the new 
demand for constitutional change.
To understand the conflicts that developed around the 
Constitutions of 1962 and 1963» it is necessary to understand 
the role played by Juan Bosch and his Partido Revolucionario 
Dominicano (Revolutionary Dominican Party) (PRD).
Juan Bosch was fifty-three years oJLd when he returned 
to the Dominican Republic after 26 years of exile. A writer 
and political scientist, who was largely self educated,
Bosch was born in La Vega, the son of a Catalonian builder 
and a Puerto Rican mother. In his early years, he had made 
some effort to come to terms with Trujillo, but after 1937* 
he went into exile, actively opposing the dictator. He spent 
some of his time in Costa Rica, Venezuela, Puerto Rico and 
the United States. During 19 years of his exile he lived in 
Cuba, but he left in I960, convinced that Fidel Castro had
51*
- . \, /
betrayed the Cuban Revolution, While in Cuba in 1939 > Bosch7 d 
founded the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD)• rr \ J
The PRD was a non-Communist leftist organization based
on the same ideology as the Cuban Revolutionary Party ^
(Autentico), the Accion Democratica of Venezuela, and the
Popular Party of Puerto Rico. These were parties appealing
to large dispossessed masses with promises of greater parti-.
cipation in the economic and social life of the country,
greater freedom from internal dictatorships, and independence
2from imperialistic international control,
Bosch believed that the PRD could solve many of his 
country's difficulties. Fiercely proud of his Dominican 
nationality and imbued with a deep love of country, Bosch 
often brooded over his nation's problems. In his book, Un­
finished Experiment, he described his feelings:
My poor country— from its first day of life as 
a republic, it had a multitude of political leaders 
who dedicated their capacity and strength to look­
ing for a mother country to which to surrender our 
independence . . . .  I suffered in my living flesh 
. . . .  In my infancy, I had seen lowered from 
public buildings the Dominican flag in order to 
hoist in its place the flag of North America, and 
no one could imagine what that meant to my little 
soul of seven years . . . .  The man of today 
comes pre-figured in the child of yesterday • • • •
I can be sure that at the age of ten I felt ashamed 
that Santana, who annexed the Republic to Spain in 
1863, and Baez, who wanted to surrender to the 
United States were Dominicans . . . .  As I passed
2
Jose A. Moreno, Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo
Domingo (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1970), p. 16.
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through those years, that pain and that shame 
were converted into a Dominican passion . • . 
when I was called to be the leader of a political 
party . . .  I took good care to always conduct 
myself as a Dominican who had pride in his *
nationality.3
Upon his return to the Dominican Republic, Bosch was 
determined not only to make his PRD a force in Dominican 
politics, but also to educate the masses and to communicate 
to them his pride in the Dominican nation.
Returning to participate in the elections of 1962,
Bosch arrived at an auspicious moment. Free elections in the
Dominican Republic were an unprecedented event. Since 1844,
in thirty-two presidential elections, only four were free,
4and only two were conducted by direct popular vote. Great 
expectations were in the air!
Prior to the election campaign, Bosch and his PRD 
were practically unknown. The Union Givica Nacional (UNO) 
and the Fourteenth of June Movement (1J4) had captured most 
of the interest of the politically minded. The UNC was the 
party in power after the ouster of Balaguer, and many of its 
members had been closely connected with Trujillo. The Four­
teenth of June Movement was composed of young, strongly 
nationalistic revolutionaries who had operated underground
^Juan Bosch, The Unfinished Experiment (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), P* 162. This book was first 
published in Mexico in 1964 under the title Crisis de la 
Democracia de America in La Republlca Dominicana.
4Moreno, Barrios, p. 17.
since Trujillo's suppression of the Castro-supported invasion
!&>■of the Dominican Republic in 1959. These two divergent r
t-
parties often cooperated with each other. By 1962, however, 
the two parties split,and the UNC became the party of the 
right. As late as 1962, the UNC was alleged to have harbored 
some members of the Communist party.^ The 1J4 became the 
party of the extreme left although most of its members were 
from the upper middle class.
When Bosch became the candidate of the PRD, he took a, 
completely new approach to Dominican politics. Directing his 
attention to the masses, he discussed problems on a national 
level. Bosch believed that his chief task was that of 
developing a political awareness among the lower classes.
The PRD immediately set out to build a party organization.
The leaders devoted themselves to setting up committees in 
rural areas and urban neighborhoods, municipalities and 
provinces. They also spoke on the radio and organized 
rallies.^
Slowly and patiently, Bosch himself tried to educate 
the people by talking to them almost every day on the radio. 
Using simple language they could understand, he tried to 
instruct them in the ways of democracy and the rule of law.
^Theodore Draper, "The Roots of the Dominican Crisis," 
The New Leader. May 24, 1965, p. 4.
^Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 72.
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He talked to them about such things as: What is democracy,
and how does it function? What are the economic problems 
of the Dominican Republic? How is Dominican society organ-
4-
ized?^
"In speaking of democracy,* Bosch wrote in his book,
"I explained what a constitution is and what laws are, how 
the separate powers of the government function and are inter­
related, how and why people vote, and what a political party
O
is." Bosch also spoke to them about economic problems--such 
things as balance of payments, foreign exchange, the dif­
ference between foreign and domestic markets.
In talking to them about the organization of Dominican 
society, he told them that the masses were and always had 
been subjugated by a minority. He used the term "tutompotes." 
a Dominican colloquialism meaning "big shot," to describe 
the upper class. For this, he was often accused of inciting 
class conflicts.
Above all, Bosch emphasized that he and the PRD wanted 
to be not a party of distinguished people, but rather a party 
of the great popular masses; and from the first he and the 
PRD went after the masses. In describing his approach, he 
said that
^Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 85* 
3Ibld.. p. 78.
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• . . it would have been foolish to have tried to
win over the people with money. There was not
enough money in the world to give each of them 
what they needed. But it was not foolish to con­
vince them that they had the right to be given 
the opportunity to obtain what they need.”
The PRD's slogans of "Dignity against Money* and "Land 
and Dignity" attracted the intellectual and the landless 
peasant alike. At the same time, according to Bosch1s book, 
the PRD gained more and more people from the lower-middle
class. "Our strategy was to go out after the masses . . .
■ )
who also pulled in a sizable part of the lower stratum of 
the lower middle class. And in the wake of the latter would 
come a few of the middle stratum."1^
No one doubted that Bosch1s strategy had worked. His 
electoral sweep was tremendous. The official vote showed 
that he had received 619»^91 votes out of a total of 1,05^,9^  
cast— 58 per cent. His opponent Viriato Fiallo of the UNC 
received 317,327 votes— 30*08 per cent. The Social Christian 
candidate who came in third polled only 5*8 per cent of the 
total.11
After the election the American Ambassador, John
Bartlow Martin, wrote that
. . .  clearly, Bosch's mandate was overwhelming.
He had the votes of the campesinos. of the dis­
placed campesinos in the cities . . .  of
^Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 78.
10Ibld.. p. 74.
11Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 306.
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Trujillistas, of Castro/Communists ^”who had 
been urged by the party not to vote in the * -; .
electionJ  and of the relatives of soldiers ‘
and the police--of nearly everyone • • • • k.
In ray opinion, the vote showed the existence *
in this Republic of a deep and powerful . ; ;
revolutionary current.
•-A 1 . * *
These people wanted a better life, and Bosch somehow 
convinced them he would give it to them. But from the be­
ginning, Bosch excited controversy. The London Times 
described Bosch as "the type of President the country needs, 
free of jingoism, anxious to attract foreign investment, \
IQ *. -
serious about land reforms." J \
Ambassador Martin, despite a close friendship with 
Bosch, often worried about Bosch's ability to govern the 
country. In speaking of Bosch's personality, Martin said that 
Bosch was brilliant but unstable and reckless, that he was 
complicated and moody, a "concealed man with few friends • • • 
arrogant and vain and streaked with martyrdom." Martin 
asserted that "throughout his tenure Bosch feared plots dark 
as the inside of a cave. His was a dark and conspiratorial 
mind," a quality which Martin thought might be essential to a 
man trying to survive exile and politics but not necessarily
lli
helpful to a President.
12Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 306.
-^ Hispanic American Report. XV, no. 12 (Events of 
December 19^2), p. 1113.
1 it , ,
Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 3^*
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* *
Dan Kurzraan, a newspaper man who reported the Civil 
War of 1965, viewed Bosch from a different point of view ^ 
when he noted that
...
Not even his best friends derived comfort '4
from his tendency to react emotionally and some­
times irrationally to situations requiring 
coolness and a tough skin . . . . But if Bosch ^ ;
lacked a tolerant spirit, he did not vent his 
intolerance in violence, force, or dictatorship.
He refused to let his bitterness and prejudice 
dilute his moral convictions or sway him from 
the path of democracy.*5
It must be emphasized that Bosch's temperament was 
typically Dominican. J. B. Hernandez, writing in the Domini­
can newspaper El Carribe. said that "if anyone from Alaska 
asked me to define our national temperament, I would answer
one word: tropical. Our manner of being is like the weather
16and atmosphere that surrounds our island."
Ambassador Martin, himself, admitted that "vanity,
pride, posturing, rigidity, hopelessly grandiose dreams,
volitility and instability, an almost child like refusal to
assume responsibility: these were flaws in Bosch's character
17as they were flaws in the Dominican character." 1
*^Dan Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1965)> p. 97.
1 El Carribe. Feb. 18, 1963, p. 6.
17'Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 71o.
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At the same time that the Dominicans elected Bosch as 
president, they also selected the members of a Revisionary 
Constitutional Assembly. According to the law that governed 
the election, the new Congressmen would also make up the 
Revisionary Assembly. If that body had not completed its 
task by February 27, 1963, their alternates would serve in 
the Chamber of Deputies until the Congressmen had finished 
the revision of the Constitution. In January 1963, the first 
free assembly in thirty-three years met to write a new 
constitution.
Although the banner of Bosch's movement was political 
democracy, in his campaign he had emphasized a program of 
social and economic reform. He pledged a revolution, but a 
peaceful one; therefore, it appeared almost certain that the 
Constitution would be revolutionary. Speaking to the people 
in a homecoming speech, Bosch declared that "the people voted 
for a democratic revolution" and that this, revolution cannot 
be given to them if "we do not have a revolutionary Consti­
tution." Again and again he emphasized this same approach. 
“The Dominican Republic is forging a new image. . . .  This
national image must be engraved now in their Constitution.
11 18
• •
The delegates to the Revisionary Assembly, predomin­
ately PRD members, interpreted their victory as a mandate 
to carry out Bosch's reforms.
18Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 325*
CHAPTER IV
* .. K'\,
THE CONSTITUTIONS OP 1962 and 1963 ' " ^
The Constitutional Revisionary Assembly completed its 
work on April 29, 1963. United States Supreme Court Justice 
William O. Douglas assisted in the preparation of the new * 
Dominican fundamental law. The 1963 document embodied many 
of the principles of previous documents, and in regard to 
mechanics and organization of government, the 1962 and 1963 
Constitutions did not differ fundamentally.
As in most earlier constitutions, both announce that 
the government is essentially civil, republican, democratic, 
and representative; and that the government is divided into 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. These three 
branches are independent in the exercise of their respective 
functions.1
Both the 1962 and the 1963 Constitutions expressly 
state that sovereignty resides inherently in the Dominican 
people, and both documents are explicit on the principle of 
non-inte rvent i on.
The Constitution of the Dominican Republic. 1962 
(Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1965).
Constitucion de la Reoublica Dominicana. 1963 (Santo 
Domingo: Ministerio de Educacion, Bellas Artes y Cultos,
1963). All citations from the text of the Constitution of 
1963 are translated from the Spanish by the present writer.
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The 1962 Constitution provides for a President and a 
Vice-President elected every four years by direct vote. The 
President cannot immediately be re-elected. The President 
is Commander of the armed forces. The enumerated powers of ^
t. ■"'
the President include appointing and removing cabinet and 
sub-cabinet officials, promulgating laws and regulations, 
ensuring collection of revenues, declaring a state of siege 
and also declaring a state of national emergency in case of 
grave danger when Congress is not in session. He is also 
empowered to make contracts, control the armed forces, defend 
the country, prohibit entry of and expel undesirable aliens, 
and grant pardons. The President and Vice-President may not 
resign except before the National Congress.
The powers of the Executive under the 1963 Constitu­
tion do not differ substantially from those of the 1962 
Constitution except that under the 1962 document, the 
functioning of the ministries is regulated by law; whereas, 
under the later one, this power is given to the Executive.
The 1962 Constitution provides for a Senate and a 
Chamber of Deputies elected by direct vote every four years, 
with alternates for Senators and Deputies. Exclusive powers 
of the Senate include electing judges of the Supreme Court 
and of inferior courts and trying impeachments. The Chamber 
of Deputies has the sole power to impeach public officials. 
The Chamber and Senate constitute the National Assembly, 
which is largely ceremonial in that each chamber operates
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independently of the other. Both constitutions empower the 
Congress to levy taxes, approve or reject the budget, create 
or abolish political divisions, declare a state of siege or 
national emergency, create or abolish the courts, approve or 
reject requests for extraordinary expenditure, grant loans, 
and approve or reject treaties. The Congress also has the 
power to interpellate ministers on authorization of* the 
President, approve and reject contracts submitted by the 
President and legislate on all matters not within the compe­
tence of another branch of the government or contrary to the 
Constitution.
Regarding congressional powers, the 1963 Constitution 
differs only in that the Congress is specifically empowered 
to refuse to authorize loans made by the executive power 
against the credit of the nation. In addition, Congress may 
interpellate ministers on its own authority, and may author­
ize or refuse to authorize the alienation.of real property 
by municipal governments.
The 1962 Constitution establishes a Supreme Court of 
at least seven justices, the Chief Justice to be named by 
the Senate. Its exclusive jurisdictions include actions 
involving the President and Vice-President, members of the 
Congress, ministers, judges, and diplomats; hearing appeals 
of causation; and acting as ultimate court of appeal.
The 1963 Constitution differs only in that it pro­
vides for nine Supreme Court Justices. Other provisions
regarding the Supreme Court are virtually unchanged. - . ,,v
The 1962 Constitution provides that laws contrary'to 
it are null and void and forbids retroactive effects of laws 
unless favorable. „ V'
Both the 1962 and 1963 Constitutions divide the •’ T 
country into municipalities and the National District. There 
are no provincial legislatures,and the governors are ap­
pointed by the President. Both constitutions provide for 
popular election of the municipal councils, which in theory 
have some degree of autonomy; but both the 1962 and 1963 
documents provide that autonomy might be restricted by 
statute.
Both the 1962 and 1963 documents provide that the 
Constitution may be amended if a proposal is presented in 
the Congress, supported by one-third of the members of either 
chamber or if it is submitted by the executive power. A law 
declaring the need for amendment must be passed by a two- 
thirds vote in each chamber.
It is evident that the newly completed 1963 Consti­
tution did not alter the form of government nor the 
organizational pattern of its institutions. Indeed, in 
mechanics, the 1963 document did not differ fundamentally 
from that of 1962 or any other previous Dominican charter. 
Moreover, with a few exceptions, most of the individual 
rights in both the 1962 and 1963 Constitutions are the same 
as those which Dominicans began to include as far back as
1 8 ^  in their first Constitution. *
The 1962 Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience 
and worship; freedom of association; and freedom of expres­
sion without censorship, with the latter right subject to 
penalties for persons who threaten the honor of individuals, 
the social order, or the public peace. Also guaranteed are 
freedom from arbitrary imprisonment, double jeopardy, and 
self-incrimination. The 1963 Constitution has an amplified 
list of individual rights including freedom of belief and 
conscience, association, speech, movement within and without 
the Republic, and access to the courts. The 1963 Constitution 
also forbids military arrest and imprisonment and deportation.
Dominican constitutions often make religious pro­
nouncements. Earlier, Trujillo established a Concordat with 
the Holy See, which was continued in the 1962 Constitution:
wTITLE III 
Concordat”
Article 11. Relations between the Church and 
the State are regulated by the Concordat between 
the Holy See and the Dominican Republic, in ac­
cordance with the law of God and the Catholic 
tradition of the Dominican Republic.
The 1963 Constitution makes no mention of the Concordat.
In addition to organizing the government and enumer­
ating individual rights, both constitutions did not ignore 
the social role of the government. Both the 1962 and 1963 
Constitutions expanded social welfare pronouncements.
When the Council of State enacted the Constitution of 
1962, the Council enlarged the already existing social welfare 
section of the Trujillo document. Trujillo had introduced 
several provisions based on the assumption that the govern­
ment should regulate social and economic affairs in an effort 
to achieve social justice. But, of course, to Trujillo, 
constitutions were mere facades: therefore, he was neverjf
concerned with implementing his welfare provisions.
The Council of State recognized that it is the duty 
of the state to promote social welfare, but in the 1962 
Constitution the role of the state is generally passive. 
Primary stress is on the role of the individual. The preface 
to the Human Rights section of the 1962 Constitution announces 
the aims of the state, but not the extent to which the govern­
ment will participate in achieving those aims. However, the 
words "maintenance," "protection,” "improve himself,” indi­
cate the general philosophy of the 1962 Constitution.
"TITLE II 
Human Rights”
Article 8. The effective protection of the 
rights of the human being and the creation and 
maintenance of the means which will permit him to 
improve himself JTItalics mine 7 progressively 
within a system of individual liberty and social 
justice, compatible with public order, the general 
well-being and the rights of all, are recognized 
as the principal aims of the State. In order to 
guarantee the accomplishment of these aims the 
following standards are set:
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The 1962 Constitution affirms freedom of work and * 
encourages the establishment of proper working conditions, 
but there is no definite commitment to go beyond minimum
o ,'■ ■ *
protections.  ^ v
Article 8.
(3) Freedom of work. The law shall, as required 
by the general interest, establish the maxi­
mum working day, days of rest and vacations, v 
minimum wages and salaries and their forms 
of payment, social security, the partici­
pation of nationals in all work, and in 
general all provisions for State protection 
and assistance for workers that may be con­
sidered necessary. ,
The 1962 Constitution deals with a number of other 
economic rights, all of which support the idea of social 
security as a protection against unemployment, sickness, 
disability, and old age. The 1962 document also offers 
paternalistic protection to the elderly and assistance to the
poor:
Article 8.
(15) The State shall continue the progressive 
development of social security so that one 
day every person shall enjoy adequate pro­
tection against unemployment, sickness, 
disability, and old age.
(16) The State shall offer its protection and 
assistance to old people in a manner 
determined by law, in order that their 
health shall be preserved and their well­
being ensured.
(17) The State shall offer social assistance to 
the poor. This attention shall consist of 
food, clothing, and insofar as possible, 
adequate housing.
69
The Human Rights section of the 1962 Constitution 
affirms the right of freedom of enterprise and prohibits 
private monopolies:
Article 8. ?
(^ ) Freedom of enterprise* Monopolies may be 
established only in favor of the State or 
State institutions. The creation and 
organization of these monopolies shall be 
done by decree-law of the executive power*
The 1962 Constitution contains a provision protecting 
the right to own property. This is the original Trujillo 
provision, modified in 1962 to give the state the right to 
use confiscated Trujillo property to "repair the moral and 
material damage" done by the dictatorship* This section also 
establishes procedures for agrarian reform:
Article 8*
(9) The right to own property* This, however, 
may be taken over for a duly justified 
reason of public benefit or social interest, 
and after fair compensation. In cases of 
public disaster compensation need not be 
paid in advance. A general confiscation 
of property is prohibited, except as punish­
ment of persons guilty of treason or 
espionage in behalf of an enemy during a 
time of legitimate defense against a 
foreign state or guilty of abuse or 
usurpation of power or of any public 
functions for purposes of enriching them­
selves or others. In these last cases the 
property acquired by the State through 
confiscation ordered by law will have first 
priority as means of repairing the moral 
and material damage caused by the usurpa­
tion or abuse of power or public function.
The law may establish special procedures 
for acquisition by the State of areas or 
portions of rural lands that may be needed 
for introducing and developing adequate 
systems or agrarian reforms, in which case 
the same law shall regulate the form of 
indemnity or compensation*
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Continuing a principle established in earlier Domin 
ican constutitons, the 1962 document declares it is the 
duty of the state to guarantee free, compulsory elementary 
education: ••/, •': I*
Article 8.
(6) Freedom of education. Elementary education
shall be compulsory for children of school * 
age and for all those who for diverse reasons - * 
have not previously been able to enjoy this 
right. It is hereby declared a duty of the • 
State to furnish a basic education to all 
inhabitants of the national territory and 
to take the necessary steps to eliminate or > 
prevent the reappearance of illiteracy. •
Both elementary education and the education 
offered in vocational, art, commercial, 
manual arts, and home economics schools 
shall be free. These duties of the State 
presume on the part of persons inhabiting 
the territory of the Republic the correla­
tive obligation of attending the educational 
institutions of the country in order to 
acquire at least an elementary education.
The State shall strive for the widest pos­
sible dissemination of science and culture, 
thus adequately facilitating all persons 
to benefit from the results of scientific 
progress.
The 1962 document takes a special interest in the 
family and announces broad protection for mothers and 
children. The state also encourages the establishment of 
the family homestead:
Article 8.
(14-) With the aim of strengthening its stability 
sind well-being, its moral, religious, and 
cultural life, the family shall receive the 
broadest possible protection from the State.
The law shall provide the necessary means 
for protecting maternity and, in particular, 
mothers, during a reasonable period before 
sind after childbirth. One of the principal
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objectives of the social policy of the State 
is declared to be the constant reduction of 
infant mortality and a sound development of 
children. The establishment of the family 
"homestead** (bien de familial is also 
declared to be of high social interest.
The State shall encourage family savings 
and the establishment of credit, producer, v- 7 
distribution, and consumer cooperatives 
and any others that may be useful.
In addition, the Constitution of 1962 provides for 
property agreements between husband and wife. However, the
1962 document does not mention divorce:
Article 8.
(19) Husband and wife may freely arrive at 
their marriage agreements or elect any 
system adopted by law, which shall always 
establish the system of separation of 
property and prescribe what shall govern 
in the absence of special provisions, the 
following characteristics being understood 
to be inherent in this system of separation 
of property: (a) that each spouse shall
retain the ownership, administration, 
enjoyment, and free disposition of his or 
her property; (b) that any renunciation by 
the wife of the right to recover the adminis­
tration of her property which she had entrusted 
to her husband is void; and (c). if after ten 
years of a marriage under separation of 
property, one of the spouses dies, his or 
her creditors, heirs, legatees, or successors 
may not, for any reason, initiate any action 
against the surviving spouse for the resti­
tution or return of property.
When the Revisionary Assembly met, they incorporated 
most of the preceding welfare pronouncements into the new
1963 document; but in addition, to expanding social rights, 
the 1963 Constitution directs the state toward a stronger, 
affirmative role. Juan Bosch had charged the Assembly with
the task of writing a revolutionary constitution. To the
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majority of the delegates to the Assembly, the existing 1962 
Constitution had not gone far enough. A comparison of the 
social welfare provisions of the two constitutions will reveal 
sharp philosophical differences. It was these differences  ^
which led to the overthrow of the Bosch government in Septem­
ber of 1963 and ultimately became a contributing cause of 
violent conflict in the Revolution of 1965.
*
Though both the 1962 and 1963 documents affirm human 
rights and the dignity of man, the 1963 Constitution does 
not conceive of these rights as limited to the individual, but 
considers them as social and economic in their ramifications. 
Human rights are affirmed by stressing social goals and their 
implementation. In the 1963 document, emphasis is always 
on the state as the agent who will guarantee social rights. 
Moreover, not only must the state take a larger role in using 
its positive powers, the 1963 Constitution explicitly requires 
that the government exercise its responsibility. The 1963 
Constitution specifically charges the state to use its power, 
not merely to promote. but to guarantee the welfare of 
society and the individual.
Primarily the 1962 Constitution concerns itself with 
the organization of government, while the 1963 document con- , 
centrates on the organization of society. The basic divergence 
in the two constitutions lies in the attitude of each toward 
the way in which society should be organized and to the 
degree of authority given to the state for carrying out the
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nation's goals. In this respect, a wide gap exists between 
the two documents. ,  ^ ^
Dominicans have written twenty-seven constitutions,  ^
all of them basically the same; but the 1963 RevisionaryI 
Assembly created a constitution which differs radically from 
all earlier documents. Although unchanged in mechanical 
forms, the philosophic content is a wide departure from all 
previous Dominican charters. By adopting a completely new 
attitude toward the role of the state, the Assembly created 
a totally new constitution. Even the format and arrangement , 
had been altered. In all previous constitutions, the opening 
statement customarily begins with a description of the nation 
and its government. The 1963 document opens with a statement 
of "Fundamental Principles" and four pages of social welfare 
declarations, each one stressing the rights of society over 
the rights of property and the individual. Even the order 
is significant. Those articles dealing with the right to 
work, to social security, to organize and conduct strikes 
are followed, rather than preceded, by the rights of initia­
tive and property. Above all, the 1963 Constitution outlines 
goals for society and makes sweeping proposals for social 
change.
To understand and evaluate the disputes which later 
arose over the Constitution of 1963» it is necessary to look 
at the controversial portions. The 1963 Constitution begins 
with a statement of fundamental principles which set the tone
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for the entire document* Throughout, the emphasis' is always 
on such words as "guarantee," "Public Power," "social*needs, 
and "duty of the state," At once the 1963 Constitution
declares its aims: v 6
" ■ '■"
"FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES”
Article 1* The basic ends of Public Power are:
(a) to protect human dignity and promote and 
guarantee its respect;
(b) to work toward the elimination of the 
obstacles of the social and economic order which 
limit the equality and the liberty of Dominicans ; 
and which oppose the development of human per- • , 
sonality and the effective participation of all
in the political, economic, and social organiza­
tion of the country*
The 1963 Constitution establishes a new attitude of 
the state toward the function of work, when it announces 
that the principal existence of the Dominican nation is in 
work:
Article 2*
The existence of the Dominican nation is 
principally in work. Work is declared to be 
the primary base of its social, political, and 
economic organization and it is established as 
the inevitable obligation of all Dominicans*
Therefore:
(a) The right of work is recognized for all 
persons, and the State is obligated to promote 
and guarantee the conditions which are indis- 
pensible for making the exercise of this right 
effective.
(b) It is the duty of every citizen to 
develop, through his own selection and his own 
abilities, an activity or function that con­
tributes to the material and spiritual progress 
of the nation.
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(c) Mendicity and vagrancy, and any other - • , 
social vices which are opposed to the consecra- 
tion of work as a fundamental principle of the ’ , c r 
existence of the nation, is declared a public i ^
calamity. ^
V * "
The 1963 Constitution proclaims the right of private
initiative, but makes it clear that such a right must be
subordinate to the public good. . * t ‘
Article 3. Freedom of private initiative is 
declared. Nevertheless, it cannot be exercised 
to the prejudice of human liberty, dignity or 
security. The law will determine the measures 
and controls necessary to insure a complete 
compatibility between private economic effec­
tiveness and social interests. \ :
Article For the general norm, property must 
serve the progress and welfare of society.
In the announcement of fundamental principles, public
officials are prohibited from using their positions for
personal gain:
Article 5. It is declared a crime against the 
people to remove public funds, take advantage of 
positions inside the organization of the State, 
its dependencies, or its autonomous entities, or 
to obtain illegal economic advantages for personal 
gain.
It is also a crime for persons in the same 
position to deliberately distribute economic 
advantages to his associates, family, friends, 
and relatives.
The same law shall be applied to accomplices.
The law requires restriction of illicit appro­
priations. 2
2All provisions which are basically the same as 
those in the 1962 Constitution or which are non-controversial 
have been omitted from this analysis.
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Article 9. The laws are not retroactive. ’ :
V v  t» •
In pronouncements on work, the 1963 Constitution f 
differs widely from earlier charters. The 1963 document I  ^!, 
does not merely emphasize the promotion of work by the state, 
but instead announces the guarantee of work itself. In
■ , i
addition, the Constitution recognizes the right of workers 
to participate in the benefits of industry:
"ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL SOCIO RELATIONS
Section I v - •
OP WORK"
Article 13. All forms of work are under the ~
supervision and protection of the State. The 
principal duty of the State is to occupy itself 
with the formation of workers organizations.
Article People who are disabled or untrained
for work have the right of education or rehabili­
tation. The State will assist the disabled in 
providing that which is necessary for subsistence.
Article 15. Union organization is unrestricted 
with the provision that the unions are democrat­
ically organized and that they be registered in 
the local and central offices of the Department 
of Labor.
In contractual arrangements between management 
and workers of the same enterprise, and always 
when dealing with unions of equal nature, where 
there is more than one union, the State will only 
recognize the one affiliated with the majority of 
workers.
Article 16. The government is dedicated to freedom 
of work and shall establish according to the general 
interest maximum hours, days of rest and vacation, 
wages, social security— in general all the benefits 
of the protection which the State considers neces­
sary or useful for the benefit of work. ^f*This is 
basically the same as Article 8 of Section 3 of 
the 1962 Constitution. j
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Article 17# Equal pay for equal work regardless, 
of age, sex or station. t
Article 18. The State recognizes the right and the 
duty of workers to collaborate with businesses in 
the form and according to the limits established by 
law in order to elevate the workers socially and ; ,
economically and also to respond to the necessities * 
of production. * .
*
Article 19. In every enterprise (industrial, i
agricultural, commercial or mining) the workers 7,
have the right to participate in the benefits of 
the enterprise, recognizing the legitimate inter- ’
ests of the management and the other factors of ' 
production.
The law will fix the limits and form of this 
participation.
. ' x
Article 20. The law recognizes the right of 
workers to strike and management to suspend work 
(lockouts), except in public service. Rules for 
regulating strikes and lockouts shall be set down ' 
by law in conformity with the interest of workers 
and management and social necessities and national 
security.
Article 21. The rights and benefits established by 
this section in favor of workers as well as those 
made by law cannot be abrogated.
In the 1963 Constitution the use and retention of 
property are conditioned by the social good. The 1963 docu­
ment allows the right of property; but allows the state, in 
the interest of the public good, to expropriate if there is 
fair compensation:
Article 22. The State recognizes and guarantees 
the right of property: Since the ends of property < 
must serve progress and benefit the welfare of 
society, expropriation shall take place in the 
cause of the social interest by virtue of pro­
ceedings that shall be organized by law.
To fix the indemnification, the State shall ; 
keep in mind the interest of society on the one
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hand and the interest of the proprietors on the h  
other.
Indemnification in litigation shall be decided .u
by the courts in conformity with the law which 
shall keep in mind the preceding paragraph. In 
such cases, the State shall take possession of the 
property without waiting for the decision ofvthe 
courts. In cases of adjudication and forced sale, 
the State shall acquire the property or the value 
representing the property within the norms fixed ■? 
by law, and measures shall be adopted for reverting s 
the property if necessary to the persons expro- 
priated. '
The 1963 Constitution limits ownership of excessively
large (latifundio) or small (minlfundio) landholdings. 'The
state also reserves the right to decide who should own land.
Neither corporations nor foreigners may freely acquire land.
Article 23. Possession of excessive land by 
persons or private entities is declared contrary 
to the collective interest. Consequently, lati­
fundio s are prohibited regardless of the form in 
which they originated.
The law will fix the minimum size of land 
that a proprietor, whether an individual or an 
entity, can possess, keeping in mind ecological, 
economic and social factors.
Corporations cannot acquire property in land 
unless it is to be directed to the widening, en­
largement, and promotion of the welfare of the 
populace or for the installation of industrial 
plants and commercial establishments in conformity 
with legal regulations. These entities may, in 
rural zones, acquire the lands necessary for 
factories and improvements.
Exempt, as the law shall determine, from this 
provision are credit institutions which can acquire 
property in land which has been given as a guarantee 
of its credits, also cooperatives because of the 
high socio-economic ends which they pursue. The 
law may establish other exemptions as necessary.
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Article 24. Minifundio is declared uneconomic 
and anti-social. The law will determine what V 
understands minifundio to be and will dictate tl 
measures necessary to reach integration and
Article 25. Only Dominican individuals have the 
right to acquire property in land. Nevertheless, 
the Congress may authorize the acquisition of 
lands in urban zones for foreigners when it is 
in the national interest.
economic unity.
The law shall regulate the renting of land to * 
people or corporations who are not Dominicans.
The resources of the subsoil and of the sub­
marine platform belong to the State, no matter , 1 J
who, nationals or foreigners, has concession of 
their exploitation. The property of underground * k 
mines is inalienable. .
The 1962 Constitution encourages the establishment of
the family homestead, but the 19&3 Constitution contains far
wider provisions relating to the right of every Dominican
to own a comfortable, sanitary home. Not only does the 1963
charter prohibit seizure of the home from creditors, but it
also announces that the state will assist those who do not
have the necessary resources.
Article 26. Each Dominican family should possess 
his own residence, comfortable and clean, and in 
the event of the lack of necessary economic re­
courses they shall be distributed by the State
with the cooperation of the beneficiaries in 
accordance with their earnings and economic 
possibilities, all in accordance with plans made 
by competent agencies.
The family cannot be deprived of the family 
home. The family home is inalienable and not 
subject to seizure.
Article 27. The law will determine the extension, 
composition, and value of family estates which 
shall be inalienable. . . .
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The 1963 Constitution also provides for the; usesof 
state lands and the division of excessive landholdings for '
the purpose of agrarian reform. The state recognizes that1
%
the establishment of the family homestead in land is in ^ the
highest public interest:  ^  ^^
Article 28. Each rural family which does not have 
sufficient land has the right to be given the same, V 
with the size and parcels of land being proportioned v. 
according to the conditions of the land, and of the • f 
necessities and capacity to work, and also giving 
to them the adequate means of assuring economic and ; 
social progress of the community. '
The State will assist the agrarian insti- 
tutions, associations or unions to assure that >•. 1 '
those who cultivate the land will reach the highest 
standard of living possible.
Consequent with this principle and for the ends 
proposed, it is declared that the dedication of f 1 
lands of the State to the plans for agrarian reform^ 
and the division of lands which exceed maximum 
limits prescribed by the law and the sale of these 
lands to the farmers, is declared to be in the 
highest social interest. If there is a lack of 
purchasers, the State will acquire the land pre­
viously divided for later transfer to the farmers.
Article 29. The State will encourage the creation 
of cooperatives. . . .
An extensive section in the 1963 Constitution deals
with monopolies and announces that anyone attempting to
limit or eliminate competition will be penalized:
“Section III
OF THE SOCIAL ECONOMY"
Article 30. Monopolies in favor of private indi­
viduals are prohibited. The following will be 
prosecuted according to the law:
(a) Those who are dedicated to the monopoly or
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concentration of articles of necessary consumption 
with the purpose of causing a rise in prices of 
the articles. r . * •■■ k. ^
(b) Anyone who manipulates industrial distributors, - 
merchants or managers of public services with the 
intent to fix prices above normal, divide the mar- ‘ ^
kets, negate a commercial pact, or link the sale or,.7:.Pa­
rent'of a product with another, or by whatever mode . ‘
limit or impede the free traffic of industry, in­
ternal or external commerce, or public services. *
(c) Anyone who directly or indirectly discriminates H 
in pricing among producers or sellers of equal 
category in external or internal commerce, when
such discrimination has the effect of limiting the 
free intercourse or creating a total or impartial 
monopoly.
Anyone engaged in manipulation or creation of 
combinations which are prejudicial to the public 
and, one social class, or the collective interest. ■
The 1963 Constitution also charges the state with
assisting rural and urban cooperatives and guaranteeing a
just price for agricultural produce:
Article 31. It is the duty of the State to 
guarantee to farmers a sure and advantageous 
market. So that those interested in their own 
initiative shall receive the most beneficial 
price, the State will be responsible for obtain­
ing a suitable price for agricultural products.
The following provision became extremely controversial 
because the state announced that property owners whose land 
appreciated because of public works must cede the profit to 
the state:
Article 32. In cases in which the value of land 
or property increases, and the increase has been 
produced without private effort or capital and 
only because of the action of the State, the pro­
prietors shall cede the benefits to the State 
according to proportions established by law.
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Article The State will authorize whatever
is necessary to create free ports and zones and %
to offer related exemptions that favor the develop­
ment of the industry of the country.
Special mention is also given to education in the
\ ■ t . 
1963 Constitution. The state will not only guarantee free
elementary education, but will provide gratuitous secondary 
education as well. The Constitution proclaims "Freedom of 
Teaching," sind places the school system under the supervision 
of the state. In addition, the state will give special pro­
tection to the teaching profession:
I
"Section IV <
OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE"
Article 35. The right of all Dominicsins to 
education is recognized and the State is obligated 
to take all necessary measures to guarantee the 
complete exercise of this right. . . .
Article 37. Freedom of teaching is guaranteed and 
science is proclaimed as the basic fundamental of 
education. The State shall have in its charge the 
organization, inspection and supervision of the 
school system, in order to procure the achievement 
of the social ends of the culture and for the best 
intellectual, moral and physical formation of those 
being educated.
Article 38. Because of its social transcendance, 
teaching is raised to a public function. There­
fore the Public Powers are responsible for the 
elevation of the standard of living of each 
teacher and the distribution of means necessary 
for the perfection of his knowledge in order to 
protect and safeguard his dignity so that he can 
dedicate himself to the exercise of his elevated 
mission without economic, moral, religious or 
political pressures.
Article 39. The State will give to all the in­
habitants free primary and secondary education.
Primary education is obligatory for all residents 
in the country of school age.
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Article *K). The State will strive to dispense the 
highest university, professional, vocational and ? / 5
technical teaching to workers and farmers* A ^
'V *'i
Recognizing the duty of the state to safeguard the 
social development of the family, the 1963 Constitution
t• ' s< ,
provides special protection for maternity, and assumes ” 
responsibility for neglected children. All children are 
equal before the law whether b o m  in or out of wedlock. The
f
Constitution recognizes common-law marriage and allowsV 
dissolution of marriages (divorce) by mutual consent or on 
demand by either party;
"Section V
OP THE FAMILY*
Article . The Public Powers shall promote 
through adequate economic measures, the formali­
zation and stabilization of the family and its 
consummate ends.
Article 42. The State will offer special pro­
tection to marriage and the family, to the 
pregnant woman and to maternity and to the child 
from its birth until its complete development.
Article ^3. Children without distinction shall 
enjoy the same opportunities of social, spiritual 
and physical development.
Article The father and the mother have the
obligation of feeding, educating and instructing 
their children, and the children to respect and 
assist the parents.
Article *4-5. The State will protect children from 
abandonment or moral or material exploitation.
Article **6. Matrimony is recognized as the legal 
foundation of the family and it is declared that 
matrimony presupposes an absolute equality of 
rights for both the members, including financial 
arrangements•
8^
Article 47. The married women shall enjoy all 
civil legal rights. For disposition of immovable 
property and community property, both members of 
the union must give consent.
Article 48. No matter what its nature, legal' . i
state, or condition, the marriage may be d i s - ^
solved with the accord of both members or by the 
demand of either one of the two, in the manner 
and for the causes established by law.
The law will determine in which situations 
unions between persons with the capacity to con­
tract marriage can for reasons of equity and 
social interest grant economic arrangements (
similar to those of marriage.
Article 49. It is prohibited for public officials 
to expedite certifications indicating whether the 
child is born in or out of wedlock and in general 
all qualifications relative to the nature, and 
character of the filiation except that which the 
law establishes.
Section VI of Part I of the 1963 Constitution deals 
with health. Many of these provisions are the same as those 
included in the 1962 document and none are controversial.
The remainder of the 1963 Constitution, Part II, deals with 
the organization of the government.
Constitution makes a definite effort to anchor human rights 
to the "welfare state." Throughout, the 1963 Constitution 
clearly proclaims that the state is committed to a policy 
of regulating for the good of society by exercising the 
positive powers of government. Henceforth, state and private 
resources would be allocated to public needs.
Upon examination, it becomes obvious that the 1963
The recurrent use of such concepts as "public vs. 
private interests"; "social good"; "property must serve the
'•V v
progress and welfare of society"; "the primary duty of the ’ 
state is to concern itself with the training of workers and 
improvement of their skills" all such concepts emphasize 
the idea of the state as a positive force. The PRD Assembly 
had created a "blueprint for a welfare s t a t e . T h e ’contest 
over whether or not the "blueprint" would be accepted was y 
yet to come.
-^Howard J« Wiarda, "Contemporary Constitutions and 
Constitutionalism: The Dominican Republic," Law and Society
Review. II (June 1968), p. 396.
CHAPTER V ' * * V ’ *•
V"
CONFLICT ■; -; ,r‘ . ,■* * - 3r .. *■*
y  *
Juan Bosch had pledged a revolutionary constitution,1 
and plainly, the Revisionary Assembly had written one. The 
comprehensive nature of the welfare program of the 1963 
Constitution indicated a deliberate policy of social and 
economic reform which emphasized the power of the state to  ^
intervene in the economy on behalf of the welfare of the 
general society. Here was an attempt by Bosch and the PHD 
to fulfill their campaign promises to bring a better life to
those Dominicans who had long been excluded from the fruits
of the economy.
Nevertheless, not everyone agreed with the goals and 
ideals set forth in the Constitution. A 101 gun salute 
accompanied the promulgation of the Constitution on April 29, 
1963* hut the entire nation did not rejoice and applaud the 
work of the Revisionary Assembly. Though the elections had 
given Bosch overwhelming support, some sectors of the society 
viewed his victory with misgivings— although uneasy, they 
waited. It was not long before apprehension became intense 
anxiety, especially among members of the property-owning 
classes.
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Only a few weeks earlier, great optimism had*swept * * 
the nation as the Revisionary Assembly prepared to meet. The
independent daily, El Carribe. expressed many of the Domini-
; •'»*•
can hopes for the future:
On the Constitutional Assembly which will 
meet in a week depends the orientation of the 
institutional life of the Dominican Republic. f' ;
We are about to initiate one of the most * , . 
important accomplishments in our contemporary * *-
history. This is the first constituent assembly , 
in decades truly elected by the people.*
Prom the beginning, the newspapers reported the * “
activities of the Assembly and printed detailed descriptions 
of each projected provision. With each new revelation, 
isolated but unorganized opposition began to appear. On 
January 29, while the Assembly deliberated, El Carribe pre­
maturely leaked a copy of the draft Constitution. Its , 
publication sent shock waves through much of the business 
and landholding community. Some of the provisions frightened
religious groups as well. As the text of -draft reached the
2public, reaction came immediately.
The American Ambassador, John Martin, attending a 
party a few evenings later, spoke with some of the members 
of the outgoing Council of State, with whom the Ambassador 
enjoyed a cordial relationship. The conversation, as
A
El Carribe (Santo Domingo), Dec. 19, p. 6.
2The text of the draft Constitution is in El Carribe. 
January 29, p. 10. Translations of the draft and passages 
from El Carribe are by the present writer.
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reported in the Ambassador's book, catalogs most of the fears 
in the minds of those who later rejected the 1963 Consti-. 
tution:
. . . President Bonnelly, Donny Reid, and Tony s 
Imbert took me aside into a little room and de­
manded indignantly to know what I thought of the 
new draft Constitution* President Bonnelly . • . *
declared it was a "Communist Constitution" and '
would ruin the Republic* As a lawyer, he said 
the Constitution was loosely drawn* It would <
frighten away investment* It did not protect 
property rights. * * . It authorized expropria­
tion of property without compensation. . * . It 
forbade foreign persons and all corporations 
from owning property* It said property must 
serve the needs of the masses, . . .  It pro­
hibited latifundio. but left it to Congress to 
define latifundio* It legalized concubinage and 
made divorce easy, it "rudely" infringed the 
Dominican tradition that the man was the head of 
the family by declaring the sexes equal, did not 
guarantee civil liberties, and did not consecrate 
the Vatican Concordat.
Imbert joined in vociferously. So did Reid.
The country was a keg of dynamite with a short, 
burning fuse. Throughout the conversation flowed 
venom against the new regime.
President Bonnelly agreed— the people were 
ignorant and needed to be educated to own land ~
and to participate in business and in government.
When Ambassador Martin tried to placate them, saying
that he did not think Bosch and the PRD intended to turn the
country into a Communist state, Imbert interrupted saying,
"There is already one Communist state in the Americas be­
lt
cause the U.S. did not believe Castro would go Communist."
-^Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 316 
^Ibid.. p. 317.
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Ambassador Martin told the group that the United\ ^ 
States was determined there would not be another "Fidel". in 
the Caribbean and pointed out that they were discussing a 
mere draft. However, Imbert and the others made it abso­
lutely clear that they did not intend to "sit by and hand ' 
the country over to the Communists."-*
The opposition did not confine itself to private
i
denunciations behind closed doors. As the Assembly debated 
in its chambers, the public debated in the home, on the radio, 
and in the newspapers. Most of the attacks came before the 
promulgation, during the time the Assembly deliberated. ' ' '■ v
Practically all of the principal arguments arose during that 
period. After enactment, severe criticism continued, but 
most of the denouncements were a repetition of previously 
stated objections. Almost every day, from January through 
April, the newspapers reported the proceedings of the revision­
ary body. In addition the newspapers printed editorials 
expressing their own views; not all were critical. Perhaps 
most significant, newspapers such as El Carribe and El Listin 
Diario carried numerous paid advertisements sponsored by 
various interest groups, voicing disapproval of specific 
portions of the draft Constitution and appealing for re­
visions. Some advertisements covered as many as two full 
pages.
^Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 317*
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Always the critics attacked the social welfare pro­
visions. Articles pertaining to the right of property, 
private initiative, worker-employer relations, latlfundios, 
education, pronouncements concerning marriage) divorce, and 
illegitimate children elicited the moBt controversy.
Some of the differences were resolved during the 
debates; but, for the most part, the substantive content of 
the document remained unaltered. When the Assembly did make 
changes, such revisions usually consisted of rewording or' ; 
elimination of a word, phrase, or a sentence. V 5
A look at the most controversial portions of the 
draft Constitution, the discussions that centered around 
them, and the provisions in their final form shows a reveal­
ing picture of the basic conflicts revolving around the 
Constitution of 1963*
Perhaps one of the most emotionally charged pro­
visions was that pertaining to private initiative. Article 
11 of the draft Constitution states that
Private economic initiative is declared free. 
Nevertheless the same cannot be exercised when it 
opposes the national utility or when it prejudices 
the human security, liberty, and dignity.
The law will provide the necessary measures 
and controls in order to obtain complete compati­
bility between public economic activity and private 
or social interests.
After weeks of bitter debate and denouncements, the 
Assembly made some minor changes in the wording. Neverthe­
less, the principle remained the same. In the final 1963
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Constitution, Article 11 became Articles 3 and 4 and con­
tinued to affirm that "property must serve the progress and 
welfare of society."
The pronouncement that the right of property is 
subject to the social function made leading businessmen 
jittery about the new Constitution. They feared it would 
abolish private property, and they especially condemned 
Article 2*4- of the draft Constitution which declared that
The state protects and guarantees the enjoy­
ment of property and establishes as the general 
norm that property must serve progress and the 
welfare of society at the same time. For that 
reason expropriation may take place in the cause 
of the general interest by virtue of the law, 
that at the same time fixes corresponding con­
ditions and indemnification.
On the day following the publication of the draft 
Constitution, El Carribe. in an editorial, said that there 
is no doubt that the draft Constitution is establishing a 
series of truly revolutionary principles.
We must admit that these provisions might be 
beneficial for the Dominican people, but if we 
analyze the Constitution objectively, we must 
admit other aspects of the changes may result 
in the stagnation and regression of the economic 
development of the country.6
The next day a headline on the front page of El 
Carribe announced that "The Commercial Institutions are 
Viewing the Proposed Constitution with Anxiety." The article 
referred to a statement by the Chamber of Commerce of the
^E1 Carribe. Jan. 30, p. 9*
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National District, the Association of Industries of the Repub­
lic and the Confederation of Owners of the Republic claiming
; v S. < -■
that "the new Constitution ignores the rights of owners,and
*
includes provisions, which if adopted, will completely destroy v 
the incipient national economy." It will cause private ^
initiative to totally disappear and will completely dis-
7  j. t *courage investment in stocks of new businesses.1 <
Shortly afterwards, El Carribe ran another front page 
story summarizing the arguments of the Dominican Association , 
of Landowners and Farm Owners. The association criticized 
the projected Constitution, saying that the national riches 
and production would decrease considerably. It would cause 
domestic capital to liquidate itself and foreign capital * 
would become more difficult to obtain. The Association mem­
bers feared that businesses of every kind would begin to
disappear. Elsewhere a two page advertisement printed the
o
objections in full.
On the other hand, the editorial page of El Carribe 
carried an article entitled "Objections Must Be Constructive" 
in which Dr. Rafael Richiez Savinon defended the PHD position 
on property. Using philosophical arguments, Dr. Savinon 
asserted that "a new attitude toward property is inevitable 
as a consequence of the evolution under which the right of
?E1 Carribe. Jan. 31, p. 1; full text, p. 2.
q ■* •
Ibid., Feb. 10, p. 1; full text, p. 10. ;
i
•jr v
property has been altered." He argued that the new theory 
toward property comes as a result of progressive' and revo­
lutionary legal theory. According to Savinon, property can 
no longer be consigned to the notion of absolute rights J 
because the right of property is not only a function of 
rights but is also a social function. He declared that the 
French civil legal expert, Josserand, had signified that under 
the social and economic pressure that has occurred in the 1 
course of this century, the dogma of absolute property has. 
been exposed to hard scrutiny. Its exercise has been human­
ized and is seen in terms of social ends. "The notion of the 
right of property has repeatedly suffered limitations imposed
by the collective necessities of society. Now the private
g
interest must cede to public good."^
Another article of the draft Constitution dealing
with the "collective necessities of society" provoked more
stem disapproval. Article 25 of the draft declares:
For the ends of collective exploitation and 
for the benefit of the people, the Public Power 
can legislate in the sense of converting the 
property into collective or economically collec­
tive property by virtue of the law which declares 
its expropriation and the value of the corres­
ponding inderanification of the land soil, the 
subsoil, the natural resources and measures of 
protection. In this case methods for proceed­
ings established in the section on expropriation 
will apply.
^E1 Carribe. Feb. 18, p. 8.
9 4
• >, *
Here was a call for expropriation of private property ‘
• * ,  *
containing natural resources. Both Articles 24 and. 25 became
■ ' * 1
the object of adverse criticism from various social, economic, f
and political groups as well as the organs of the press.\ i
El Carribe warned that "in the final editing, proposals 24
and 25 may produce serious repercussions in the Dominican
society, especially because of the obscurity of the articles.",
The editor suggested modifications which would clarify '>■
Articles 24 and 25 and also clarify the sense and make the>
provisions more adaptable to "the democratic system and the ^
traditions of Dominican society."*^
El Carribe also asserted that "The right of property
is essential in a democratic regime. It will be a great error
if they do not put that sentiment into the document. The
final text should read that 'the state protects and guarantees
11the right of property.1" The Assembly listened but only
partially acceded to demands for revision. -
In its final form Article 24 became Article 22 of the
1963 Constitution, with only the most minor changes.
Article 22. The State recognizes and guarantees 
the right of property: Since the ends of property
must serve progress and benefit the welfare of 
society, expropriation shall take place in the 
course of the social interest by virtue of pro­
ceedings that shall be organized by law.
I oEl Carribe. March 20, p. 6.
IIIbid.
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The Assembly did, however, make one concession pertaining to\ 
indemnification when property is taken before adjudication" 
is completed. The final form of Paragraph 2, Article 22 
provides that the property may revert to the original owner 
if the court decides in his favor. ^
In the case of Article 25, pressure brought some 
results. The Assembly made a definite change and eliminated 
most of Article 25 of the draft. The remainder was incorpor­
ated into the second paragraph of Article 25 of the final 
document, which said that "The resources of the subsoil and 
the submarine platform • . . and buried minerals belong to 
the state and are inalienable.1* Though perhaps implied, no 
specific mention is made of deliberate expropriation for con­
verting natural resources into collective property.
Above all, the draft Constitution shocked landowners 
by prohibiting latifundio (large landholdings). Article 27 
of the drafts states that **latifundio is completely pro­
hibited. The State will dictate the disposition of the excess 
land.1
Angry critics especially focused attention on this 
attempt of the Constitution to break up large landholdings. 
Advertisements again appeared in the newspapers. A paid 
advertisement by the First National Convention of The Men of 
Industry reflected much of the typical concern:
The primary need for improving our socio­
economic structure is the right of property to 
be solidly maintained with all of its attributes.
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We agree that land distribution is a basic goal 
for all of us, but we recognize that such programs -
do not justify injustice for some in order to get 
justice for others.12
-V
And repeating what many other groups had been reiter­
ating, the advertisement contended that in order to have 
economic reforms, strong and adequate measures for promoting 
economic free enterprise must be created.
In the same statement, the Men of Industry also 
proposed a solution, suggesting the creation of an Agrarian 
National Bank financed by the state, international organiza­
tions and private individuals who would then provide funds 
for those among whom the land would be divided. The Associa­
tion proposed that the Bank hold mortgages, guarantee 
payments and designate a just price for the legitimate 
previous owners of land. The Men of Industry ended by urging
that the Assembly safeguard the right of freedom of initia- 
1 ^tive. J
From time to time, El Carribe continued to allow 
space for those who desired to defend the Constitution. On 
February 6, Dr. Armando Gonzales Tamayo, the Vice-President 
elect of the Republic, declared that "the charter of the 
Dominican Republic will be a revolutionary constitution which 
will transform the general structure of the country and by so
12E1 Carribe. Feb. 16, p. J*.
13Ibid., Feb. 16, p. >*.
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doing would prevent the country from falling into Communist <-
1  Zl -
hands." ,
■" - . ?; - ■; ■
Upon returning to Santo Domingo to prepare for his 
inauguration, President Bosch, in a two hour and forty-five 
minute improvised speech berated the opposition for its 
attacks, and asserted that "the Constitution was proposing , 
measures to terminate the exploitation of the p o o r . E l  
Carribe gave full front page coverage to Bosch's remarks."
On February 21, El Carribe allowed Angel Miolan/ 
president of the PHD, front page space to reply to criticism 
of the draft Constitution. Miolan declared that "the proposed 
Constitution is the legal and juridic materialization of 
what shall constitute a peaceful revolution in our history."
He said that it was most natural that interests which have 
traditionally oppressed the people should feel uneasy and 
attribute to the document more gravity than it really de­
serves. This criticism he charged is "nothing more than 
criticism of the defeated— inventions of children." He 
indicated that the Assembly wanted time to clear up these 
"ridiculous" inventions and added that the draft Constitution 
was only a basis for discussion. Miolan added that the pro­
jected Constitution should have been confined to the privacy 
of the Assembly chambers, and that the reporters had created
^ E l  Carribe. Feb. 6, p. 6.
15Ibid., Feb. 18, p. 1.
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Ma tempest in a teapot."*^ „ *
Most of the arguments by the proponents did not
placate critics; the debate continued* A provision-stipu-
' ' ' *
lating who could own land became another area of. dispute* ^  7? 
Paragraph III of Article 27 in the draft declares that , 
"corporations cannot acquire property in land*" In addition, 
Article 28 of the draft announces that aliens cannot own * 
land: , -
ft .
Only Dominican individuals, naturalized or ..
by birth, have the right to acquire land • • • 
and obtain concessions. • * * Nevertheless the 
nation may grant the right to foreigners who 
have Dominican children . . .  if they agree to 
allow the profits to remain in the nation.
Paragraph I. Individuals or corporations 
who are not Dominicans may rent land and property 
for a period of fifty years.
Commenting on Article 28, two days after the release 
of the draft, El Carribe in an editorial said that "perhaps 
the spirit of the article is to avoid latifundios. but there 
is no doubt that this constitutional principle will bring 
with it an anti-legal situation since corporations have the 
legal attributes of physical persons." The editor argued 
that no text can discriminate against either without affect­
ing "the cement" of the legal structure of Dominican society.
/
The newspaper also criticized the imprecisions and vague 
statements of Article 28, and appealed to the Assembly to
*^E1 Carribe. Feb. 18, p. 1.
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hold public hearings, to appoint commissions to study the 
Constitution* Nevertheless, in concluding, the editorial^ V 
said, "We are not opposed to all of the proposals of the''. 
Constitution." r > *
Article 28 later became Article 24 of the 1963 Con­
stitution and differed only in the wording of the first 
paragraph, which stated that "Congress may authorize within 
the law and in the national interest, the renting of lands in 
urban zones to foreigners." Also, in the final 1963 document, 
specific time limitations on leases are omitted saying only 
that "the law will regulate the renting of land."
Perhaps, more than anything else, the section on work 
frightened business management. Referring to Article 2 of 
the draft which stated that "the existence of the nation is 
in work," the Association of Landowners and Farm Owners 
charged that "it was a preposterous statement ignoring all 
of the factors of work." The organization suggested that the 
Constitution was trying to organize the nation for the benefit 
of only one class— labor. As an example, they cited Article 
14 of the draft which recognizes the "right of unions to 
initiate the formation of laws in regard to labor matters."
The Association suggested that this article be eliminated 
since it was unnecessary. "If not eliminated, at least, it 
should be made certain that all economic classes have the
*^E1 Carribe. Jan. 30* P» 9*
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right of representation— owners as well as w o r k e r s . ? ;> ’ V '
. -v 7T* / ■
The Chamber of Commerce and its associated groups 
also voiced their objections. They agreed that it was t r u l y , 
necessary to create social justice but asserted thatT the 
country also needed justice which, in its extreme forms, did 
not abrogate the legal rights of capital. "The prosperity 
of the working class," they contended, "is directly related 
to the success of business. If business must comply with
obligations that produce their ruin, it is certain this will
19 ‘gravely affect the entire working class." ^
In the case of Article 14, critics succeeded. The 
Assembly completely eliminated Article 14, and no vestige of 
it remains.
The opposition was not so successful in its bid to 
change other provisions relating to workers. The proposal 
to recognize only one union in a plant, particularly alienated 
employers. Article 13 of the draft declares:
Parallel unions in one center of work are 
prohibited, be it federation or confederation.
The State will not recognize more than one 
union and that will be the one with which the 
majority is affiliated.
Businessmen charged that Article 13 was dedicated 
only to workers and not to management. Some held it tanta-
1^E1 Carribe. Feb. 1, p. 1; full text, p. 10. 
19Ibid., Jan. 31, p. 1.
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mount to constitutional authorization of a single centralized > 
union* * • - -
Bosch defended the provisions of Article IJi
i
The authors of this controversial provision  ^ ■ c
had no intention of establishing a single central­
ized union* Each union was free to affiliate with r
whichever central body it felt would best further 
its interest. The wording merely intended to 
prevent the creation of company unions, by which 
bosses could organize a union favorable to their 
interests and preclude the organization of a union 
that would genuinely respond to the needs of the
majority of the w o r k e r s , 20
Although Article 13 aroused bitter disapproval, in its final 
form nothing was fundamentally changed. It became Article 15 
in the 1963 Constitution:
In contractual relations between owners and 
workers of the same enterprise and always when 
dealing with unions of equal nature • • • , the 
State will only recognize the one which is 
affiliated with the majority of workers.
Even more distasteful to owners was the provision of
Article 15 in the draft, stating that
the State recognizes the right of workers to 
collaborate with business in the form and accord­
ing to that established by law in order to elevate , 
work socially, economically, and also to respond 
to the necessities of production.
The Association of Landowners and Farm Owners criti­
cized Article 15, charging that what is meant by collaboration 
is not clear, and that the provision gives the workers the 
right to intervene in the direction of businesses, "This
20Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 130.
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interference," they charged, "will prejudice not only the
worker but the whole national economy." The Association J
recommended the elimination of Article 15 or at least 4that it
be consigned to a simple declaration of principle such as "it
21is the right of the worker to collaborate with industries#"
In defending Article 15, Dr. Savinon in El Carribe 
pointed out that "collaboration" in the article did not refer 
to individuals but to labor groups and contended that the
final part of the article indicated that collaboration would
22be regulated.
In the final Constitution Article 15 became Article 
18 and except for the addition of one word, "duty," the pro­
vision on the right of workers to collaborate remained the 
same. Thus, the amended portion read, "the right and duty to 
collaborate."
This small addition satisfied some of the critics.
El Carribe applauded the Assembly for changing Article 15, 
and said that the public had feared that the Constitution was 
recognizing the right of workers to interfere in the adminis­
tration and direction of business# The editors said that by 
changing the wording, the Assembly had allowed the "democratic 
spirit to triumph.
^*E1 Carribe. Feb. 1, p# 1.
22Ibid.. Feb# 18, p. 8. 
23Ibid.. March 11, p. 6.
Nevertheless, most capitalists continued to worry,
$ *
especially about the pronouncements which said that workers 
had a right to share in the profits of industry and agri­
culture as in Article 16 of the draft:
In any agricultural, industrial, commercial 
or mining enterprise, the workers shall have the 
right to participate in the benefits of the same, 
recognizing the legitimate interest of management 
and other factors of production.
The laws, decrees and resolutions of the 
Minister of Labor shall fix the limits and form 
of this participation.
The Association of Landowners and Farm Owners charged
that the Constitution made the Minister of Labor an economic
2lidictator. The Chamber of Commerce and its allied groups
agreed that workers have a legitimate right to participate in
the benefits of business, but they argued that the form and
limit should not be established by laws and decrees but by
the particular circumstances of each business. They also
suggested that it would be better if the Constitution said
that participation in benefits should be made by collective
pacts or agreements.2^
Defending the PRD position, Dr. Savinon in El Carribe
asserted that allowing workers to participate in benefits
creates an incentive in the work force since workers cannot
2 6participate if there are no profits.
2 liEl Carribe. Feb. 1, p. 10.
25Ibid., Jan. 31, p. b. 26Ibid.. Feb. 18, p. 8.
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For many weeks discussions on work continued, with 
opponents alternating between recriminations and supplications. 
When the debates had ended and Article 16 became Article 19 
of the final 1963 Constitution, only minor changes were * 
visible. Article 16 incorporated all of the wording of the 
draft provisions, and affirmed the right of workers to^par­
ticipate in the benefits of industry. Only one small change 
was made; Article 19 stated that the "law* and not the v 
minister of labor "would fix the limits and form of partici- , 
pation."
It is evident that rights of property and private 
initiative became a serious source of friction during the 
months the Revisionary Assembly met. Most businessmen and 
landowners were not opposed to a certain amount of regulation 
of the economy by the government, but they were not willing 
to accept the all encompassing interference which they saw 
in the PRD Constitution. Those who opposed the 1963 Consti­
tution, especially, believed that it would stifle the economy 
and free enterprise. El Carribe summaries the typical 
objections of those who were against the new document:
Social justice based on a weak economy is 
counter-productive. The greatest responsibility 
of the Assembly is to write a charter that will 
assure rapid economic expansion of the country 
and guarantee the rights of citizens to act within 
the structure of social justice and at the same 
time guarantee respect for all fundamental human
rights.27
2^E1 Carribe. Feb. 19$ P* 6.
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It should be pointed out that disagreements over the 
Constitution were not confined to economic principles. A 
great many Dominicans were equally disturbed by certain pre­
cepts of the section on education. Article 19 of the draft 
especially provoked consternation among religious leaders. r
Article 19 became a source of dispute since it stated that
In an absolute manner the school system is 
subject to the organization and supervision of 
the State. ,, \ ,
In private establishments only the parents, 
tutors and those in charge of the education of 
the child have the right to decide whether or 
not to teach religious principles.
Article 19 raised a furor among the clergy, but in 
addition it caused confusion as to what the article intended 
to do. Because of the way in which the text was written, the 
purpose was not clear. The clergy demanded addition of 
"Freedom of Teaching." A paradox resulted because some 
people believed that adding the statement "Freedom of Teach­
ing" would allow religious schools while others believed 
"Freedom of Teaching" would permit only lay schools. El 
Carribe proposed that Article 19 should expressly say that 
teaching in official schools should be lay, leaving to the 
parents and teachers the right to decide whether or not a
child should be instructed in religion in the private
28schools.
28E1 Carribe. Mar. 1, p. 6.
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Despite the confusion, the Church took a definite . ^
stand demanding that "Freedom of Teaching" be added to pro- 
nouncements on education* The newspapers were filled with 
advertisements by groups such as the Catholic Dominican 
Institutions, The Committee of Dominican Christians, and <
The National Union of Catholic High Schools of the Dominican 
Republic, all imploring the Assembly to add "Freedom of
>  •
Teaching" and to expressly state that parents have a right
2 Q  *to choose the education of their children. 7
Not only Catholics, but Protestant groups debated the 
educational provisions* A large advertisement sponsored by 
the Committee of Schools for the Dominican Evangelical Church 
appeared in El Carribe. This group, too, solicited the 
Assembly, requesting the inclusion of a statement saying that 
"the Dominican people must have freedom of teaching."^
A short time later, El Carribe began to take a stronger 
position asserting that freedom to teach is a natural right 
of all men; and, therefore, El Carribe "radically opposes the 
monopoly by the State which proposes that private schools may 
not operate unless they conform absolutely to requirements 
prescribed by the state." The editor accused the Assembly 
of trying to establish one system in the whole nation, oblig- , 
ing parents against "their sacred right" to give their 
children only the kind of education the state prescribed.
2^E1 Carribe* Mar. 1, p. 6. Texts Feb. 3* P* ^5 
Feb. 22, p. 2; Feb. 26, p. 20.
Ibid.. Mar. 7* p* 8.
"We are not demanding the religious school, we are demanding 
the private, the democratic school whether it be lay,
Catholic or Protestant."*^ 1
Not everyone opposed Article 19. The Student Christian 
Movement in an advertisement criticized the move to change 
Article 19, saying that certain sectors are in favor of vio­
lating the principles of human rights. The students group 
argued that the existing religious teaching in the public 
schools constituted discrimination for those who had other 
beliefs. It created problems and would convert the schools 
into a scene of constant religious debate. The students also 
stated that teaching religion had always signified mutual 
obligation between Church and State which, in effect, did 
away with the separation of both. The student group urged 
that the Assembly "consecrate lay teaching in public schools 
as a method of guaranteeing liberty to all in religious 
matters. "*^ 2
The Assembly acquiesced to some of the wishes of its 
critics. Some changes were made in the education section.
In its final form Article 19 became Article 37 which stated 
that
Freedom of teaching is guaranteed, and science 
is proclaimed as the basic fundamental of education.
The state shall have in its charge the organization,
^ El Carribe. Mar. 7> P* 8.
-^Ibid.. Mar. 3, p. 4. Note: Other publications
record similar patterns of debate.
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inspection and supervision of the school system, 
in order to procure the achievement of the social 
ends of the culture and for the best intellectual, 
moral and physical formation of those being 
educated.
The final wording did not completely satisfy the 
Roman Catholic Church since the Church objected to the state­
ment that "science is the basic fundamental of education.”
Sharp clashes also developed over several provisions 
relating to the family. Many Dominicans, especially the 
Roman Catholic Church, condemned the pronouncements which 
recognized common law marriages and protected children born 
out of wedlock. Many critics also severely rebuked the 
assembly for legalizing divorce.
Jottin Curry, in an article "Divorce in the Consti­
tution of the PRD", criticized the provision which recognizes 
all classes of marriage, legal or not. Moreover, Jottin 
said that he could see no reason for granting property rights 
to extra-marital relationships. Jottin suggested that such 
"delicate subjects" as divorce, common law marriage, and 
illegitimate children should not be material for a constitu­
tion but should be legislated instead.^
After the long and bitter denunciations, the Assembly 
revised some of the wording, but most of the provisions of 
the section dealing with the family were incorporated into 
the final document without any visible change.
33e 1_ Carribe. Feb. 12, p. 16.
On April 25th, 1963, the Dominican Episcopate sent 
an official statement to President Bosch, expressing alarm 
at the presence in the Constitution of "ideologies against 
Christ and human beings and their rights*" The Episcopate 
argued that the new constitution would foster agitation and 
terrorism and would bring moral, social, and ideological 
chaos— and finally "slavery." The Church suggested that the 
unrest which was prevalent in the country would disappear if 
the members of the Revisionary Assembly would decide to 
revise the ambiguous and confused articles of the Constitution 
or if the Assembly would submit the Constitution to a popular
r>lL
referendum.^
The Episcopate deplored the failure of the 1963 Con­
stitution to recognize the Concordat between the Holy See 
and the Dominican Republic* The Church suggested that such 
action ignores the "concrete historic Catholic situation of 
the Dominican people." The Episcopate also denounced the 
Constitution for its "lack of respect for the sacred rights"
of Roman Catholic marriages, and condemned the provision for
3*5divorce.
The Church refused to send an official representative 
to the promulgation ceremonies. Bosch argued that "this was
'*Ll
^ Alfau Danilo Brugal, Tragedia en Santo Domingo; 
Documentos para la historia (Santo Domingo: Editorial El
Carribe, 1966), p. 39.
3^Ibid.
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a gesture of rebellion condemned by the Church itself, since 
the Church maintains as doctrine respect for legally estab­
lished institutions and governments."^
Attacking the Constitution from a different point of 
view, some jurists even suggested that the Constitution of 
1963 was invalid because it was a product of a Revisionary 
Assembly and not a Constituent Assembly. They argued that
since the Assembly had not merely revised the Constitution
37but had written another one, the 1963 document was void.-'
So, the debates continued; tensions increased. Each 
proposal brought a barrage of criticism from those Dominicans 
who considered the Constitution of 1963 a threat to their 
economic and social interests.
-^Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 129 
-^Brugal, Tragedia. p. 36.
CHAPTER VI
COUP
As the members of the Revisionary Assembly neared the 
conclusion of their labors, polarization widened. Official 
enactment of the new Constitution did not bring harmony to 
the Dominican Republic. Although the PRD dominated Assembly 
accepted some criticisms and modified a few objectionable 
articles, none of the revisions altered the original character 
of the 1963 Constitution. Moreover, minor modifications 
failed to placate the bitter resentments that had emerged 
during the past months. When the Assembly had finished its 
work, much of Bosch's earlier moderate support had dissipated.
Criticism increased rapidly after the promulgation 
of the new charter. As soon as Bosch's reform program began 
to materialize, opposition intensified. It was not long 
before disapproval of the Constitution became intertwined 
with fears of Communism, and the 1963 Constitution became a 
rallying point around which to gather forces opposing Bosch's 
programs. Whether imagined or real, those in high political 
and economic positions feared that Bosch would lead them down 
the road to Communism. Reforms in the areas of landholding, 
taxation, and church and state relations provoked a steady
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stream of charges that Bosch was soft on Communism.
Bosch was accused of harboring Communists when he 
allowed twenty political exiles to return, among them Maximo 
Lopez Molina who was deported in 1962 after his formation of 
the pro-Castro Dominican People's Party.^ Others charged 
that Bosch had allowed Communists to infiltrate the govern­
ment. Dr. Viriato Fiallo, the leader of the Union Civica 
Nacional (UCN), accused Bosch of placing Communists in key 
government positions and letting them use the schools and 
government buildings for their political indoctrination#
Fiallo publicly demanded a clear and definite statement of
2Bosch1s position toward the Communist ideology.
Charges of Communism were not confined to those made 
by Dominicans. Armistead Selden, Jr., the United States 
Democratic Congressman from Alabama and chairman of the U.S. 
House of Representatives subcommittee on Latin American 
affairs, told the House of Representatives on May 31> 1963, 
that Communist subversive penetration in the Dominican Repub­
lic "apparently is not being effectively countered by the 
new Dominican Government."^ On the same day, President Bosch 
accused Representative Selden of trying to "dictate the best
^"Dominican Chaos" On Record: Deadline Data on World
Affairs, II, No. 10 (June 1965), p.
2
Centro de Ensenanza de las Fuerza Armadas. Libro 
Blanco (CEAF), pp. 1^7-53, in Moreno. Barrios in Arms, p. 18.
B-'On Record, p. 9.
k
way1’ to run the Dominican Government,
Some United States journalists also joined in the
indictments against Bosch, In a story datelined Miami, Jules
Du Bois of the Chicago Tribune and Scrips Howard Chain, wrote
A Communist takeover of the Dominican Republic 
is nearing hard reality with extraordinary speed. 
President Juan Bosch . • • appears to be neatly 
laying out the carpet for the Reds,3
Hendrix wrote many such articles and most of them were re­
produced in El Carribe and El Llstin Diaro,
Such accusations disturbed the American Ambassador, 
John Martin, who was trying desperately to bolster the Bosch 
government, Martin expressed his apprehension, "Clearly my 
effort to win support for Bosch had failed, at least in some 
newspapers. Now our influence was wholly negative— we could 
do little but keep telling everybody we supported the consti- 
tutionally elected President,"
In defending himself Bosch described the article by 
Hendrix as "tattle picked up in saloons" and challenged
7
Hendrix to substantiate his charges with one single fact.
A reporter in the Christian Science Monitor defended 
Bosch, saying that
h.
On Record, p. 110,
-'Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. $0•
6ibia.. p. 510.
Hispanic American Report. XVI, No. 5 (Events of May
1963), p.
i m -
Hr. Bosch is merely trying to push through 
the 1 social transformations1 called for in the 
Alliance for Progress. They say projected re­
forms and the President * s refusal to come out 
publicly against communism gave the traditional 
ruling classes and conservative opposition an 
excuse to sound alarms about the government1s 
ideological orientalion.8
Bosch was also severely criticized for permitting 
Dominicans to travel to Cuba. After the first group departed, 
Bosch wanted to put a restriction on all new passports, for­
bidding such travel, but there was no law he could use to 
enforce this restriction. Moreover, Article 73 of* the Consti­
tution specifically permitted freedom of transit.
By July 1963, the opposition tried to create the 
impression of massive reaction of the populace against the 
policies of the government. Huge HChristian Affirmation” 
rallies were organized all over the country. Truckloads of 
peasants were transported to the city to demonstrate against 
the Communists and Bosch's government. The radio, the news­
papers, the talk on the streets were full of "Christian
o
Demonstrations."^
Ambassador Martin, sensing danger, talked to Bosch 
and told him that though he agreed that the extreme right had 
gone too far, especially with the "Christiam Affirmation,” the 
fact remained that Bosch was in trouble because of his 
handling of the Communist problem and suggested that Bosch
8Christian Science Monitor. June 1, 1963*
Q
7Moreno, Barrios, p. 19*
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punish Guban travellers. When Bosch protested that the Con­
stitution prohibited such action, Martin answered: "Let the
10courts decide that. Do it anyway.”
Before long, not only enemies but also former 
supporters began to display signs of disaffection with 
Bosch. In the elections Bosch and his FED pledged economic 
and social reform. The Bosch government had made some im­
provements in the economy. By the end of April the government 
budget was in balance; gold reserves, which earlier had 
plummeted, were being maintained. The national debt had been
reduced from $9^ million to $15 million; and net reserves at
11the Central Bank had tripled. The economic picture indeed 
looked brighter; yet many Dominicans grumbled about the 
austerity which made such gains possible. In addition,
Bosch*s much promised economic development program had failed 
to materialize; the promised large scale land reform plan did 
not take place. The plan stalled when large landowners who 
had been dispossessed of their lands flocked to the courts, 
leaving much of the land for reform tied up in litigation. 
Workers, too, became dissatisfied as unemployment persisted, 
and some workers became wary of Bosch1s proposal to combine 
unions into a single labor alliance.
10Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 50^.
11Hispanic American Report. XVI, No. 6 (Events of 
June, 1963)# P® 572o
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From the first Bosches bisrsrest handicap was the lack 
of experienced and able oectle to help hire run the government• 
Scarcity of trained professional and technical personnel pre­
vented Bosch and his Americ ax collaborators from making 
visible headway in eccncric development projects*
Y.any of Bosch1 s critics accused him of inefficiency 
and political incompetence. There were some grounds for such 
charges, but neither inefficiency nor the disastrous legacy 
of the Trujillo era were the sole obstacles to progress. The 
long years of neglect and misrule had left problems common 
to most underdeveloped countries: lack of managerial person­
nel, inadequate capital, and little or no political consensus 
or institutional continuity. Prom the cutset Bosch1s goals 
and ideals were thwarted by the political, social,and 
economic realities of a country with widespread illiteracy, 
rampant unemployment, and stifling poverty amidst abundant 
resources. But perhaps the most fundamental yet intangible 
problem of the Bosch administration was the lack of a sense 
of civic responsibility. 7lsO segment of the community seemed 
Killing to subordinate its personal claims to the national
■% ■ i  £good. *
By the end of July Bosch began z q  meet further re­
sistance whep the Congress modified the Law of Public
i 2
“ Abraham P. Lowenbhal, "Limits of American Power:
the Lessons of the Dominican Republic, * Haroers KaarazIne,
June 1964, p. 95*
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Confiscation originally passed under the Council of State. 
This law expropriated property owned by the Trujillo family 
and other Trujillistas. According to Article 9 of the 1962 
Constitution, the judiciary had been designated as the sole 
tribunal for this procedure. Now the Congress designated 
itself to act as the tribunal. J
Property owners became further alarmed, when the PHD-
dominated Congress attempted, though unsuccessfully, to pass 
a law by which the Minister of Public Properties could seize 
any land or property which had been illicitly acquired by 
public officials through the use of their public position.
The law also applied to property acquired by. a third person 
who had profited from his relationship with a public official. 
In addition, the new law placed the burden of proof of 
innocence upon the accused. Article 5 of the 1963 Consti­
tution contained the enabling provision for the law. Since
almost everyone who owned property could not have acquired 
it without at least passive cooperation with Trujillo, owners 
feared that the law would permit confiscation of any property. 
This law frightened them much more than any constitutional 
provisions providing for expropriation.
By early September, talk of confiscation filled the 
newspapers and airwaves. Attempts to alter the confiscation
1R-'Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 509» 
1^Ibxd., p. 495.
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laws infuriated property owners. The editors of El Carribe 
described as monstrous the Congress's proposition to put the 
burden of proof on the accused in matters of confiscation.
El Carribe pointed out that it has always been a universal 
law that a person is innocent until proven guilty. "We are 
not saying that Bosch will be the same as Castro, but we are 
saying that once converted into law, the project of the con­
fiscation will cause all capital and property to be at the 
mercy of political caprices. . •
In the words of El Carribe. "The political ambient 
continued to boil all during September." Tensions mounted 
daily as headlines announced new friction between the govern­
ment and its critics. Each day another group renounced the 
project of confiscation. The Association of Dominican Lawyers
charged that the system would violate a series of juridic
1 Aand constitutional principles. At the same time, right-
wing Senators urged that the Constitution be amended to make
17Communism illegal. 1
While businessmen and former supporters of Trujillo 
accused Bosch of surrendering to the Communists, the far left 
also attacked the Bosch government. The Fourteenth of June 
(1J4) accused the Bosch government of capitulating to the
*^E1 Carribe. Sept. 5> P* 8* 
l6Ibid.. Sept. 11, p. 1. 
•^Ibld. . Sept. 3, p. 1.
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forces of "Yankee Imperialism." The ij4 charged that the 
country was in a grave economic crisis brought about by the 
oligarchy, the landowners, merchants, and American imperial­
ists. Members of the 1J4 accused those groups of using their 
economic power to discredit the government and cry Communist 
danger in order that the "Tru.jillista military could justify 
calling a state of emergency." The 1J4 asserted that Bosch
had betrayed the popular masses while doing nothing to im-
18prove the economic development of the country.
To add to Bosch's problems, some of the more power­
ful factions of the armed forces had joined the landowners, 
businessmen,and the Church in openly opposing the Bosch 
government. The 1963 Constitution had not changed the con­
stitutional status of the armed forces. Bosch had not 
attempted to make drastic changes or reforms in the military. 
He made no effort to reduce their size or to reorganize them. 
In general, he refrained from tampering with the armed forces 
for fear that his government would be immediately overthrown. 
He did, however, curtail some of the top-level military graft. 
Though Bosch in his book claimed such curtailment as a major
reason for his overthrow, most observers contended that it 
19was not. '
^ E l  Carribe. Sept. 3, p. 15*
19^See Donald A. Allan, "Santo Domingo: The Empty
Showcase," The Reporter. XXIX (December 5* 1963)* 30; Bosch, 
Unfinished Experiment, pp. 184-85.
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One issue, however, united all the military officers 
who opposed Bosch: this was the issue of growing Communist
influence in his government. Howard J. Wiarda, in his article, 
"The Politics of Civil Military Relations in the Dominican 
Republic," asserts that for the officers, Communism was 
neither an ideological, economic nor imperialistic system, 
but only meant, as they recalled the case of the Cuban revo­
lution, "destruction of the armed forces and death to the 
officers." Wiarda believed that it "mattered little that 
there were few Communists or Fidellstas in the country, and
that they were disorganized and badly split; what was impor-
20tant was that the armed forces believed otherwise."
Despite the growing tensions and fears of Communism 
in the armed forces, Bosch did not take any action against 
either the ultra-leftists or the military. Bosch continued 
to reiterate that he would not preside over a dictatorship. 
Bosch was determined to be the antithesis of Trujillo and to 
keep the country completely free from persecution of any kind 
unless sanctioned by law. This helped to speed his downfall. 
Bosch hated Communism, but he refused to deprive the Com­
munists of their constitutional rights. In addition, he felt 
that Communists in the open were less dangerous than
20Howard J. Wiarda, "The Politics of Civil Military 
Relations in the Dominican Republic," Journal of Inter- 
american Studies. VII (October 1965), ^80.
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21Communists underground.
As Wiarda noted, "While the stand might have been 
laudable from an idealistic point of view, politically it 
proved disastrous." Wiarda believed that Bosch was probably 
correct in his assessment of the weak Communist position in 
the country, but that he was mistaken in not recognizing the 
issue as a political matter which "lofty principles could not 
decide."^
On the evening of September 24, 1963# a group armed
forces leaders, headed by Brigadier General Elias Wessin y
Wessin demanded, for the last time, that Bosch do something 
to curb Communist activity. Bosch refused to comply with 
their demands. At 2:30 A.M., on September 25, General Wessin 
placed Bosch under arrest and detained him in the National 
Palace. General Wessin and his group then took over the 
government.
In a statement announcing the coup, a communique blamed
the government for not taking a firm stand on the issue of
Communism despite the clear warning given by the military.
The communique also indicated that the new government would 
"respect the rights of the individual and of associations, 
especially the right to private property and free enterprise,
21El Carribe. July 9, 1963; Kurzman, Revolt of the
Damned.
^^Wiarda, "Politics of Civil Military Relations,"
p .  4 8 0 .
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so that commerce, industry and banks, free from fears of
confiscation could contribute to the development of the 
21country." ^
After the coup the military officers immediately 
dissolved Congress, abrogated the 1963 Constitution and re­
instated the Constitution of 1962.
2-^ CEAF. Libro Blanco, pp. 90-91 in Moreno, Barrios, 
pp. 90-91*
CHAPTER VII
THE REVOLUTION
On September 26, the day after the coup, military 
leaders installed a three man civilian junta, a Triumvirate, 
headed by Donald Reid Cabral* As his first official act,
Reid announced the deportation of former president, Juan 
Bosch*
Six hours after the coup, the United States suspended 
diplomatic relations and ordered the immediate withdrawal of 
all military and economic aid personnel except the peace 
corps. Washington also announced a freeze on economic assist­
ance funds*1
In the five years since the assassination of Trujillo,
the United States had committed itself to a wide range of
instruments of power and influence to ensure a democratic
regime in the Dominican Republic. The Kennedy administration
injected massive doses of economic aid in the form of millions
2
of American dollars and technical personnel. President
i
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela­
tions, Background Information Relating to the Dominican 
Republic‘s 89th Congress, 1st Sess. , October 18, 19&5$ Doc.
Ill, 73.
^For the year 1963, the United States spent 53*5 
million dollars. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Morse dis­
cussing recent events in the Dominican Republic, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess., June 8, 1965, Congressional Record, p. 12769.
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John Kennedy had hoped to make the Dominican Republic a 
"Showcase for Democracy" under the Alliance for Progress, 
but the swift overthrow of the constitutionally elected 
President, Juan Bosch, shattered many of the illusions of 
the Kennedy Administrat ion.
The State Department publicly condemned the military 
coup, and the United States continued its diplomatic, economic, 
and military boycott through October and November of 1963*
On November 27, shortly after Reid announced plans for presi­
dential elections in July, 1965, the new Johnson administration
extended diplomatic recognition to the Triumvirate govern- 
3
ment. President Johnson immediately resumed the United States
aid program, and during the next sixteen months, the United
States and the International Monetary Fund poured nearly 60
million dollars worth of grants and loans into the Dominican 
4Republic. Nevertheless, such aid did little to alleviate 
the steadily worsening situation.
In the aftermath of the coup, political and economic 
conditions deteriorated rapidly. While Trujillo controlled 
the nation, he held foreign importations and wages within 
strict bounds. After Trujillo*s death, salaries tripled;
^U.S.,- Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela­
tions, Background Information Relating to the Dominican 
Republic"  ^ 89th Congress, Fst Sess., October 1&, 1965, Doc• 
II, 83.
Il
Lloyd B. Dennis, "Dominican Dilemma, ** Editorial 
Research Reports. 14 (April 13, 1966) , p. 267.
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purchasing power increased; and imports rose from 69.5 mil­
lion in 1961 to 200 million in 1964. The foreign debt rose 
to alarming heights and completely destroyed the balance of 
trade.
To add to Reid*s difficulties, corruption, always a 
problem, now ran rampant throughout the nation, especially 
in the armed forces. The armed forces and the National Police 
conducted a contraband operation, selling forbidden imported 
goods to the public. One such enterprise, the Canteen Com­
pany of the National Police, openly advertised its wares in 
the newspapers. Armed forces abuse of the commissary privi­
leges reached such an extreme that the Merchants Association 
of Sellers of Vehicles and Household Effects in Santo Domingo 
complained that the armed forces technical services were 
importing home appliances, duty free, and publicly selling 
them in direct competition with merchants.^
The Reid government had inherited many of its problems, 
and despite strenuous efforts, Reid made only limited progress 
in improving conditions in the nation. Reid, a member of the 
old landholding elite, genuinely desired social change and 
even began a successful program of agrarian reform. Although
^Hispanic American Report. VII, No. 7 (Events of 
July 1964), p. 621.
6
Christian Science Monitor. April 28, 1965* V* H >
El CarribeT November 5> 1964, p* Hispanic American Report. 
VII, No. 9, (Events of Sept. 1964), p. 807.
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scrupulously honest, Reid was never popular; and, ironically,
his steps to overhaul the ruined economy and eliminate cor-
7
ruption ultimately led to his overthrow.'
To alleviate the balance of payment problem and to 
bolster the economy, Reid imposed a strict austerity program. 
He also took measures directed at eliminating corruption in 
the armed forces. Reid adopted a system of rotating top 
commands in an attempt to lessen the authority of the military 
leaders. He imposed a freeze on promotions and demoted some 
of the worst offenders who were engaged in corrupt operations. 
Reid's actions antagonized the strongest senior forces in the 
military and did nothing to placate the younger officers, who 
were impatient with Reid because he did not move fast enough 
in cleaning up graft and corruption. Reid's slowness in 
retiring senior officers to make way for promotions based on 
merit also disappointed junior officers.
At the same time, unemployment reached alarming 
proportions. As strikes became a common occurrence, Reid 
suspended civil liberties. Conditions in Santo Domingo grew 
more chaotic. After the overthrow of Bosch, prospects for 
the nation had been gloomy; now they were bleak. Everywhere,
7Howard J. Wiarda, "The U.S. and the Dominican Crisis: 
Background to Chaos," Caribbean Monthly Bulletin. IX (July 
1965)f in University Colloquy on Public Issues, After Santo 
Domingo What? U.S. Intervention in Latin America. An Inquiry 
(Austin, Texas: The University of Texas, 1966), p. II.
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in all sectors of the society, frustrations increased. To 
many Dominicans, there seemed to be no visible hope of alle­
viation through peaceful, non-violent means. For one reason 
or another, almost everyone in the country seemed anxious to 
remove Reid. Rumors of intrigues and plots for a counter-coup 
circulated freely all around the nation.
Indeed, shortly after the overthrow of Bosch, Rafael 
Molina Urena, speaker of the House under Bosch, began to 
organize a civilian movement aimed at restoring the Consti­
tution of 1963 and returning Bosch to the presidency. With 
the help of former members of the PRD, Urena gained adherents 
from small groups of upper and middle class.intellectuals and 
professionals in Santo Domingo and Santiago. These new sup­
porters were significant because a good many were dissidents 
from the conservative Union Civic Nacional (UCN) and other 
political parties which had previously opposed Bosch. Leaders 
from organized labor also joined Urena when it became apparent
that Bosch's overthrow was a severe setback for the free
8labor movement in the Dominican Republic.
In January 1965, leaders of the PRD and the Social 
Christian Revolutionary Party (PRSC) met in Puerto Rico and 
signed the "Pacto de Rio Piedras," which formally agreed to 
"build a common front to re-establish constitutional order
o
For a list of labor leaders and former Bosch oppo­
nents who joined Urena*s organization, see Moreno, Barrios, 
pp. 22-2*K Also see "Participants in the Dominican Crisis" 
in the Appendix.
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and to attempt to bring a democratic solution to the problems
of the country." This pact was highly publicized in El Listin
Diario and El Carribe through paid advertisements signed by
9
2000 people, most of them professionals and intellectuals.
On March 16 the Central Committee of the Popular 
Socialist Party (PSP) issued a manifesto calling for the 
return of Juan Bosch and the restoration of the 1963 Consti­
tution. Because of this manifesto, Bosch has been accused of 
conspiring with the Communists. According to Ambassador 
Martin, there is no evidence that Bosch's PRD ever sought the 
support of any of the three Marxist parties operating in the 
country; and on many occasions Bosch openly rejected the sup­
port of the Communists. As Ambassador Martin pointed out in
his book, "Bosch could hardly be blamed if they £" Communists J
10decided to support his PRD-Social Christian movement."
At the same time that Urena began his civilian 
organization, a group of young military officers, many of 
middle class extraction, began to organize a movement against 
the Reid government. Most of these younger officers had been 
trained in military academies at home or in the United States 
or the Canal Zone. Ironically, two important leaders, Colonel
9
^Jose A. Moreno, Sociological Aspects of the Dominican 
Revolution (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell Univer­
sity, 1967), P. 25; El Listin Diario. Feb. 12, 1964; El 
Carribe. Feb. 26, 1965*
"^Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 643* The PSP is the 
official Communist Party in the Dominican Republic.
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Francisco Deno Caamano and Colonel Rafael Fernando Domingues,
11were sons of Trujillo*s most hated generals; and Caamano
was one of those who participated in the coup which deposed
Bosch in 1963* At the time of his overthrow, Bosch claimed
to have supporters in the armed forces, particularly among
12enlisted men and lower and middle grade officers. By the
fall of 1964, a large number of younger officers from the
Army, Air Force, Navy, and National Police had joined the
pro-Bosch revolutionary movement.
At the end of 1964, four different groups were
plotting to overthrow the government: The PRD civilian
group; the military group organized by Domingues; and a grass
roots movement among rank and file of the army, headed by
Captain Pena Taveras. Another group organized by Colonel
Neit Niva Seijas of the San Cristobal military installation,
proposed to bring back former President Balaguer. Seijas*
group had among its followers high-ranking officers, includ-
11ing some generals. ^
By the spring of 1965* rumors of plots and conspira­
cies proliferated. Reid was aware of the intrigues against 
him, but did not expect trouble until late May or early June.
11Moreno, Barrios. p. 25.
1 2Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 644.
1 3-'Moreno, Barrios. p. 26; Martin, Overtaken by 
Events, p. 644.
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Unknown to Reid, Bosch’s civilian supporters and some younger 
officers of the armed forces had scheduled a revolt for 
April 26, 1965. But on the morning of April 2^, Reid took 
steps to prevent future difficulties within the armed forces. 
He sent his Chief of Staff, General Rivera Cuesta, to arrest 
six would-be conspirators, General Cuesta ordered Captain 
Mario Peno Taveras to assist in the arrest, but Taveras was 
himself one of the leaders plotting against Reid, Instead of 
following orders, Taveras arrested Cuesta and freed the 
prisoners. Taveras*s action prematurely triggered the up­
rising. The remainder of the disaffected middle grade junior 
officers now declared themselves in revolt against the Reid
government and set the coup in motion by seizing the 27th of
1February Military Camp.
Early that same afternoon, a group of civilians took
1 6over the two radio stations in Santo Domingo. ^ Pena Gomez 
of the PRD announced that the Reid government had been over­
thrown, and Gomez then appealed to the people to give the 
rebels their support. From the slums of Santo Domingo, 
thousands of Dominicans poured into the streets and cele­
brated.
1 ^ Moreno, Barrios, p. 27,
1 SU.S•, Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Testimony of Brigadier General Elias Wessin y Wessin. Hear­
ings before a Subcommittee to investigate the Administration 
of the Internal Security Act and other internal security laws, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess., October 1, 1965, p. 209.
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The rebellion had taken everyone by surprise, espe-
1 f icially the members of the various Communist parties and the 
American Embassy. Members of the American legation had no 
inkling of an immediate revolt. On Saturday, April 2*+th, 
the Embassy was almost deserted. Ambassador W. Tapley 
Bennett, Jr. was in Washington on a routine trip and had 
taken the weekend to visit his mother in Georgia. The Ameri­
can Naval Attache was on a dove-shooting trip with General 
Antonio Barrera Imbert. Air Attache, Colonel Thomas Fishburn 
was playing golf with General of the Air Force, Juan de los 
Santos Cespedes. Eleven of the thirteen members of the 
Military Advisory and Assistance Mission were spending the 
weekend at a conference in Panama. Until Ambassador Bennett 
returned, Charge d*Affairs, William Connett, who had been in 
the country six months, was in charge of the Embassy. Actively 
working with Connett was Second Secretary Arthur Breisky.
By Sunday, April 25th, the situation in Santo Domingo
became increasingly confused. Reid appealed to the generals
at San Isidro for support but could only rally about UOO
troops. When General Elias Wessin y Wessin and the other
senior officers of the armed forces refused to come to Reid's
17aid, Reid announced his resignation and went into hiding. '
16J. I. Quello and N. Isa Conde, MRevolutionary 
Struggle in the Dominican Republic and its Lessons,1' The World 
Marxist Review. 8 (December 1965)> PP* 71-81.
17'Wessin Testimony, p. 213
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Upon the resignation of Reid, the leaders of the 
revolt followed Bosch's instructions and swore in Molina 
Urena as provisional President. According to the 1963 Consti­
tution, Urena was constitutionally next in line for the 
presidency since he had been the speaker of the House under 
Bosch.
By this time the revolt, which began as a classic 
coup, became a mass uprising. However, once under way, it 
was apparent that the officers involved had differing objec­
tives. The junior element of the armed forces demanded a 
restoration of the 1963 Constitution and the return of Bosch 
as President. They also supported the installation of a pro­
visional government with Urena as President until Bosch could 
return from exile. The opposing group, mostly top-ranking 
officers, refused to accept Bosch's return and insisted on 
the formation of a military junta. Here the two factions 
came into open conflict; for while sentiment ran high against 
the Reid regime, there was no consensus of what should take 
its place.
Most of the junior officers supported Bosch and the 
Constitution of 1963; a few favored the 1963 Constitution, 
but not Bosch. Some of the older military officers favored 
the return of former President Balaguer. Still others were 
against Reid because of his efforts to reform the armed
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1 Hforces, but they also opposed Bosch. Among the staunchest
supporters of the military junta, there were senior officers
who later claimed that they had supported Reid*s removal
because they ”believed his ouster would bring free elections
and a return to constitutional government.” They refused,
however, to even consider the return of the 1963 Constitution 
19and Bosch. 7 It was this wide divergence of objectives among 
the military officers which finally split the armed forces.
No matter what the reason, divisions within the mili­
tary continued to widen, and at this point, everyone could 
agree on only one thing: The situation had become highly
confused. When the rebels and the representatives of the 
senior generals sat down at the conference table on Sunday, 
April 25, to discuss a settlement, Colonel Hernando Ramfrez, 
speaking for the rebel leadership made one point perfectly 
clear to Colonel Pedro B. Benoit, the negotiator for the
generals: the principle of the return to the Constitution
20of 1963 with Bosch as President was not negotiable.
18U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Selden speaking on 
"The Dominican Situation,” 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 23,
1965, Congressional Record, p. 2^975.
1Q / >
7 Juan Tomas Mejia Feliu, "Prologo,” in Danilo Brugal 
Alfau, Tragedia en Santo Domingo: Documentos para le Historia
(Santo Domingo: Editorial El Carribe, 1966), p. vii. ~
20Moreno, Barrios, p. 28.
A note about terminology: From the beginning, the
rebels called themselves "constitutionalist” and referred to 
the loyalists as "anti-constitutionalists." The terms rebels
13^
Outside, the young people chanted, "Juan Bo Presidente,” 
but inside the negotiations reached an impasse. The senior 
element of the armed forces remained adamant. Pro-Bosch 
forces, equally determined, insisted on an immediate provi­
sional government with Urena as President until Bosch could 
return from exile. Pro-Bosch army officers prevailed, but the 
senior officers refused to comply, declaring that they would
attack the rebels unless a military junta were installed to
21prepare for national elections in September.
Around five o'clock on April 25th, as the constitu­
tionalist President, Molina Urena, was officially being sworn 
in, General Wessin*s pro-junta forces began strafing the 
National Palace. Outraged by the air attacks, pro-constitu­
tionalist civilians began looting and firing on the National 
Police. The people from the slums poured into the streets. 
Rebels, who had previously broken into the arsenal of the 2?th 
of February Gamp, trucked arms and amunition into downtown 
Santo Domingo and began distributing rifles and machine guns 
to civilians. The uprising now became a civil war. The 
distribution of arms to civilians was a key element in
and constitutionalists for one side and loyalists and anti­
constitutionalists on the other side will be used inter­
changeably to refer to the two factions. No ideological 
connotation is intended. In the early stages of the Revo­
lution, the two sides were also designated as pro-Bosch or 
pro-junta.
^ Wessin Testimony, p. 209.
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transforming the nature of the rebellion* It was at this
point that pro-junta forces began to charge that the movement
22had been taken over by Communists*
In the first hours, hundreds were killed, especially 
in fire fighting between the two groups* As General Wessin 
advanced into the city, the rebels dug in behind barricades 
in the Ciudad Nueva section of the city* Fighting remained 
indecisive*
On April 26th, Wessin*s anti-rebel forces, which 
earlier had been badly disunited and disorganized, again began 
to move against the rebels* The Dominican Air Force bombed 
and machine-gunned various rebel held installations. Rebel 
distribution of arms to civilians continued, and the morning 
of April 27th saw a complete breakdown of law and order*
At 12:k0 P.M*, that same Tuesday, April 27, Ambassador 
Tapley Bennett arrived in Santo Domingo. During the early 
part of the day, pro-junta forces seemed to be making progress 
against the rebels but encountered heavier resistance than 
they had anticipated* By afternoon, junta forces had lost 
their earlier momentum, and the situation in the city became 
increasingly tense and confused. The police were no longer 
effective and junta forces, tired and disorganized, began to 
crumble. Nevertheless, Wessin*s forces continued to move 
toward the city.
22w essin Testimony, p. 209*
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Already on the 27th, about 2000 people were reported
dead. Late in the afternoon, as the tanks from San Isidro
advanced upon the city, a group of rebel officers came to the
United States Embassy to appeal to Ambassador Bennett to
mediate. There are conflicting reports about what was
actually said that afternoon. The rebels insist that the
Ambassador refused to mediate and suggested total surrender
instead. Bennett claims to have said that the United States
was neutral and could not interfere. He told the rebels that
he did not have the authority to mediate, and that the matter
21should be settled by "Dominicans talking to Dominicans." ^
At first, the rebels appeared to be shaken by 
Bennett's statements. Urena and a few others, who were 
completely demoralized by the recent fighting and the Ambas­
sador's refusal to assist in the negotiations, took asylum in 
a foreign embassy. At this point, Ambassador Bennett assumed 
that the rebel movement had collapsed and that the uprising 
was over. He advised Washington to that effect. The next 
day, American newspapers printed stories announcing that the 
Dominican Revolution had sputtered out.
Unknown to Bennett, most of the rebel military leaders 
and a number of civilians had decided to return to the battle­
field. Outraged and feeling there was no other door open to
21^Center for Strategic Studies, Dominican Action—  
1965: Intervention or Cooperation? Special Report Series,
No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1966), p. 28.
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them, the remaining rebel leaders launched a counter-attack.
By seven o ‘clock the rebels, under the leadership of Colonel 
Caamano and Colonel Montes Arache, regained full control of 
the fighting. That same night the rebels reorganized their 
leadership cadres. Colonel Caamano, who earlier had been 
appointed by Urena as Chief of Operations, now became the 
highest ranking rebel officer with full responsibility for 
the movement. With the reorganization, a number of civilian 
leaders who had joined the revolution in the last two days 
began to emerge in important leadership roles. Many of them 
had a high degree of organizational abilities, and some had 
military guerrilla experience. Their participation gave the 
rebel movement new organizational expertise, but also tinged 
its political goals with a high degree of radicalism since most 
of these men could be considered to be to the left of the 
original rebel leaders. The regular army officers insisted, 
however, that they always maintained control of their leader­
ship positions. Nelson Goodsell of the Christian Science 
Monitor was in Santo Domingo during the first days of the 
civil war, and he noted that "while there are Communists in 
their midst, top rebel command is in the hands of non-Com-
2 II
munist elements who fiercely proclaim opposition to Communism."
2 Ll , ,
The Christian Science Monitor. May 6, 1965, P» 11*
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The next day Caamano appointed Montes Arache, Minister 
of Defense and Hector Aristy, Minister of the Presidency.
From then on, Caamano and Aristy worked as a team. From the 
start the rebels emphasized the fact that they wanted to 
return to a legitimate constitutional situation. On May 3, 
the Dominican National Assembly gathered in Ciudad Nueva in 
emergency session and elected Caamano constitutional President 
according to article 105 of the 1963 Constitution, by a vote 
of 49 out of 58 votes.
On Wednesday, April 28, Ambassador Bennett sent an 
emissary to San Isidro and found the loyalist commanders in 
disarray, discouraged, and disorganized. Colonel Pedro B. 
Benoit informed the American emissary that "the loyalist troops 
could not protect United States lives," and Benoit emphasized 
that he thought Americans were in danger. By noon Colonel 
Arturo Despradel, of the National Police, told Bennett the 
same thing. Around one or two in the afternoon Bennett 
reported Benoit*s views to the State Department by telephone 
and sent Despradel*s statements by cable. Bennett also re­
ported that despite the disorder of the Wessin forces, 
loyalists were ready to resume attack. Meanwhile, smother 
loyalist leader, General de los Santos, urgently requested 
fifty walkie-talkies. Ambassador Bennett recommended that
2*>^Gaceta Official de la Republica Dominicana. 
March 4, 1965 > in Moreno. Barrios. p. 40♦
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they be provided, saying that "he regretted having to turn 
to a military solution for a political crisis, but that now 
with all responsible rebels in hiding or asylum, the struggle 
had developed into one between the Castro Communists and the 
loyalists*"^
At noon that same Wednesday, Radio San Isidro an­
nounced the formation of a military junta, headed by Colonel 
Benoit. Benoit then telephoned the Embassy to request U.S. 
aid in "restoring peace." Bennett cabled the oral request
to Washington at 3:16 P.M., but said that he did not believe
27the situation at that time warranted a landing by marines.
At 3:30 P.M. Benoit formally requested aid to "put 
down the rebellion which was directed by Communists armed to
oO
convert the country into another Cuba." The second request 
was in writing, but made no mention of protecting American 
lives.
At 5:30 P.M. President Johnson received another urgent 
cable from Bennett saying that the situation had deteriorated 
rapidly, and that the police could no longer protect the 
evacuation of Americans. Bennett also informed Washington
2 AU.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Pulbright on "The 
Situation in the Dominican Republic," 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 
September 15, 1965, Congressional Record, p. 23357* Also 
see Martin, Overtaken by Events^ p7 £>55.
27Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 655»
28Ibid.. p. 656.
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that the Generals at San Isidro were dejected, and that the
Embassy team unanimously believed the time had come to land
29the marines,
Johnson called in Congressional leaders, and at 8:^0 
P.M. went on the radio to declare that the United States was
sending American marines to protect Americans and other
nationals who were in danger.
President Johnson quickly summoned former Ambassador
John Martin from his home in Connecticut and sent him as a
special emissary to the Dominican Republic. Martin arrived 
on the morning of April 30th, the same day that the Papal 
Nuncio, Emanuele Clarizio, succeeded in obtaining a cease-fire 
from the contending factions. By this time, United States 
troops had created an wInternational Security Zone" around 
the American and other foreign embassies.
Upon arrival in Santo Domingo, Martin made contact 
with Colonel Caamano in the rebel zone and then went imme­
diately to see his old acquaintance, General Antonio Barrera 
Imbert. Martin spent seventeen days in Santo Domingo trying 
to negotiate a settlement and helping to set up the Government 
of National Reconstruction, headed by General Imbert.^
2^U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. Vol. LII,
May 17, 1965, p. 738, pp. 9^1-b2; June 1^, T965, pp. 9^1-9^.
10- John B. Martin, "Struggle to Bring Together Two 
Sides Torn by Killing, * Life. May 28, 1965, p. 28.
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Forty-eight hours after his arrival, Martin made up 
his mind about the Revolution. On May 2, Martin held a press 
conference, and declared that the Revolution had been taken 
over by Communists. That same night in Washington, President 
Johnson on nationwide radio and television announced that he 
and his State Department advisors were convinced that the 
Revolution was in Communist hands. As President Johnson told 
the nation:
The revolutionary movement took a tragic 
turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained 
in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, 
to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They 
took increasing control. And what began as a 
popular democratic revolution, committed to 
democracy and social justice, very shortly moved 
and was taken over and really seized and placed 
into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators.
The American nations cannot, must not, and will 
not permit the establishment of another Communist 
government in the Western Hemisphere•31
That same evening, marines, who had been waiting on 
the nearby carrier, Boxer, poured into Santo Domingo. Before 
the Americans withdrew, 22,000 marines had landed on the 
troubled Caribbean island.
The arrival of the United States marines quickly 
halted the actual fighting. A few days later, an Inter- 
American Peace force, hastily organized by the Organization 
of American States, arrived in Santo Domingo and joined the
^U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, LII, No. 1351, 
May 17, 1965, p. 745.
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32marines. Despite a cease-fire agreement and intervention 
by troops of the United States and the Organization of American 
States, sporadic fighting continued throughout the summer. 
General Imbert and supporters of the National Reconstruction 
government declared that the constitutionalists were Communist- 
dominated, The constitutionalists called Imbert1s adherents 
reactionary. Each faction accused the other of atrocities, 
and claimed that it would have achieved military victory if 
the United States intervention had not occurred.
Negotiations conducted by the Papal Nuncio and of­
ficials of the Organization of American States, the United 
Nations, and the United States continued throughout the summer. 
These joint efforts finally produced a settlement, and Hector 
Garcia Godoy became the Provisional President of the Pro­
visional Government on September 3> 1965-
Thousands of words have been written about the American 
intervention and whether it was justified; whether it was 
legal; whether it tipped the balance in favor of one side or 
another; and whether the Revolution had been taken over by 
the Communists. The testimony of a number of participants 
and observers show sharply differing views on all of these 
questions, but especially on the question of Communist infil­
tration and control. Most parties involved, even impartial
12For a discussion of the role of the Organization of 
American States, see U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, LII, 
June 7, 1965, pp. 909-919.
1 ^ 3
observers, seem unable to agree on the Mfacts." The emo­
tionally charged nature of the conflict seems to have made 
a clearcut assessment almost impossible. Moreover, the 
majority of reporters and analysts did not arrive in the 
Dominican Republic until several days after the uprising was 
under way. As one observer noted, HIn a very real sense, the 
historical record of the Dominican revolt remains beclouded,
and certain key questions . . .  probably will never be re- 
aa
solved.^
On one thing, however, all observers could agree: The
conflict took on a completely different character after the 
American intervention® What had begun as a domestic upheaval 
took on international and hemispheric proportions. But it is 
not the purpose of this study, to make conclusions about the 
American intervention or whether or not the Revolution had 
been taken over by the Communists. This work will confine 
itself to examining the issue of constitutionalism and its 
role in the Revolution.
aa .
Richard Rc Pagen, et al, Political Power in Latin 
America: Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 232„
CHAPTER VIII
HUMAN CONCERNS
An uprising in a tiny island in the Caribbean now 
became a matter for international concern— an event fraught 
with world-wide implications. But for the average person in 
Santo Domingo, the Revolution continued to be a matter of 
simple human concerns. In the first hours of the civil war, 
when participants chose one side or another, they were 
primarily motivated by personal goals and desires. Most 
Dominicans were not preoccupied with world affairs or politi­
cal ideology. In most cases, they considered their involvement 
in terms of opportunities for a better future— jobs, housing, 
self-advancement; or in terms of gaining power or preserving 
privileges and position.
Much of the current writing on the April violence 
accepts the standard view that the Revolution was simply a 
popular uprising against oligarchic-military rule, an out­
growth of a widespread desire among the Dominican people for 
a return to constitutional, reformist government under Bosch.* 
Many of the proponents of this view place particular emphasis
1
See La Nacion. the official constitutionalist news 
paper, May 8, May 11, 1965.
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1^5
on the constitutional struggle as the overriding cause of the
2
Revolution. Such an approach is an over-simplification of 
a confrontation of considerably more complexity.
It is true that in the early hours of the Revolution 
the rebels adopted the battle cry of "constitutionalism and 
the return of Juan Bosch” and began to call themselves con­
st! tutionalists. It is also true that such a slogan forced 
Dominicans to take a stand for or against a particular consti­
tution. The Constitutions of 1962 and 1963 were legal and 
formal expressions of two different ways of life, two different 
value systems, and two different conceptions of the way in 
which society should be organized. To the rebels, the Con­
stitution of 1963 and its proposals for a welfare state 
promised a fulfillment of personal and national goals. On 
the other hand, those who supported the Constitution of 1962 
saw the Bosch document as a stumbling block to the achievement 
of their own goals. Above all, the anti-constitutionalists 
viewed the 1963 Constitution as a threat to their previously 
attained social, economic, and political positions.
In general, most Dominicans who took a stand in favor 
of one side or another, made their decisions on the basis of
2
Howard J. Wiarda, "Contemporary Constitutions and 
Constitutionalism: The Dominican Republic,” Law and Society
Review, II (June 1968), p. *401. This writer rejects Wiarda's 
emphasis, but this is not to discredit the excellent work 
done by Wiarda in his many studies on the Dominican Republic.
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whether they rejected or accepted the principles of the Bosch 
Constitution. Nevertheless, it must be made perfectly clear 
that constitutional issues alone did not decide all align­
ments. At the time of the April uprising, societal divisions 
ran deep and wide, not only among the various classes, among 
political parties, and among interest groups; but also there 
was division and fragmentation within these groups. Much of 
the fragmentation may be directly traced to the chaotic and 
turbulent Dominican past. The Dominican Revolution was more 
than a mere struggle to restore the Constitution of 1963* 
Actually, the Revolution was fought on two levels. In one 
respect it was a fight for constitutional government and an 
attempt to bring the deprived masses into the life of the 
nation. But on the other hand, the Revolution may be viewed 
as a struggle for personal advancement or power on the part 
of individuals and groups within the society. As such, the 
uprising must be viewed in the context of the old Dominican 
pattern of constantly changing political alliances.
Perhaps the key characteristic of recent 
Dominican politics has been the predominance of 
a very direct, virtually naked, confrontation 
among groups in conflict. The tactics employed 
by each group since 1961 have tended toward 
increasingly undisguised and unrefined displays 
of power, directed more often at replacing 
/"italics mineJ  the government than at forcing 
it to take specific action.3
^Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Politics of Chaos, p. 47.
1^7
All through Dominican history, the country has lacked 
institutional means by which groups might present their 
demands and obtain satisfaction# In the Dominican Republic 
"Force has always been the arbiter*" The Revolution was one 
more chapter in the long struggle of the "ins" against the 
"outs," and the bloody civil war was the culmination of the
h.
long years of constantly recurring turmoil.
And so, not everyone committed himself to the rebel 
or loyalist cause because he supported or opposed certain 
constitutional precepts. Although in many cases the principles 
of the Constitution of 1963 were of paramount importance, some 
participants made their commitments on the basis of what would 
best promote their efforts to retain or gain personal power.
To make such distinctions, is not to minimize the 
role of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism was important 
because it became a rallying ground for mobilizing forces 
behind one group or another, and in that respect, played a 
vital role. It is, therefore, useful to look at the various 
sectors of Dominican society to see how they aligned them­
selves vis a vis the Constitution. At the same time, every 
effort will be made to point out the instances in which the 
struggle for power was the dominating factor. Hopefully, 
such an examination of the tensions and attitudes in Dominican 
society should result in a better understanding of the nature 
of the uprising.
h
Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p.
1^3
How did the various social sectors and interest 
groups fit into the overall pattern of the Revolution? It 
has often been suggested that the rebels were fighting against 
oligarchic rule. Bosch, himself, in the official constitu­
tionalist newspaper, La Nacion. said, "The Revolution is an 
episode in the fight of the Dominican people to overcome the 
will of the . . .  oligarchic minority."-* But there have been 
conflicting opinions as to the actual role of the oligarchy 
in Dominican society as well as in the Revolution itself.
Abraham Lowenthal, who lived and studied in the 
Dominican Republic from 196^ to 1966, noted that mention of 
the oligarchy would suggest "a coherent, hereditary elite of 
large landowners who tightly controlled economic and political 
power." Such an oligarchy would be expected to be reactionary 
in outlook and firmly opposed to social change. Lowenthal 
contends that in the Dominican Republic, there is no such 
coherent group. There is a small group of families de -primera 
(first families) who have been prominent in Dominican society 
for several generations. Nevertheless, the elite constitutes 
a very small percentage of the population, not more than a 
hundred families. Moreover, Trujillo kept most of them 
"atomized and without an independent power base" during his
7
domination.'
^La Nacion. May 11, 1965* P* 3*
^Lowenthal, Politics of Chaos, p. 37*
7
'Wiarda, Dictatorship and Development, p. 99*
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In addition, this upper stratum does not form a 
plutocracy, nor does it control the economy* Even in the 
context of an extremely poor country, this most oligarchic 
group is not wealthy. Most of the principal sources of 
wealth in the Dominican Republic became the property of the 
state after the confiscation of the Trujillo holdings. The 
remainder of wealth is either in the hands of foreigners or 
recent immigrants.
Neither is the oligarchy politically powerful; for, 
in general it has abstained from politics. The elite has 
often been pictured as a monolithic, anti-reform oligarchy, 
but Howard J. Wiarda in a reassessment of Dominican society 
after the Revolution, observed that rather the elite was "a 
loose coalition of individuals, families, and organizations 
which on some issues gave the appearance of working as a
o
unified group."
Ambassador Martin, upon his arrival in the Dominican 
Republic in 1962, was of the opinion that most of the members 
of the oligarchy were "beyond any question the ablest, best 
educated people in the Republic." Martin described them as 
being "realistic at their worst and favoring justice at their 
best." Martin added that it may seem odd "that a liberal 
Democrat like myself should come to consider the Dominican
Q
Howard J. Wiarda, "The Dominican Republic After the 
Revolution," in Pagen, Political Power, p. 292.
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oligarchy as one of the really hopeful groups in the Re­
public.
In fact, many of the elite did not actively oppose 
Bosch, and some even protested his overthrow publicly when 
few Dominicans did, A number of oligarchs and their friends 
such as Marco Cabral and Carlos Alberto Ricart, the publisher 
of El Listin Diario. openly opposed the coup in 1963**^
The important thing to remember about the oligarchy
is that, in general, it does not dominate politics and prefers
to remain aloof in provincial Santiago, avoiding the political
11atmosphere of Santo Domingo.
In the Dominican Republic, of the various monied 
groups, perhaps the new rich of the upper middle class come 
closest to playing the role of an oligarchy. Composing the 
social stratum immediately below the elite, most of the new 
rich achieved their position through political and economic 
force rather than ancestry. The new rich -are found in high 
military posts, high level and middle level political posts, 
and above all in business. Most of those in important 
political and military positions ascended the social ladder 
during the Trujillo regime; the new rich of the business 
community are recent Spanish, Syrian, or Lebanese immigrants
^Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 134.
10Ibld.. p. 715.
Robert, Handbook for the Dominican Republic, p. 66.
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whose fortunes have been made in the past forty years. It 
is this small group of new rich, rather than the traditional 
oligarchy, who run the country. This same group has a con­
siderable influence over the Church, educational institutions,
12the judiciary, and the military and police establishment.
These members of the upper middle class especially felt 
themselves threatened by Bosch*s social welfare program in 
1963. In 1963 Bosch did not try to depose the older power 
structure but tried to implement a reform program by means 
of his welfare oriented Constitution, When the Bosch govern­
ment embarked upon specific reforms and moved beyond minimal 
adjustments to the system, cries of protest arose from the 
property-owning groups. When the new rich, business-property- 
owning elements banded together with some sectors of the 
military and overthrew the Bosch regime, they declared that 
they were ousting Bosch because he was leading the nation 
toward Communism, Fundamentally, however, it was the social 
welfare pronouncements of the 1963 Constitution which actually 
triggered their opposition. Polarization of Dominican society 
began with the publication of the draft Constitution of 1963* 
The fissure widened in the eighteen months following the 
coup, but no one had attempted to conciliate the abrasive 
issues which had precipitated the coup. The same conflicts 
which divided Dominicans In 1963 continued to be present and
12Roberts, Handbook for the Dominican Republic, p, 67,
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unresolved In 1965. There was no reason to believe that 
those members of the upper-middle class who had opposed Bosch 
and his program in 1963 would be willing to accept him in 
1965. Thus, the new rich of the upper middle class continued 
to give strong support to the loyalist anti-Bosch forces*
On the other hand, alignments in favor or against the 
rebels cut sharply across the urban middle class* The middle 
class is bounded by the new rich at the top and the lower 
class at the bottom. This range includes a variety of dif­
ferent groups, each trying to attain the symbols of status 
that differentiate it from the next lower class. This sector 
is small and politically divided, consisting mostly of small
businessmen and white collar workers with education but no
13economic independence* ^
The most significant aspect in regard to the middle 
class is the generational split. This cleavage between 
parents and sons intersected all classes,‘but especially that 
of the urban middle class. Even before the Revolution, a 
split between the young and the old began to emerge* After 
the death of Trujillo, many adults who had lived under the 
dictatorship refrained from political activity, perhaps 
because of cynicism or, perhaps because of their sense of 
guilt at having passively cooperated with Trujillo* As a 
result, most students broke politically with their parents
1 3-^Roberts, Handbook for the Dominican Republic, p* 199*
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whom they saw as discredited by their acquiescence to Tru— 
jillo*s rule*
Many of the middle class youth were intensely 
nationalistic and desired to revenge themselves for the 
compromises of their fathers. Especially, the urban educated 
youth hoped to achieve social progress after the death of 
Trujillo, and they committed themselves to creating a new
i k
social order based on social justice and progress.
In 1962, the youth thought the prospects for their 
country had improved. Their personal and national aspirations 
for the future were high. Nevertheless, while hopes were high, 
material and political conditions in the nation deteriorated. 
After President Bosch was overthrown, frustration of social 
and personal aspirations among youth was universal. By the 
time of the overthrow of Reid, students* hopes were sub­
stantially disappointed.
Bryant Wedge, who made a psychological survey of 
Dominican youth immediately following the Revolution, observed 
that by spring of 1965 Dominican students were strongly 
motivated toward anger. Thus, the direct action of the mili­
tary forces in shooting and bombing the rebels on April 25, 
clearly precipitated violent response. Paced with a direct 
threat, students who had not anticipated participation in 
violence suddenly sought and accepted weapons. "Frustration
1^Roberts, Handbook for the Dominican Republic, p. 171#
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had brought them to protest, fear ensured its violent form."*-*
In April of 1965, the young in the Dominican Republic 
mobilized for the first time and played an active and signif­
icant part in the Revolution. About 20 per cent of the 
educated middle class youth actively participated on the side 
of the rebels, and it was the youth who provided the main 
support of the constitutionalist movement. Almost without 
exception, the young supported the social welfare program of 
the Constitution of 1963, but not all of them supported Bosch 
himself.1^
One interest group, not nearly so cohesive, was the 
Catholic Church. In 1963 Bosch blamed the upper middle class, 
the military, and the Church for his downfall. At the time 
of the promulgation of the 1963 Constitution, the Church 
officially expressed its disapproval of the Constitution in a 
formal statement by the Dominican Episcopate. In fact, in 
1963, the Church actively worked against Bosch*s administration. 
In 1965, however, the Church took a less overt stand. The 
official hierarchy did not attack either side but appealed for
1-'Bryant Wedge, "The Case Study of Student Political 
Violence: Brazil 1964 and Dominican Republic 1965,* World
Politics, XXI (January 1969), PP* 192-97* Wedge*s observa­
tions are drawn from dialogic interviews with students in 
their normal surroundings, recording 132 interviews and 32 
group interviews involving 653 students, five months after 
the outbreak of violence. Wedge's research was under the 
auspices of the Center for International Studies at Princeton 
University.
l6rt>ia.. p. 187.
peace, and later endorsed the U.S. formula for a government
17of "national unity with broad popular support." f In general
the Church rallied behind the forces of the loyalists, but it
cannot be stated flatly that the Church totally mobilized
against the rebels. In fact, conflict over the Revolution
widened already existing divisions within the Church. It is
true that most of the Church hierarchy were hostile to the
constitutionalists. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made
between the universal Church on the one hand— officially
represented by the Papal Nuncio and unofficially by the
younger clergy, most of them foreigners trained in the United
States and Europe— and the local Church, represented by the
bishops and the local clergy. The first group actively tried
to find solutions for the crisis, and the Papal Nuncio,
Emmanuel Clarizio, worked diligently to get a cease fire
agreement. In addition, the Nuncio and others close to him
distributed food and generally assisted both sides. Some of
the lesser clergy even moved into the rebel zone after the
older, more conservative priests departed, and some actively
18shared the rebels' hardships.
It must be pointed out that even before the Revolution 
some changes had been taking place in the hierarchy. Some of 
the younger and more liberal administrators showed evidence
17E1 Listin Dlario. April 2, 2k, 1965, p. 11.
18Moreno, Barrios, p. 161. Also see Patria, May lk,
1965.
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of being influenced by the progressive movement begun by 
Pope John XXIII.Nevertheless, most clerics viewed Bosch's 
social welfare program as a danger to the established order.
In addition, a strong and vocal minority, particularly Jesuits 
who had been expelled from Cuba, portrayed Bosch as a Marxist- 
Leninist and Communist sympathizer. The majority of the 
Church hierarchy supported this anti-Communist sentiment, 
fearing that a rebel victory would mean a loss of Church 
power. Officially, the Church remained uncommitted; unof­
ficially and covertly, the Church hierarchy favored the
2'loyalists, while many of the lesser clergy favored the rebels.
Constitutionalism and the struggle for power played 
equal roles in motivating members of the armed forces. Tra­
ditionally, the military structure has looked upon itself as 
the protector of the established order and as the nation's 
strongest bulwark against the Communist threat. The Dominican 
military has been pictured as a monolithic force which always 
aligned itself with the oligarchy and the Church against the 
masses.
During the thirty years of the Trujillo dictatorship, 
the military helped to maintain a system of government which 
gave members of the armed forces a privileged position in
19^Wiarda, "The Dominican Republic After the Revo­
lution," in Pagen, Political Power, p. 292.
20Moreno, Barrios, p. 162.
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society; and, indeed, the military was a monolithic force 
which helped to impose the will of the dictator on the people. 
When the dictatorship ended, the military continued to refuse 
to subordinate itself to civilian authority and, instead, 
attempted to use its power to perpetuate its monopoly of 
political life. Nevertheless, the death of Trujillo, the 
ouster of the Trujillo family, and the exile of many Tru.111- 
lista officers deprived the armed forces of their leadership. 
Thus, a power vacuum resulted. This lack of leadership 
ushered in a return to competition similar to that of the 
old days before the Constabulary; except that the contemporary 
struggle was not between rival bands, but was within the 
armed forces themselves.
Meanwhile, Bosch's reform administration threatened 
to dissipate the dominance of the military. Interpreting the 
1963 Constitution as a menace to its prerogatives, the mili­
tary hierarchy linked itself with civilian groups and staged 
the coup which ousted Bosch. This action created a fissure 
in the ranks of the already divided military structure. Many 
of the junior officers and younger enlisted men, as well, 
came from the lower classes and approved of the reforms 
introduced by Bosch. They felt a great affinity for civilian 
leaders who were demanding social justice and the abolition 
of excessive privilege.
Following the overthrow of Bosch, constant strife 
continued and caused frequent shifts of key military
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personnel, with the firing or reinstatement of officers and
enlisted men, the exile of some, and the return of others.
While some of the junior officers truly desired reform, others
wrangled for power and a chance at the spoils. The old
familiar pattern returned with politics in the Dominican
Republic, especially within the military structure, resembling
a "kaleidoscope of constantly shifting groups of 'outs1
against equally temporary alignments of 'ins,* but with very
21little consistency with respect to program or ideology."
Within the armed forces, there was a constant shuffling and 
reshuffling of alliances. During the years following the 
assassination of Trujillo, various military figures appear 
again and again in different combinations. In the Dominican
Republic, switching loyalties or political positions has always
22borne little cost.
Thus, in the Revolution of 1965# the struggle for 
power was as important as the struggle for* social justice.
Many officers fought to restore constitutionalism, but just
Lowenthal, The Politics of Chaos, p. 40; p. 47*
22Further amplification regarding the shifting of 
alliances in the military would require a separate essay. To 
mention a few: The brothers Rodrigues Echavarria, the
cousins Montas Guerrero, Belisario, Peguero, Fransico Caamano, 
Deno, Fernandez Domingues, Francisco Rivera Gaminero, Neit 
Nivar Seijas, Pedro Benoit, Elias Wessin y Wessin, and many 
others constantly changed groupings. For documentation, see 
the biographies of the armed forces leaders in their own 
publications, Avance and Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas.
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as many of them fought for reinstatement into the armed forces 
from which they had been fired, or to maintain and continue 
privileges they had always enjoyed. Whether for reasons of 
power or ideology, by the time of Beid*s overthrow, division 
was plainly visible in the armed forces. The ultimate split 
occurred, however, over the question of the Constitution of 
1963 and the return of Juan Bosch.
Perhaps, the least divided and fragmented sector of 
Dominican society was that of the lower class urban prole­
tariate. It was among these urban masses that a strong 
cohesion was most visible. Juan Bosch and the PHD had 
awakened the political consciousness of the masses, and it 
was among them and their leaders that an ideological frame 
could be detected. In the case of the urban masses, the 
slogan, calling for "a return to the Constitution of 19&3 
with Juan Bosch," played an important role in mobilizing mass 
opinion in favor of the rebels.
The organization of the rebels consisted of about 
3000 regulars who had participated in the initial uprising 
and 4000 irregulars, who organized as commando groups and 
became a part of the paramilitary organization.Among the 
urban masses only a small number actively participated, but 
in the barrios altos (slums) it is estimated that approximately
2-^Moreno, Sociological Aspects, p. 122.
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200,000, about 80 to 90 per cent, favored the constitutionalist 
ideals.
Valuable insight into the rebel psychology may be 
found in the research of Jose A. Moreno, a teacher and former 
theological student who had been doing field research for his 
doctoral program at Cornell University. Moreno was in the 
Dominican Republic in April 1965 when the violence erupted, 
and he experienced, first hand, the events of the uprising. 
Moreno changed the original subject of his dissertation and 
began studying the sociological aspects of the Revolution.
In describing his research, Moreno speaks of the methods he 
used in trying to obtain unbiased information:
For four months I lived with the rebels, sharing 
their feelings, anxieties, prejudices, fears and 
desires. I tried to put my mind into the minds of 
the rebels to grasp the ideological process that 
was taking place. I was aware that my work as a 
participant observer had linked me emotionally and 
ideologically to the rebel group. For this reason 
I decided through my interviews to build as broad 
a picture as possible, by meeting and ‘interviewing 
the leaders of both factions, civilians and military.
To check the accuracy I used not one, but several 
independent sources of information. I was placed 
in a position to check doubtful information and 
verify its accuracy.
Moreno drove back and forth through the city, and for 
the first two weeks of the war, he lived in the barrios altos 
(slums). He spent many hours interviewing top leaders, 
visiting residents in their barrios, and talking with the
o Ll
Moreno, Sociological Aspects, p. 122 
2$Ibid.. p. 12.
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commando boys in the parks or at their machine gun nests. 
Roughly speaking, he came in contact with thousands of people 
from all social classes, strata, groups, occupations, edu­
cational levels, and religious denominations. He attempted 
to discover specific traits which would differentiate the 
rebels from the loyalists. It is significant that in his 
findings, Moreno observed that two social characteristics were 
constantly present in the rebel group, but were rarely found 
among the loyalists: a certain ideological frame and a deep
feeling of alienation.
In defining the term "ideological frame," Moreno 
pointed out that generally "an ideological frame may be under­
stood . . .  to mean a set of ideas, values, and beliefs which 
define society in general, what goals it seeks and which means 
should be used in preference to others." To further clarify 
his meaning, Moreno indicated that these beliefs are closely 
related, but by no means identical to, official party doc­
trines. Ideological frame here refers to the non-cognitive, 
political, economic, and sociological concepts found in the 
"rhetoric of the masses."
To discover what motivated the masses to choose the 
side of the rebels, Moreno visited with them in their shacksf 
ate with them,and helped provide food and medical attention. 
All the while, he tried to discover why they favored the
^Moreno, Barrios, p. 86; p. 98*
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constitutionalists. In simple words, these people clearly 
told him that they supported the Revolution because "they 
had suffered too much under the Trujillo regime with its 
corrupt police and military" and because "the rich had always 
had too much while the poor had had too little." They indi­
cated that they thought that by ending the abuses of the past 
the Revolution could bring a change for the better. The 
people in the barrios also approved of the Revolution because 
it promised a return of Bosch to power. They indicated that 
they liked Bosch because he spoke their language and did not 
steal."27
To properly understand the attitude of the masses 
toward Bosch, it must be made clear that in the Dominican 
Republic, formal ideological conviction has a minor place in 
practical affairs. When groups and parties are mobilized for 
social action, the base for such action is likely to be 
formed around a strong personality. To gain wide support, a 
leader must address himself to the predominately illiterate 
sectors of the population and must appear as a man they can 
trust and one who will be able to further their interests. 
Although many Dominicans reiterated again and again that they 
were willing to fight for Bosch and the Constitution of 1963> 
very few of them knew what was written in either the Con­
stitution of 1962 or that of 1963. The masses knew nothing
27'Moreno, Barrios. p. 89.
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of formal pronouncements, and few, if any, could articulate 
the differences between the two documents. In fact, for 
the masses, such concepts as constitutionalism, freedom, and 
human rights did not mean anything. The masses never thought 
of themselves as fighting to restore a formal document or 
legal principles. Even most of the more educated leaders 
were not able to think in terms of intellectual!zed concepts 
or doctrines. In the minds of the masses, constitutionalism 
was merely a label for something which promised greater 
participation in government, a higher standard of living, and 
the hope of alleviating the deep feelings of powerlessness 
and frustration. Most Dominicans could only think of the 
Constitution in terms of fulfillment of simple human concerns 
at the level of everyday existence. For the masses, it was 
not democracy or freedom, but housing, jobs, and an education. 
Moreover, these promises could not seem real to them unless 
they were embodied in the person of a leader who could 
actually implement their goals. The only honest government 
the proletariate had ever known, and the only one which had 
promised them a future was that headed by Bosch. Therefore, 
the masses rallied to the support of Juan Bosch.
Moreno, in his talks and interviews with rebel 
leaders, as well as with the masses in their barrios, ob­
served that the men involved in the fighting often expressed 
feelings of helplessness and powerlessness. Bryant Wedge
16^
p o
in his surveys of Dominican youth noted similar findings.
More than anything else, the participants expressed frustra­
tion and fear that their personal goals would never be 
achieved. The rebels were especially disappointed because 
they believed that fair competition was not the regular 
channel for social mobility. Above all, many individuals 
felt that they were not a part of the political processes, 
and that they were powerless to change the institutions that 
tied them to the social system. Therefore, they believed that 
by ending the abuses of the past, the Revolution meant a change 
for the better. And most of them believed that the best way
to achieve that change was with Bosch and the Constitution of 
291963. It should be pointed out that in the case of the
youth, they supported the return of Bosch as a symbol of
legality, but Bosch personally was often the object of care-
80ful critical judgment.
It seems clear that among the urban masses, constitu­
tionalism played a significant role and directed many rebels 
toward forming some sort of ideological conviction, whether 
articulated or implied. Because they believed the return of 
the Constitution of 1963 and Bosch promised a better life,
2 ftSee supra note 1^ of this chapter.
29Moreno, Barrios. p. 126.
-^Wedge, "Student Political Violence," p. I87.
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the masses, either actively or passively, rallied behind the 
rebels.
Those who joined the rebel cause were a cross section 
of the nation: intellectuals, professionals, younger mili­
tary officers, young people of almost every class, the urban 
lower classes, and some of the rank and file of the Catholic 
clergy. Opposed to the rebels were the regular armed forces, 
the Church hierarchy, some elements of the middle class, and 
most of the nei* rich of the upper strata of the middle class. 
In general, the oligarchy did not mobilize itself for or
against the Revolution, but many of them helped others to
31prepare for it.
In the process of trying to determine what made 
participants fight, one discovers that certain themes recur.
It appears that some goals and beliefs were widely held on 
both sides. Most Dominicans agreed that there was a need for 
more widespread participation of all classes of the people in 
the life of the country. Most Dominicans also agreed that 
there was a need to remove the old Tru.lillista power structure 
from political and economic power. Almost everyone on both 
sides stressed the need to return to constitutionality, but 
did not agree on which constitution should prevail. Rebels 
and loyalists alike agreed that there should be a more just 
distribution of the economic and cultural wealth of the
31
J Moreno, Barrios, p. 126.
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nation but disagreed about priorities and methods for imple­
menting national goals.
Both factions agreed that freedom, work, health, and 
education were worthy long term goals, but each side differed 
in its ideas about the means of achieving those aims. As has 
been previously stated, not everyone joined the revolution 
to fight for constitutional issues. Nevertheless, for those 
who did, the real conflicts came over social justice and the 
role of the state in guaranteeing that justice. Moreover, 
these were the same conflicts that had provoked violent dis­
cord in 1963. Primarily, disputes centered around the 
concepts of "rights vs. privileges," "property rights vs. the 
social good," and "private vs. state economic development."
In addition, constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists 
disagreed on the causes of economic deprivation and the 
necessary means to eliminate it.
The loyalists seemed to place special emphasis on the 
assumption that if the individual is industrious and capable, 
he will get an education and work. The loyalists declared 
that "those who don't succeed fail because they are neither 
industrious nor able." The loyalists also believed that the 
state should be essentially passive, and that it should merely 
guarantee the freedom to work, to be educated, and to receive 
assistance when disabled. Any more positive steps would be 
an infringement on individual rights.
32
J Moreno, Barrios, p. 111.
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The rebels, on the other hand, believed that the 
function of the state is to guarantee a job, welfare, and 
education. Rebels believed that an individual cannot be free 
unless he has employment and a decent standard of living.
They believed that the only way to achieve these goals is 
through positive action by the state. As one of their 
leaders said, "Let us guarantee the deprived, uneducated 
masses not freedom to work and to educate themselves, but 
rather let us guarantee them work and education . . .  not 
bread and medicine but social security and health."^
Emotional oonflicts also raged over the questions of 
"private property vs. the social good," and "private vs. 
state development" of economic resources. Again and again, 
property owners reiterated that they did not oppose social 
justice, but that social justice must not eliminate property 
rights. Property owners believed that the Constitution of 
1963 deliberately ignored their vested interests. ^
Another source of conflict, the problem of private 
vs. state economic development was unique in the Dominican 
Republic. There was no need to nationalize any industries 
and utilities or expropriate foreign holdings since the state
-^See articles 1 through 35 through ^0 in the
Constitution of 1963. Also see La Nacion. May 8, May 11; 
also Bosch, Unfinished Experiment, p. 131.
J Moreno, Barrios, p. 11.
■^See debates in Chapter V of this work.
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already owned most of these resources. After the assassina­
tion of Trujillo, most of the best land, power plants, 
transportation, utilities, sugar mills, and some commercial 
enterprises reverted to the state. Nevertheless, cleavages 
arose over how to develop these resources in a way which 
would best serve the nation economically. The loyalists 
believed that only the private sector had the knowledge and 
expertise to do the job. The rebels were not concerned about 
who should develop the resources, but were concerned about 
who should share in the profits. Both sides attributed evil 
motives to the other's position.
It is evident that in regard to constitutional issues, 
attitudes on both sides had not changed since 19&3* Basically, 
the two consitutions embodied two different philosophies. To 
the constitutionalists, the 1963 Constitution represented 
social change in the form of greater participation of all 
classes of people in the cultural, economic, and political 
life of the country.
To the anti-constitutionalists, only the 1962 Con­
stitution symbolized peace and stability and protection of 
the rights of property. Loyalists saw the 1963 Constitution 
not only as lawless and godless, but also they viewed it as 
the instrument which would deprive them of their privileges 
and position. Above all, the loyalists saw the 1963 Consti­
tution and Bosch as a direct threat to their survival.
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On a simpler level, Dominicans viewed the two consti­
tutions in terms of human concerns. The masses were concerned 
with employment, education, housing, and a chance to enjoy 
the fruits of their society. The loyalists were concerned 
with power and position, but above all, they wanted to pre­
serve that which they had already attained.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
Most of the literature about the 1965 Revolution shows 
a strong preoccupation with the words constitutionalism and 
democracy* Yet, such writing fails to convey that it was 
human and not political concerns which were responsible for 
the ultimate breakdown in Dominican society.
In Hadley Cantril*s study, The Pattern of Human Con­
cerns . he asserts that the concerns of people are patterned 
according to the phases of development they are in, in other 
words, the stage of social and political organization of a 
nation.1
According to Cantril, there are several phases of 
development. In the first stage, which is the slumbering 
stage, people are still unaware of their problems or are too 
depressed to have many ambitions for themselves. In the 
second stage people awaken and become aware of new potentiali­
ties and acquire new purposes and aspirations. It is in this 
phase that people become psychologically mobilized and begin
-t
Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press^ 19&5)> P*
303. Cantril is a social psychologist at the Institute for 
International Social Research at Princeton, New Jersey. 
Cantril collaborated with Lloyd Free in studying aspirations 
of people in underdeveloped nations around the world.
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to learn what they want out of life. At the same time, it 
is during the second phase that people also begin to acquire 
new frustrations. Cantril says that his data has continuously 
shown that "frustration and worry are the other side of the 
coin of hope." As a backward people learns that new satis­
factions are available, they goad themselves to be rid of
2
their old constraints.
Cantril notes that there is likely to be an interim 
period of relative social chaos, irresponsibility and lack of 
discipline following the breakdown of established loyalties, 
institutions, and controls. Old group allegiances and the 
appearance of old symbols are weakened. There may be few if 
any roots in the past to which people can cling. Cantril 
observes that
When such psychological moorings and the ties 
that bind are temporarily lost, it may take con­
siderable time before any new and commonly shared 
significances can become articulated and accepted 
and organized into some institutional form. The 
transforraation of a people is not always easy.3
In phase three, the people become aware of the means 
to realize their goals and begin to perceive the possibility 
of achieving them. In this period the people must have faith 
that their visions will come true, or the vision of a bright 
future will give way to despair. This is the stage when the
o
Cantril, Human Concerns, p. 304.
3Ibid.
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political situation in a country is a precarious one, especial
ly "if a parliamentary government stemming from a politically
Ll
inexperienced people is trying to cope with the situation." 
Such was the stage in which the Dominicans found themselves 
just after the assassination of Trujillo and before the over­
throw of Bosch.
Frustration and discontent are bearable as long as 
faith is in some way confirmed. However, impatience is likely 
to be the greatest when the goal is "just around the comer." 
Cantril says that it is at this stage that the system will 
crack or fall.
The Dominican people were underdeveloped and inex­
perienced in political organization. Through the dramatic 
leadership of Juan Bosch, the great mass of the Dominican 
populace not only gained an awareness of their new potentiali­
ties, but also became engendered with the faith that their 
aspirations would be fulfilled.
To the average Dominican, constitutional government 
did not mean the promise of idealistic democracy, nor did the 
average person think of constitutional government in terms of 
social reform. Cantril1s studies revealed that people in the 
underdeveloped world today are rather unconcerned about 
political freedom. Instead they primarily concern themselves
L
Cantril, Human Concerns, p. 305* 
"’ibid., p. 306.
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with such things as a decent standard of living and the hopes
for a congenial family life in the foreseeable future.^
After the death of Trujillo, all Dominicans from the
wealthiest to those in the lowest-socio-economic brackets,
both urban and rural, were sensing new possibilities ahead.
All of their hopes and fears, regardless of economic status,
were found to revolve around the idea of well-being defined
in terms of a decent standard of living, jobs, education, and
7
opportunities for their children.'
Bosch was well aware of the high rate of expectations; 
indeed, he helped create the new awareness. Nevertheless, 
Bosch was not realistic in his assessment of the ability of 
underdeveloped Dominicans to cope with popular government.
Here was a people with no political experience suddenly 
awakened to the possibilities of a better life under the 
banner of democracy. The means for achieving these goals lay 
just ahead in the Constitution of 1963. Unfortunately, 
Dominicans, as well as North Americans who were aiding Domin­
icans, failed to understand that a political system of 
government such as democracy cannot be exported and super­
imposed on a politically underdeveloped nation. Bosch and his 
American advisors failed to comprehend the magnitude of the 
task they had assigned themselves. Failing to understand the
^Cantril, Human Concerns, p. 305*
7
Lloyd Free, Attitudes. Also see Chapter II, page
*4>7 of this work.
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realities of Dominican political life, the idealistic Bosch 
tried to bring democracy and govern under his new constitu­
tion. It was precisely at this point that Bosch met with 
strong opposition from those who had previously wielded social, 
political, and economic power. Perhaps, Bosch might have 
succeeded if there had been more time to educate the populace, 
or if he had proceeded more slowly in demanding revolutionary 
change. But Bosch relentlessly pressed for improvement and 
reform, and moved at a pace faster than those at the top of 
Dominican society were willing to accept.
Bosch’s strong welfare program antagonized those who 
might otherwise have supported some form of constitutional 
authority. Those who opposed Bosch used the Constitution of 
1963 as a rallying point around which to muster their forces. 
When those same forces overthrew Bosch, the reason given was 
his softness toward Communism. Those people truly feared 
Communism (whether or not the threat was real), and the 1963 
Constitution increased their fears. These groups did not 
necessarily oppose all government intervention, but they did 
reject the all-embracing social welfare program of the 1963 
Constitution. Bosch's opponents could only view his program 
as a threat to their H sacred rights.1 Thus, the more powerful 
sectors of society refused to yield to the new contenders for 
power. Given Bosch's program, and the long tradition of un­
stable constitutional practices, in September 1963 civilians 
joined the military in performing the action which had always
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been an integral part of Dominican Constitutional tradition: 
They reverted to the age-old Dominican habit of solving 
disagreements by revolution instead of through legal, respon­
sible means.
would have met little resistance, but by 1963 the Dominican 
Republic was no longer the same nation. After the death of 
Trujillo, for the first time, the people had been made to feel 
a part of the nation. Political participation had expanded 
dramatically. Political awareness had increased as well.
Added to this was the sudden rise in the level of expectations.
eluded that one of the most firmly established experimentally 
and clinically validated propositions in psychological study 
of behavior is its frustration-aggression hypothesis:
Experimental animals and men become angry when 
their goal seeking purposes are interfered with; 
aggressive behavior appears to be an innate re­
sponse to such frustration. Among men, common 
social purposes may be more or less widely shared 
in societies; interference with the realization of 
these purposes constitutes collective frustration 
and results in angry effects that are expressed 
in aggression toward the frustrating agent. . . .
When the frustrating agent is perceived as a 
political authority . . .  the outcome is a psycho­
logical predisposition toward political violence.^
In the months before the Revolution of April 1965 
Dominicans were disappointed in their hopes for their country
In the past such an unscheduled transfer of power
Bryant Wedge, in his survey of Dominican youth, con-
f,Case Study of Student Violence," pp. 187-
189.
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and themselves. As material and political conditions in the 
nation deteriorated, personal frustrations mounted. Domini­
cans were exceedingly pessimistic about their own positions 
and their hopes for the nation. In his study, Wedge suggests 
that anger is greatest when there are fewer non-violent means 
for satisfying valued goals: “The extreme case is when all
channels of response are blocked, when the frustrated and 
angry man's back is to the wall. The likelihood of violent
response is expected to rise when opportunities for value
o
fulfillment are narrowed."7
As studies by Cantril also reveal, when a populace 
is awakened and improvement and reforms are not sooner or 
later accommodated, impatience and frustration are likely to 
turn to violence.
In the spring of 1965 the Dominican Republic was a 
tinder box filled with a long record of chaos and instability, 
with a legacy of political and economic bankruptcy, with 
personal hopes clashing against fears. Rising expectations 
and human concerns lit the sparks. Frustration then ignited 
the flames which burst into the tragic Dominican conflagration.
^Wedge, “Case Study of Student Violence," pp. 19^-
195.
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APPENDIX 1
PARTICIPANTS IN THE DOMINICAN CRISIS
Aristy, Hector —  Former associate of Xmbert and Amiama Tio. 
Sided with the rebels at the outbreak of the revolt and 
soon became one of its most important leaders. Ap­
pointed by Caamano as minister of the presidency.
Highly influential. Later ambassador to UNESCO.
Baez Acosta, Jose —  Helped in the hospitals in the rebel 
zone during the revolution. Later mayor of Santo 
Domingo.
Balaguer, Joaquin —  Scholar and politician. Served as presi­
dent under Trujillo and the Council of State in 1962.
Ousted from the presidency. Lived in exile in New York.
His Reformista Party has large support in the country­
side. Some of his followers organized a coup against 
the Triumvirate. His party won the 1966 elections, and 
he became president.
Bennett, W. T. —  U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic 
since March 1964. Friend of Donald Reid. Absent from 
Santo Domingo when revolution broke out on April 24. 
Returned on April 27 and requested a U.S. landing on 
April 28.
Benoit, Pedro B. —  Air force colonel. Became head of the 
military junta created in San Isidro on April 28.
Requested the U.S. landing. On May 7, he became part 
of Imbert's Government of National Reconstruction.
Bonnelly, Rafael —  Right-wing politician. Minister of the 
interior under Trujillo. President of the Council of 
State in 1962. Supported the golpe against Bosch in 
1963c
Bosch, Juan. —  Mastermind of the revolution. Could not
return to Santo Domingo until the end of the revolution. 
Presidential candidate in the 1966 elections. Later ha was 
in self-imposed exile In Spain.
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Breisky, Arthur —  Second Secretary in the U.S. Embassy.
Took a very active role in the first days of the crisis.
Caamano Deno, Francisco —  Army colonel who became the leader 
of the rebel forces and was elected constitutional presi­
dent on May 3, 1965*
Campagna, Anibal -- Former UCN deputy. Sided with the rebels
to defend the return to a constitutional government. 
Appointed president of the Senate.
Casals, P. Manuel —  Young politician from Santiago. Parti­
cipated in the government of the Triumvirate, but later 
resigned. Sided with rebels and tried to stir the revolt 
in Santiago.
Cedeno Valdes, Arevalo -- UCN deputy who became independent 
after the overthrow of Bosch. Sided with rebels. Ap­
pointed president of the Congress. Died of a heart 
attack during the revolution.
Clarizio, Msgr. Emmanuele —  Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo. 
Managed to have rebels and loyalists sign the first 
cease-fire agreement. Became the target of the extreme 
right, whose members accused him of being a communist.
Connett, William —  Charge d'affaires taking the place of the 
U.S. ambassador during the first four days of the revolt. 
Sent the first reports of the revolution to Washington.
Cury, Jottin —  UCN deputy who proclaimed himself independent 
after the coup against Bosch. Sided with rebels. Ap­
pointed minister of foreign affairs in the rebel govern­
ment *
Del Rosario, Antonio —  President of the Social Christians.
Signed the Pacto de Rio Piedras with Bosch. Sided with 
rebels, whom he represented before the OAS.
De los Santos Cespedes, Juan —  Chief of the air force.
Ordered the strafing of the Presidential Palace on 
April 25 and following days.
Despradel Brache, Herman —  Chief of Police. Promised loyalty 
to Molina Urena, but later sided with loyalists.
Espaillat Nanita, Leopoldo —  Leader of group of intellectuals 
who protested against status quo on February 27, 19&5» 
Sided with rebels. Special adviser to Provisional 
President Molina Urena.
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Espinal, Manuel —  PRD member who organized revolt among
civilian groups. Now deputy to the Dominican Congress.
Fernandez Dominguez, Rafael —  Air force colonel who helped 
to restore the Council of State in power. Mastermind 
of the revolt from abroad. Returned to Santo Domingo 
during the revolt and died on May 19, 1965.
Fiallo, Viriato —  Right-wing politician. Head of UCN.
Presidential candidate against Bosch in 1962. Sup­
ported the golpe against Bosch in 1963.
Fishburn, Col. Thomas —  Air attache of the U.S. Embassy in 
Santo Domingo. Played an important role in the crisis, 
helping to establish loyalist stronghold in Santo Domingo.
Garcia-Godoy, Hector —  Foreign minister under Juan Bosch, 
and vice-president of Balaguer's Reformista Party.
Favorite candidate of the group of entrepreneurs from 
Santiago for provisional president. Became provisional 
president on September 3> 1965*
Gutierrez, Giovanni —  Army colonel who helped organize the 
revolt, but later went into asylum. Managed to join 
the rebels again at the end of the revolution.
Guzman, S. Antonio —  Rich landowner. Minister of agriculture 
in Bosch cabinet. Rebel candidate for provisional 
president.
Herrera, Rafael —  Editor of the independent newspaper El
Listin Diario. Refused to participate in Government of 
National Reconstruction.
Heywood, Col. Ralph —  Naval attache of the U.S. Embassy.
Played an important role in the Dominican crisis, 
helping to establish loyalist stronghold in Santo 
Domingo.
Imbert Barrera, Antonio —  Honorary general of the army for 
having participated in the killing of Trujillo. Power­
ful political figure. Chosen by J. B. Martin to head 
the Government of National Reconstruction. Resigned 
or August 30, 1965.
Jorge Blanco, Salvador —  Young intellectual and independent 
politician who sided with rebels. Attorney general for 
the rebel government.
189
Lora Fernandez, J. M. —  Army major. One of the original
organizers of the revolution. Chief of staff of rebel
forces. Killed after the revolution in the battle of 
the Matun Hotel in Santiago in December 1965*
Mainardi Reyna, Virgilio —  Former governor of Santiago.
Opponent of Bosch. Sided with rebels from the start of 
the revolution.
Mann, Thomas C. —  U.S. undersecretary of state. Went to
Santo Domingo with McGeorge Bundy to report to President
Johnson on the state of affairs in the Dominican Republic.
Martin, John Bartlow —  Former U.S. ambassador to the Dominican 
Republic. Went to Santo Domingo as special envoy of 
President Johnson. Formed the Government of National 
Reconstruction with Antonio Imbert as president.
Mayobre, J. A* —  Special UN representative sent by Secretary 
General U Thant to observe and report on the Dominican 
situation. Managed to have both factions agree to a 
second cease-fire.
Molina Urena, Rafael —  Former president of the House of 
Representatives under Bosch. Main organizer of the 
revolt. Became provisional president on April 25» but 
went into asylum on April 27. Later he went back to 
the rebel zone. Later Dominican ambassador to the UN.
Montes Arache, Manuel Ramon —  Navy colonel and former
director of the navy school of frogmen, the elite fighters 
of the Dominican armed forces. Played an important role 
as commander of the rebel forces. Appointed minister of 
defense in the rebel government.
Mora, Jose A. —  Secretary general of the OAS. Took an active 
role in the negotiations. Became the target of both 
factions, who accused him of being biased.
Nunez Nogueras, Manuel A. —  Leader of the group of officers
who joined the revolt after being discharged from service 
by the government. Helped organize the revolt and stayed 
with rebels until the end.
Pena Gomez, Francisco —  Radio speaker and youth organizer of 
the PRD. Remained with the rebels. Secretary general 
of the PRD in 1966.
Pena Taveras, Mario —  Army captain who organized the revolt 
among non-commissioned officers and the rank and file.
Was instrumental in rescuing the group of officers put 
in jail by the loyalist Chief of Staff General Cuesta.
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Pittaluga, S. Lovaton —  Foreign minister of the Provisional
Government of Molina Urena. Went into asylum on April 2? 
after several attempts to negotiate.
Ramirez, Hernando —  Army colonel who was the main military 
organizer of the revolution. Took asylum on April 27, 
1965, apparently for reasons of health. Later returned 
to the rebel zone, but had to leave a second time.
Reid Cabral, Donald —  President of the Triumvirate or
civilian junta set up by the military in 1963 after the 
coup against Bosch. Overthrown by the rebels on 
April 2^, 1965.
Rivera Gaminero, Francisco -- Commodore of the navy who finally 
sided with the loyalist troops. Secretary of defense 
in the Government of National Reconstruction and in the 
Provisional Government. Ordered to leave the country 
in 1966.
Rivera Cuesta, Marcos —  General of the army, Head of the
loyalist chiefs of staff. Put in jail by the rebels but 
later freed.
Seijas, Neit Nivar —  Colonel in the army with ties to the 
so-called San Cristobal Group. Follower of Balaguer.
Wessin y Wessin, Elias —  General of the army and commander 
of the loyalist stronghold at San Isidro. Became the 
center of resistance to the demands of the rebels to 
reinstate Bosch, whom he had ousted eighteen months 
earlier.
APPENDIX 2
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
June 14th Agrupaclon Politica 1^ de Junio, Political
Movement movement with strong nationalistic ideology,
(IJjj') organized as an underground movement against
Trujillo in 1959# Oriented toward Castro*s 
interpretation of Marxism.
MPD Movimiento Popular Dominicano (Popular Dominican
Movement). Marxist-Lenini st group founded in 
1956 with strong orientation toward Mao Tse- 
tung*s brand of communism.
PRD Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (Dominican
Revolutionary Party). Founded by Bosch and 
other Dominican exiles with broad Aprista orien­
tation of the Democratic Left. Won elections of 
1962 by a large popular majority.
PRSC Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano (Social
Christian Revolutionary Party)• Orientation of 
Christian Democracy like similar parties in 
Chile and Venezuela.
PR Partido Reformista (Reformist Party). Founded
by Joaquin Balaguer and quite popular among the 
peasants. Won the elections of 1966 against 
Bosch.
PSP Partido Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist
Party). Official Communist Party in the country. 
Founded during Trujillo*s regime. Orientation 
toward Moscow line of communism. Relatively small 
but well established in some intellectual and 
industrial sectors.
UCN Union Civica Nacional (National Civic Union).
Political group founded as a resistance movement 
against Trujillo. Became a political party in 
the 1962 campaign and appealed to upper and 
middle classes. Lost elections against Bosch. 
Instrumental in coup of 1963 against Bosch.
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